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Abstract
Formal methods have revolutionized software reliability and safety, and design patterns has revolutionized
software reusability and modularity. However, the preciseness required for formal methods and the flexibility
inherent in design patterns has rendered these two concepts somewhat disjoint and applied to different
application domains. Currently, new uses of software in medical device plug-and-play systems has pointed
to a need for creating systems that are both flexible and safe. In this dissertation, we describe significant
advancements towards the development of formal patterns to achieve greater assurance about medical device
safety. We consider three levels of safety and associated case studies in the medical device domain: device
interface safety, medical requirement safety, and network safety. For device interface safety we look at various
button-related faults and describe pattern solutions for addressing each fault. For medical requirement safety
we focus on a particular class of stress-relax safety and present the Command-Shaper pattern to address
this. Finally, in the network safety area we look at the particular case of message loss and describe an
active message repeater pattern. For each of these patterns: (i) we formally define them in the Maude
rewriting logic framework; (ii) we show their correctness by rigorously proving the required properties based
on their rewriting logic specification; and (iii) we also show practicality of each pattern with execution,
model checking, and emulation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In everyday life we naturally use patterns as a powerful form of abstraction that not only serves to concisely
represent large amounts of information around us, but also provides a reasoning mechanism to deal with a
wide range of examples that we have not yet encountered. In the same spirit, engineers have also realized
that, after successfully designing many systems, a common part of a design can be extracted as a pattern.
Future engineers can readily use these patterns as a starting point in design and benefit from the tried and
true experience from successful designs in the past. The usage of pattern designs originated in (building)
architectures [5] and was later introduced to software engineers in the famous gang of four book [21].
There is no dispute that patterns have been enormously useful in software engineering. However, current
design patterns are used mostly to ensure modularity, portability, scalability, and maintainability of code.
But in the present practice of patterns there is often no clear way to attach to patterns formal conditions for
their applicability and formal guarantees for their behavior when such conditions are met. For example, a
design pattern may be successful in many cases, but, if its applicability conditions are not precisely specified,
there may be pattern instances that fail in unexpected ways. Clearly, to harness the full power of patterns in
safely critical systems, patterns must become mathematically precise entities, which we call formal patterns.
A formal pattern must come with:
1. Formally specified preconditions on the environment and the system in order to have correct application
of the pattern.
2. Formal safety and correctness guarantees provided by the pattern, assuming that the pattern applica-
tion satisfies all the preconditions.
3. Furthermore, it is desirable to have formal definitions of the pattern that are as generic as possible
and have an executable semantics that can be easily translated into an implementation.
To define patterns with all these properties in mind in the context of medical devices (or just cyber physical
systems in general), we need a semantic framework that naturally supports modeling real-time concurrent
1
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systems and logical and actor reflection capabilities. For this, we use the Maude rewriting logic framework
[16] to formally specify, simulate, and analyze our patterns.
1.1 Formal Patterns for Medical Systems
The formal patterns we will consider in this dissertation are software patterns to improve the safety of
medical device operation. Safety in designs of medical devices and systems is an important issue that, when
left unaddressed or addressed only partially by testing an implementation (which of course should also be
done in any case), can cause severe and perhaps deadly accidents for patients. The Integrated Clinical
Environment (Figure 1.1) [23] shows all the components in a typical medical system: the patient, individual
devices, device supervisor(s), the network, the clinical database, and medical personnel.
Patterns for Safe Medical Device Interfaces: The first class of safety issues we consider is the
inputs to the system, interaction of medical personnel with these devices. This is where all the behavior
of the medical system is set and guided. If this interface is faulty, then the system may not faithfully
capture the intentions of medical personnel. We call patterns in this first class patterns for safe device
interfaces in Chapter 3. In particular, we look at various button related faults including button bounce,
stuck buttons, and phantom button presses. We address each of these problem with corresponding solution
patterns including formalizing button debouncing logic, button stuck detection, and button dephantomizers.
For each of these patterns we prove bisimulation results that these patterns do not change system behavior
under normal cercumstances. Furthermore, we show that under faulty conditions our patterns can provide
additional robustness either by fault masking or fault detection.
2
Patterns for Safe Medical Devices: The second class of safety issues we consider are the interactions
of individual devices with the patient. Over the years, medical functionalities for each device have been
nicely abstracted and decoupled into different classes: e.g. infusion pumps, cardiac pacemakers, medical
ventilators, etc. Each device responsibility gives a precise but limited control of the patient. The necessary
properties of the device are of course successfully and safely providing its dimension of control. We call
patterns in this second class patterns for safe device/patient interaction. Many times safety of an individual
device administering treatment involves rate and time constraints. We discuss a specific pattern for enforcing
these types of constraints in Chapter 4. In particular, we focus on a special class of safety properties called
stress-relax safety characterizing to when the medical devices put patients into stressful, potentially unsafe,
states. Furthermore, we discuss a command reshaper pattern that can modify potentially unsafe commands
before they are executed by a medical device. The pattern allows many modifiable parameters such as range
limitations, rate of change limitations, and also time limitations that pertain to stress-relax safety. We further
prove that our pattern will indeed satisfy all of these parameterized safety properties once instantiated. We
also apply our pattern to many different medical device models such as infusion pumps, pacemakers, and
ventilators.
Patterns for Safe Medical Device Networking: The third class of safety issues we consider are
more global: they have to do with safe device coordination. That is, some important safety properties are
interaction safety properties and must be satisfied by several devices simultaneously. For example in airway-
laser surgery, the flow of oxygen must be reduced before the laser can be allowed to be turned on. This
is a property that must always hold in order to prevent a fire. Furthermore, coordinated safety properties
can naturally conflict with local safety. For example, the oxygen cannot turn off for too long, while the
global safety property needs to be coordinated for the laser. Addressing these issues while considering the
possibility of network disconnects makes the problem even more difficult. We call patterns in this third class
patterns for safe networked device communication. We discuss some specific patterns for ensuring global
system safety under message loss in Chapter 5. In particular, we describe the heartbeat pattern, which
transforms a design that assumes a reliable network to operate in an unreliable network but still maintain
safety. We prove that our heartbeat pattern preserves all ideal behavior when no network faults occur. We
also prove that under failure conditions our heartbeat pattern can preserve the safety of a networked medical
system by ensuring that all devices fall to a safe independent mode of operation.
3
1.2 Practicality of Our Formal Patterns for Real-World Systems
In this work we demonstrate, through many examples, the technique of using formal patterns to provide
provably correct templates for software design and reuse in the realm of medical device safety. Indeed, all
patterns in this dissertation are described in the context of medical systems. For each of our patterns we
consider a few well understood and precisely defined faults, and discuss a provably safe software pattern
under this limited fault model. Of course, in real systems the set of faults and hazards is much larger, and
our patterns should not be used directly to handle specific faults unless all the other faults are shown to be
orthogonal. For example, for the button bounce fault, we can use a button debouncer (Section 3.3.3), but
this may now introduce new timing faults to the system due to the presence of additional software. Thus, in
general, we need to be careful about how patterns are applied and composed. While the guarantees provided
by a pattern are precisely defined and formally proven, any required behavior that is not guaranteed must
still be verified separately.
The fault model is continuously evolving as we understand more about a system through its deployment.
For example, the NTSB, which investigates accidents, constantly influences certification criteria for aircraft
development, and these certification criteria must be revised based on new incidents and use of new tech-
nology. Practical formal patterns need to also adapt and change with increased understanding of a system.
We need domain experts to identify faults as they are found, and more time needs to be spent formalizing
these faults, possibly extending existing software models. The formal patterns in this dissertation were
carefully abstracted to cover the concrete examples instances we have considered, and we acknowledge the
need to improve these existing pattern definitions as we learn of examples that fall outside of the current
abstractions.
Thus, we view this work as an important step among others towards feasible use of formal patterns for
safe medical system development. Some of the problems not addressed in this dissertation but important
for future work on feasible use of formal patterns include: how to identify when a pattern can be used in an
extended context of new faults; and how to compose multiple patterns that handle nonorthogonal faults.
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Chapter 2
Background on Rewriting Logic,
Maude, and Parameterized
Specifications
We use the Maude rewriting logic language and framework [16] in order to define formal specifications for
our software patterns for medical systems. We present some of the basic concepts behind rewriting logic, its
real-time extensions, and parametrization.
2.1 Membership Equational Logic
Membership equational logic (MEL) [34] describes the most general form of the equational components of a
Maude rewrite theory. These are called functional modules in Maude [16].
Formally, a MEL signature is a tuple (K,F, S) where S is a set of sorts (i.e. types), K is a set of
kinds (i.e. super types or error types for data), and F is a set of typed function symbols (and constants).
A MEL theory is a pair (Σ, E) where Σ is a MEL signature, and E a set of sentences (equations and
memberships) expressing (possibly conditional) membership or equality constraints. If an MEL theory is
convergent (satisfies properties of confluence, termination, and sort-decreasingness), Maude provides efficient
execution of its initial model semantics.
More practically, to illustrate the syntax of functional modules in Maude, we take a look at a commonly
used module TIME used throughout this dissertation to model time. We present a simplified version of the
module to just highlight the main points.
fmod TIME is
sort Time .
op zero : -> Time .
op _plus_ : Time Time -> Time [comm assoc] .
op _le_ : Time Time -> Bool .
op _lt_ : Time Time -> Bool .
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eq zero plus R:Time = R:Time .
eq R:Time le R’:Time = (R:Time lt R’:Time) or (R:Time == R’:Time) .
endfm
This module is used to define the theory of time. The first line of the module defines the sort Time, which
semantically will correspond to the set of terms that represent time. The next set of lines define operators:
a 0-ary operator (i.e. a constant) zero; a binary operator plus taking two arguments of sort Time and
returning a term of sort Time (it also has attributes indicating that it is a commutative and associative
operator); binary operators le (less than or equal to) and lt (less than) taking two arguments of sort Time
and returning a boolean term1. The next part contains equations which define semantics of the operators.
The first equation expresses the fact that zero is an identity element for the set of terms of sort Time under
the operator plus. The second equation shows that the less than, le, operator is essentially just syntactic
sugar as it can be defined as a disjunction of strict less than and equality.
Now, this defines a theory of time with addition and comparison, but what about the sematics? Maude
uses inital model semantics for functional modules, which is the unique model (up to isomorphism) that
has unique homomorphisms to all of models satisfying the theory. Intuitively, the inital model means the
”minimal” model that satisfies the theory (it introduces no additional constant terms or operators and does
not equate different terms unless they are forced equal by the equations). The particular inital model that
Maude uses is the canonical term algebra, which associates with each sort a set of constructor terms (terms
constructed from constants and operators that are irreducible by the equations) and associates with each
operator a function that constructs terms using that operator and reduces them by the equations to some
canonical form with only constructors.
Currently the initial model for our module TIME is quite uninteresting as it only has one constructor term
zero. In order to make our model of time more realistic, we need to extend it.
Time can have many different models including discrete and continuous ones. Discrete time is generally
modelled with natural numbers. We can extend our model of time by defining another functional module
NAT-TIME-DOMAIN.
fmod NAT-TIME-DOMAIN is
including TIME .
protecting NAT .
1All modules in Maude implicitly import the functional module BOOL which defines the sort Bool, constants true and false,
and the common boolean operators.
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subsort Nat < Time .
vars N N’ : Nat .
eq zero = 0 .
eq N plus N’ = N + N’ .
eq N lt N’ = N < N’ .
endfm
This new module specifies that it is including TIME, which means that it will use all the sorts, operators,
and equations from TIME but will add more constants and equations. It also specifies that it is protecting
NAT, which means that it will use the model of natural numbers (but will not modify the semantics of the
natural numbers in any way). The next line specifies that Nat is a subsort of TIME. This means that all terms
that were of sort Nat are now also of sort Time (this effectively extends the ground terms of sort Time with
all natural numbers). The next line defines some variables for the equations introduced later. The equations
identify zero with the natural number 0, and map the plus and lt operators to the corresponding operators
for natural numbers. With this new module the semantics of time now becomes an algebra with the set of
natural numbers along with addition and comparison operators. Natural number time is a very useful model
of time that we will often use later in order to do finite-state model checking of timed systems.
Note that having Nat be a subsort of Time creates a partially ordered set for sorts. The connected
components for sorts are called kinds. To have simple reasoning about sorts, Maude modules requires a
property called preregularity, where every term in a kind has a least sort. For example, the term 3 would be
of sort Nat and Time, but since Nat is subsumed by Time, Nat is the least sort. Maude’s type system in full
generality is membership equational logic, which subsumes order-sorted logic, but for practical purposes we
normally do not use the full power of membership equational logic in the models we define in this dissertation,
and we mostly restrict ourselves to order-sorted logic. Interested readers can consult [34] for an explanation
of membership equational logic.
The semantics of modules in Maude has algebraic semantics, and algebra is essentially a characterization
of structure. This structure could be as simple as the interactions natural numbers under addition, or as
complex as the structure an entire software system. Either way, the hierarchical sort system in Maude
together with its module structure allows us to build more complex structures on top of existing models.
For example, from our model of time, we can easily define a structure for clocks.
fmod CLOCK is
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protecting NAT-TIME-DOMAIN .
sort Clock .
op c : Time -> Clock .
op tick : Clock Time -> Clock .
op over? : Clock -> Bool .
vars T T’ : Time .
eq tick(c(T), T’) = c(T plus T’) .
ceq over?(c(T)) = true if 24 le T .
eq over?(c(T)) = false [owise] .
endfm
Here, we have just defined a new sort Clock that encapsulates Time with the c operator, and we define
an operator tick that will advance the time of the clock. In the equations defining the operator over?, we
have introduced a conditional equation to indicate that over? is true if the time in the clock exceeds 24.
The last equation has the attribute [owise] which means it is only applied when no other equations can be
applied.
2.2 Rewriting Logic and Kripke Structures
We just described functional modules in Maude. Functional modules define algebras which have a static
structure. However, structure is not enough to define most systems. We also need the dynamics or the
behavior of a system. In Maude, this is defined by a system module, whose semantics is expressed by the
the idea of rewriting logic.
Formally, rewriting logic [12] describes the most general form of modules defined in Maude. A rewrite
theory in Maude is defined in the form of a tuple: (Σ, E, φ,R), where (Σ, E) is an underlying MEL theory,
φ defines the frozen positions of operators (positions where no rewrites are allowed to occur below), and
R is a set of rewrite sentences (possibly conditional on equality and membership sentences). If a rewrite
theory satisfies the properties of coherence, and the underlying MEL theory of a rewrite theory is convergent,
then Maude provides efficient execution of the initial model semantics for the rewrite theory. This includes
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efficient execution for simulation, searching and LTL model checking.
To illustrate rewriting, we go back to our clock example. We define it’s behavior over time with a system
module.
mod CLOCK-EXEC is
inc CLOCK .
var C : Clock .
rl [advance-time] : C => tick(C,1) .
crl [reset] : C => c(0) if over?(C) .
endm
We imported all the sorts, operators, and equations defining clocks, but now we added two additional
rules. The first rule states that we can tick the clock by one time unit. The second rule states that if the
clock’s time has gone over, then we can reset it. Rules are taken nondeterministically, and thus, semantically,
our clock could tick to arbitrary time values before being reset.
For any sort, such as Clock, in our system module, we have the semantics of a transition system. A
transition system is a pair A = (A,→), where A is a set of states, and →⊆ A × A is a binary relation
for transitions. In our Clock sort, our set A will be all possible values of clocks {c(0), c(1), c(2), ...}. Note
that reducible terms, such as c(1 + 1), are represented by a canonical element, c(2). The transition relation
would then have a→ a′ iff the term a can be rewritten into a′ with one rewrite rule. Thus, in our example,
c(0)→ c(1), c(4)→ c(5), c(30)→ c(0), but c(6) 6→ c(8).
Furthermore, given that we have our transition system, it is natural, to label our states with atomic
propositions. For example, we have already defined the predicate over? on clocks, and we can thus label
all states in our transition system with o whenever the predicate over? holds for clocks. Thus, given some
set of atomic propositions, AP with o ∈ AP , we can define a labeling function L : A → P(AP ). In our
clock example, we would have o ∈ L(c(30)), o ∈ L(c(40)), but o 6∈ L(c(20)). A transition system with this
labelling function is called a Kripke structure.
2.3 Simulations and Stuttering Simulations
Given two transition systems (defined by Maude systems modules), it is natural to ask whether they have
similar behavior. This brings us to the notion of simulations.
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Definition. Given transition systems A = (A,→A) and B = (B,→B), a simulation from A to B is a relation
H ⊆ A×B such that if a→A a′ and aHb then there is b′ such that b→B b′ and a′Hb′.
If both H and H−1 are simulations, then we call H is a bisimulation.
A simulation from A to B means that B must exhibit all the transition behavior of A and possibly more.
Any transition A can take, B should be able to ”simulate.”
In addition to similar transition behavior given by H it is also desirable to have H preserve important
properties of states of A and B. Thus, we can furthermore relate the Kripke structures of the two systems
in order have simulation of transitions as well as a correspondence of labels on states.
Definition. Given Kripke structures A = (A,→A, LA) and B = (B,→B, LB), both over the same set AP of
atomic propositions, an AP -simulation from A to B is given by a simulation H from the transition systems
of A to B such that if aHb, then LB(b) ⊆ LA(a).
However, for the purposes of reasoning in our system modules, the notion of simulation is a bit too strict.
Mostly it requires lockstep transitions between two transition systems. Most of the time we can relax these
constraints of lock step behavior, since often we have intermediate transitions that don’t really affect the
important parts of the state of a system (or more precisely, the labelling of atomic propositions in a Kripke
structure of interest). It is useful to define a more loose notion of simulation.
Definition. Given transition systems A = (A,→A) and B = (B,→B) and a relation H ⊆ A × B. Given
a path pi in A and a path ρ in B, we say that ρ H-matches pi if there are strictly increasing functions
α, β : N→ N with α(0) = β(0) = 0 such that, for all i, j, k ∈ N, if α(i) ≤ j < α(i+1) and β(i) ≤ k < β(i+1),
it holds that pi(j)Hρ(k).
That is we divide pairs of paths in two transition systems into chunks, so that each chunk in one transition
system should match a chunk in the other transition system and in progressive order.
Definition. Given transition systems A = (A,→A) and B = (B,→B), a stuttering simulation from A to B
is a relation H ⊆ A×B such that if aHb, then for each path pi in A starting at a there is a path ρ starting
at b that H-matches pi.
If both H and H−1 are stuttering simulations, then we say that H is a stuttering bisimulation.
Intuitively, a stuttering simulation from A to B under the relation H says that for any path A can take,
B can also take a similar path. However, the paths only need to be loosely related by chuncks, and lock step
simulation is not required.
10
Of course, reasoning about all possible paths would be quite hard in practice, especially since rewrite
rules only represent each individual step. It would be convenient to have an equivalent notion of stuttering
simulation but based on each transition step instead of on infinite paths. This is conveniently provided by
the notion of a well-founded simulation.
Definition. Let A = (A,→A) and B = (B,→B) be transition systems. A relation H ⊆ A × B is a
well-founded simulation of transition systems from A to B if there exist functions µ : A × B → W and
µ′ : A×A×B → N, with (W,<) a well founded order, such that whenever aHb and a→ a′, either:
1. there is b′ such that b→B b′ and a′Hb′, or
2. a′Hb and µ(a′, b) < µ(a, b), or
3. there is b′ such that b→B b′, aH ′b′, and µ′(a, a′, b′) < µ′(a, a′, b).
For purposes in this dissertation, we use the set N for W and furthermore, we also use the functions
ν : B×A→W and ν′ : B×B×A→ N to show well founded simulation in the other direction from B to A.
The equivalence between well-founded simulations and stuttering simulations are stated in a Theorem in
[36].
Theorem 2.3.1. Let A = (A,→A, LA) and B = (B,→B, LB) be Kripke structures over AP , and H ⊆ A×B.
Then, H is a well-founded AP-simulation iff it is a stuttering AP-simulation.
It is worth noting that practically, we are interested in stuttering AP-bisimulations. However, it is unclear
which set AP of atomic propositions that we should be reasoning over. However for all relations H we define
in our stuttering bisimulation proofs, H will preserve: (1) all values of attributes in common objects, (2) the
model time. Thus in our bisimulation proofs, all atomic propositions based on object attributes and current
time are preserved by H, and this set of atomic propositiotns cover most properties of interest.
2.4 Full Maude and Real-Time Maude
We have covered the core of Maude with functional module and systems modules and given a brief overview of
their semantics. We have also shown how these semantics can be used to reason about simulations. However,
creating complex systems from just basic primitives may be difficult and hard to preserve modularity. We
now discuss some higher level Maude constructs and the tools that exist to model real-time object-oriented
actor systems.
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Full Maude [19] is a Maude interpreter written in Maude, which in addition to the Core Maude constructs
provides syntactic constructs such as object oriented modules. Object oriented modules implicitly add in
sorts Object and Msg. Furthermore, OO-modules add a sort called Configuration which consists of a
multiset of terms of sorts Object or Msg. Objects are represented as records:
< objectID : classID | AttributeName 1 : Value 1, ...
AttributeName n : Value n >
where objectID is the object’s name of class classID, and each attribute AttributeName j; has a corre-
sponding value Value j.
Rewriting logic rules are then used to describe state transitions of objects based on consumption of
messages. For example, the following rule expresses the fact that a pacemaker object consumes a message
to set the pacing period to T:
rl setPeriod(pm, T)
< pm : Pacing-Module | pacing-period : PERIOD >
=> < pm : Pacing-Module | pacing-period : T > .
Real-time Maude [43] is a real-time extension of Maude developed on top of Full Maude. It adds syntactic
constructs for defining timed modules. Timed modules automatically import the TIME module, which defines
the sort Time (which can be instantiated as discrete or continuous) along with various arithmetic and
comparison operations on Time. We have show a very small subset of this earlier as an illustration of
equational modules. Timed modules also provide a sort System, which encapsulates a Configuration and
implicitly associates with it a time stamp of sort Time. After defining a time-advancing strategy, Real-time
Maude provides timed execution (trew), timed search (tsearch), which performs search on a term of sort
System based on the time advancement strategy, and timed and untimed LTL model checking commands.
Real-time Maude provides useful constructs for defining real-time systems, including basic semantics of
time and time advancement. We use the model of linear time provided by Real-Time Maude. For time
advancement, we have used the conventional best practice where only one timed rewrite rule is used and is
fully determined by the operators tick and mte [43].
The tick operator advances time over a configuration by some duration of time. For example, with timer
(and time units being seconds): tick(timer(10 ), 3) = timer(7). That is, a timer with 10 sec remaining ticked
by 3 sec will become a timer with 7 sec remaining.
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The mte operator gives the maximum time that can elapse in a system before an interesting event occurs.
Interesting events include all state transitions in which messages are generated in a configuration. Again,
with the timer example, we assume that components only react when the timers expire, so the maximum
time elapsable for a timer would be the time it takes the timer to expire: mte(timer(10)) = 10.
Real-Time Maude also includes models of time that have infinity, INF, as a possible time value. Although,
INF will never be used to advance time in any system, it is useful to have INF to describe unbounded time.
For example, mte(stableSys) = INF.
2.5 Parameterized Modules
Modules in Maude have an initial model semantics. Maude also supports theories which have a loose
semantics (that is, not just the initial mode, but all the models of the theory are allowed). Normally, theories
are instantiated via views to other theories or to modules. In particular, a theory can be instantiated by a
view to any module whose initial model satisfies all equational, membership, and rewrite sentences of the
theory.
Parametrized modules [16] are modules which take theories as input parameters and define operations
(parametrically) in terms of the input theory. Parametrized modules are instantiated by providing views
(i.e. theory interpretations) to concrete modules for the corresponding input theories. Once instantiated,
the parametrized module is given the free extension semantics for the initial models of the targets of the
input views. Core Maude, Full Maude, and Real-Time Maude all support parameterized modules. For our
formal patterns, we will exploit in particular the Real-Time Maude parameterization mechanisms.
2.5.1 Actor Reflection in Rewriting Logic
The representation of objects in Maude allows for arbitrarily complex term types to be used as object at-
tributes, including other objects or even entire actor configurations. This allows for simple specifications
of meta-objects. Meta-objects are objects that encapsulate other objects and have the capability to con-
trol/mediate/adapt the behaviors of these encapsulated objects. Expressing patterns as meta-objects, this
allows us to separate concerns and easily compose a solution by nesting meta-objects inside each other. In
this dissertation, most of our patterns use onion-skin meta-objects (objects that wrap a single object) [3].
For example, a meta-object to filter out of range requests to an infusion pump can be specified with a rule:
crl setRate(pump, R)
< pump : RateFilter | inner: < pump : Pump | ... > >
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=> < pump : RateFilter | inner: < pump : Pump | ... > >
if R > max-rate .
Precise formal semantics have been defined for onion-skin meta-objects in rewriting logic [17], and also
for a more general notion of meta-objects that may contain entire configurations [37].
2.6 Socket Programming in Maude
Maude supports the Berkley sockets API for TCP communication. This is done by having a special gateway
object, denoted <>, to consume all the messages responsible for setting up sockets and communicating to
an external environment (e.g. createClientTcpSocket, send, receive). The gateway object will also
generate messages upon status updates from the socket (e.g. sent, received, closedSocket). Consuming
and generating messages from the gateway object is achieved by external rewrite rules which can be executed
using the erew command in Core Maude. An important thing worth pointing out about external rewrite
rules is that external rewrite rules are only applied when no internal rewrite rules can be applied. Also, using
external rewrite rules with Real-Time Maude specifications (built on top of Full Maude) requires reifying
the specification down to a Core Maude module before executing it.
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Chapter 3
Patterns for Fault-Tolerant Device
Interfaces
Fault tolerance has been a major area of study in embedded systems since their creation. General notions
of faults cover everything from anomalies of the environment to misbehavior of internal system components
due to insufficient measurements or degradation of hardware over time.
For our inital work in describing patterns for fault tolerant design, we exclusively focus on external faults
(e.g. input noise, interference, message loss, etc.). The reason for this is that external faults are much more
easy to model, since they can be seen as variations of the input. While internal system faults (e.g. bit flips,
memory corruption, computation error, etc.) are also interesting, they are much more difficult to handle
completely, and usually, we must settle for probabilistic guarantees or make probabilistic assumptions of
the fault model. We believe that at the current time, internal system faults are usually better addressed by
extensive testing and probabilistic analysis.
In terms of solving the problems of external faults. We take a 4 step approach to describing solution
patterns for fault-tolerance or sometimes even full fault masking.
1. As with any application of formal methods, the domain model that we are using must be extensively
studied through use cases and case studies and encoded in a model.
2. The domain model is separated into the external environment, E that the system receives input from
and outputs actuation to.
3. The fault model is described as a relation of ideal environmental inputs to potential faulty behaviors
of the environment. More precisely, a relation F ⊆ E × E s.t. if eFe′ then e′ is a possible faulty
environmental model of e.
4. The desired behavior of a system can be described as an ideal design s s.t. the execution of the
environment-system pair (e, s) generates ideal behavior.
5. A fault tolerance technique is then a transformation T : Sys→ Sys s.t. the following property holds.
Given a fault-tolerance characterization H. For all possible models of e, for all e′ s.t eFe′, and for all
system designs s, then the execution of the system (e′, T (s)) H-corresponds to (e, s).
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In this section, we use this idea to describe 3 different fault tolerant patterns for buttons. The external
environment in this case will be the buttons and their associated behavior. The fault relations will be
various common button related faults such as button bounce, button stuck, or accidental presses. The fault
tolerance techniques will then be common design practices for handling button related faults such as button
debouncing.
3.1 Modeling Buttons
We first describe the model of the environment in detail. That is the formal model of a button. Our goal
in modeling a system is to have some reasonable abstraction of the real world. For many device interfaces,
buttons are used to communicate useful and important information to a system. Thus, it makes sense to
look at how a button works in an abstract but general sense. Furthermore, we will also be able to use this
abstraction to model faulty button behavior.
We model a button as something that can be in one of two states, either pressed or not pressed, at any
instant in time. Thus, we can model the behavior of a button as a function buttonstate : Time → {0, 1},
where b(t) = 0 means the button is not pressed, and b(t) = 1 means the button is pressed. Time is a
totally ordered set. Time can represent some ideal continuous physical time, which can be represented by
the positive real numbers R≥0. Time can also be reasoned about from the perspective of a system clock that
ticks (advances time) in discrete intervals, in which case we can model it using the natural numbers N. In
later definitions and theorems, we let Time = R≥0 whenever possible, since this provides the most general
definitions and results.
Although this model captures everything we want about a button, we would like to have an equivalent
model that can be discretized. In order to do this, we need to make some assumptions. When a button is
held down, it is natural to talk about the time when it was initially pressed, and also the time when it was
released. Thus, we define init(b, t) = inf ({t′ ∈ Time|∀t′′ ∈ [t′, t], b(t′′) = b(t)}) and end(b, t) = sup({t′ ∈
Time|∀t′′ ∈ [t, t′], b(t′′) = b(t)}). We make the following assumptions:
1. Time starts from 0, init(b, t) is always defined, and b(init(b, t)) = b(t).
2. A button is always pressed or released for at least a minimal finite duration Tmin, i.e. for all t,
end(b, t)− init(b, t) ≥ Tmin.
Let Ivalid be the subset of button functions b ∈ [Time → {0, 1}] that satisfy these assumptions.
These assumptions allow us to model continuous button behavior as a discrete timed model, since in
each finite interval of time, given a buttion function, b, there is only a finite number of press and release
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events in b. For example, if the button behavior is b(t) = 1 for t ∈ [0, 1)∪ [2, 5) and b(t) = 0 otherwise. This
can be represented discretely without any loss of information as a list of pairs describing when a button
gets pressed and released, e.g., (press, 0).(release, 1).(press, 2).(release, 5). This model is captured in the
following Maude model:
(fmod PRESS-RELEASE is inc LTIME-INF .
The first structural property of a valid button model must have alternating press and release events. We
enforce this in button press models by using the powerful typing system provided by Sorts in Maude.
...
sorts Press Release .
sort PressReleaseList .
sorts MtList PressLastList ReleaseLastList .
subsort MtList < PressLastList ReleaseLastList .
subsorts PressLastList < PressReleaseList .
subsorts ReleaseLastList < PressReleaseList .
...
With the sorts defined, we can define the actual structure of what we want to model for a button.
Press and release events are all associated with a time stamp, and concatenating press and release events in
alternating order (enforced by the sorts) will generate valid button press models.
op press : Time -> Press .
op release : Time -> Release .
op nil : -> MtList .
op __ : PressLastList Release -> ReleaseLastList .
op __ : ReleaseLastList Press -> PressLastList .
...
Finally, even with sort constraints for button press models. We may want some further constraints on
button press models we consider as valid user input. For example, the assumption that button presses are
spaced far enough apart. However, we will not make these constraints part of the type of button press
models, as faults can easily create a button press model that is not a valid user input.
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op valid? : PressReleaseList -> Bool .
eq valid?(nil) = true .
eq valid?(L press(T)) = valid?(L) and (t-last(L) lt T) .
eq valid?(L release(T)) = valid?(L) and (T monus t-last(L)) geq T-min .
endfm)
To summarize, we have a list of press and release events over time. The press and release events must
alternate, and their time stamps must also be strictly increasing in order for it to be a valid model. The
constant Tmin spaces out the events to avoid Zeno-like behavior in valid non-faulty button press models.
3.2 Modeling the System
The formal model of our timed system can be found in Appendix A. The model starts by defining the
notion of time advancement (TICK-MTE-SEM), primitive real-time components (RT-COMP), and timed messages
(DELAY-MSG).
The behavior of a button we have defined before is a purely mathematical one by itself, it has no behavior
semantics. To capture the behavior of the list of button press events over time, we just simply convert the
list of press and release events over time into a set of delayed messages:
(tomod PRESS-RELEASE-MSGS is inc PRESS-RELEASE .
inc DELAY-MSG .
op to-msgs : PressReleaseList Oid -> Configuration .
msgs press release : Oid -> Msg .
...
The to-msgs operator homomorphically maps each element of the list to a message.
eq to-msgs(nil, O) = none .
eq to-msgs(L press(T), O) = to-msgs(L,O) delay(press(O), t(T)) .
eq to-msgs(L release(T), O) = to-msgs(L,O) delay(release(O), t(T)) .
endtom)
The object reacting to this button press event will then receive each button-related message at the
appropriate time according to the semantics of the delay operator.
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3.3 Pattern to Address Button Bounce Faults
With our current model of the environment (button presses as delayed messages), we are now ready to
discuss how to model faults. Faults essentially add additional behavior to the environment or system. In
general, we would like to capture a fault in full generality in order to check all cases, but we also need
to make enough assumptions to restrict in a realistic way the faulty behavior. Otherwise, it may become
impossible to correctly design a fault-tolerant system.
3.3.1 Button Bounce
When a button is pressed, the button may “bounce.” A button bounce is a mechanical phenomenon that
occurs due to oscillations when a button is pressed. The contact voltages of the button may oscillate between
high and low thresholds multiple times before stabilizing. This results in multiple errorneous button press
events of signals to be generated. Since oscillatory phenomena are usually dampened pretty quickly, there
is a short maximum time window, Tmaxbounce, within which a button may bounce after it is pressed.
We can formally define a bounce fault to be a binary relation Fbounce on our button input model, where,
intuitively, we use bf as the faulty button function, which may exhibit bouncing behavior, and b is as ideal
button function not subject to any faults.
A button bounce fault is a relation Fbounce ⊆ Ivalid × Ivalid (implicitly parameterized by a maximum
bounce time Tmaxbounce) where (b, bf ) ∈ Fbounce iff:
1. b(t) = 1 =⇒ bf (init(b, t)) = 1 (all initial button press events are preserved), and
2. if bf (t) = 1, then init(bf , t)− init(b, t) ≤ Tmaxbounce (all bouncing behavior occurs within Tmaxbounce time of
a button press).
3. if b(t) = 1 and t − init(b, t) ≥ Tmaxbounce then bf (t) = 1 (all bouncing behavior stabilizes after Tmaxbounce
time).
Of course, this is just defined based on the continuous model of time. However, since the definition is based
on the use of the init function, we can easily use Fbounce, represented as the binary predicate bounce-fault,
to define the same semantics for bounce faults in the list-like representation of button functions. Note that
the arguments of bounce-fault has the first argument as the faulty input and the second argument as the
non-faulty input (this reverses the arguments for the relation Fbounce but everything else about the relation
is the same).
op bounce-duration : -> Time .
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op space-duration : -> Time .
op bounce-fault : Input Input -> Bool .
eq bounce-fault(nil,nil) = true .
eq bounce-fault(I press(T), I’ press(T)) = bounce-fault(I,I’) .
ceq bounce-fault(I press(T), I’ press(T’)) = bounce-fault(I, I’ press(T’))
if T le (T’ plus bounce-duration) /\ T gt T’ .
eq bounce-fault(I release(T),I’) = bounce-fault(I,I’) .
eq bounce-fault(I, I’ release(T)) = bounce-fault(I,I’) .
eq bounce-fault(I,I’) = false [owise] .
The equations describe the Fbounce relation as the operator bounce-fault. Here, the first argument to
bounce-fault is a possible faulty button input model of the second argument (an ideal button input model).
This mostly amounts to checking that the faulty press messages are sufficiently close in time to nonfaulty
presses. Furthermore, we ignore the precise time for button releases. The important equations are those
that capture the requirements on the spacing between press events. Either they are the same press event,
or a press event is within Tmaxbounce of the nonfaulty one.
The current fault model is purely declarative. It is a binary relation that can be used to check whether
one button input is a faulty version of another. However, this gives no means for generating a faulty model
directly from a nonfaulty one. In order to have some degree of completeness in model checking analysis
later, we need to have a more executable fault model; one that specifies faults as transitions and not just by
a predicate.
3.3.2 Button Bounce Fault Generation
As mentioned above, our next step is to generate a set of faulty inputs for each set of nonfaulty inputs.
Of course, if we choose Time to be the real numbers, we have no hope of obtaining a set of possible faults
manageable for execution purposes as there are uncountably many. However, for most practical purposes,
we can obtain a fairly complete analysis just by using discrete natural number time, mostly because systems
operate based on discrete clocks anyway. Assuming a natural number model of time, a more executable fault
model can be defined.
The intuition is to create a sliding window for the faults. All input events after the window are assumed
to be finalized, and all inputs inside the window can still have faulty behavior. Each button press event in
the window can generate bounced button presses within the Tmaxbounce time intervals. Furthermore, the length
and spacing between bouncing presses can also vary and are captured by further rewrite rules. It can be
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shown that these rewrite rules will always terminate, since the time window decreases for each faulty button
press input generated, and, furthermore, each faulty button press can only decrease in duration for each
rewrite rule (and this must terminate for a natural number model of time).
The sliding window is captured by a 3 tuple: the input events before the sliding front and within the
window, the time of the sliding window front, the input event after the sliding window. Initially the window
covers all the events and is slowly shrunk. The equations capture when events are moved outside the window
because the sliding time has already moved beyond them. The multiple equations are mostly to distinguish
different events. The faulty and nonfaulty events need to be distinguished (e.g. pressf and releasef) as
to not generate more faults on top of faults.
(mod BOUNCE-FAULT is
inc BUTTON-FAULTS .
pr NAT-TIME-DOMAIN .
op bounce-fault : Input Nat Input ~> Input .
op pressf : Time -> Press .
op releasef : Time -> Release .
vars I I’ : Input .
vars T T’ T’’ : Time .
eq bounce-fault(nil, T, I) = I .
ceq bounce-fault(I press(T), T’, I’)
= bounce-fault(I, T’ monus 1, press(T) -> I’)
if T’ <= T .
ceq bounce-fault(I pressf(T), T’, I’)
= bounce-fault(I, T’ monus 1, press(T) -> I’)
if T’ < T .
eq bounce-fault(I release(T), T’, I’)
= bounce-fault(I, T monus 1, release(T) -> I’) .
eq bounce-fault(I releasef(T), T’, I’)
= bounce-fault(I, T monus 1, release(T) -> I’) .
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eq bounce-fault(nil, T’, I’) = I’ .
The actual sliding behavior of the window is defined by rules. These rules describe, respectively, how to
shift the window by one step, generate a faulty button press event with maximum duration, increase the
starting time of a bounced press, and decrease the ending time of a bounced press. All of these rules together
allow us to generate all possible bounced button press events at all times and of all durations.
rl bounce-fault(I, T, I’) => bounce-fault(I, T monus 1, I’) .
crl bounce-fault(I press(T), T’, I’)
=> bounce-fault(I press(T) releasef(T + 1) pressf(T’), T’, I’)
if T’ > T + 1 /\ T’ <= T + bounce-duration .
crl bounce-fault(I releasef(T) pressf(T’), T’’, I’)
=> bounce-fault(I releasef(T + 1) pressf(T’), T’’, I’)
if T’ > T + 1 .
crl bounce-fault(I releasef(T) pressf(T’), T’’, I’)
=> bounce-fault(I releasef(T) pressf(T’ monus 1), T’’, I’)
if T’ > T + 1 .
endm)
3.3.3 A Button Debouncer Pattern
Finally, we come to the most important part of all of our specification, namely, a pattern for correctly
handling faulty button bounce behavior. Figure 3.1 shows the intuitive structure of the button debouncer.
Essentially, all button inputs are filtered through a wrapper, and by properly timing button press events, we
can ignore exactly the faulty bounced button press events (assuming proper spacing between normal button
press events).
We first must describe the input theory that is required for a button debouncer. This includes the original
class that the button debouncer will modify, and also parameters of the system and of the fault in order to
adjust the pattern’s behavioral parameters accordingly.
(oth DEBOUNCED is
pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
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Figure 3.1: The Button Debouncer Pattern
class |Wrapped| .
op |dest| : Msg -> Oid .
op |t-bounce| : -> Time .
op |t-space| : -> Time .
eq |t-bounce| lt |t-space| = true .
msg |press| : Oid -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
eq mte(|press|(O)) = zero .
endoth)
The parameters of the theory DEBOUNCED can be intuitively thought as follows. The class Wrapped is
the class for the internal object that is wrapped by the button debouncer. An operator dest needs to be
provided in order to know whether a message should be forwarded outside of the wrapped configuration. The
constant t-bounce should be mapped to an appropriately measured constant Tmaxbounce. Furthermore, another
constant t-space is required to define the minimal time spacing between two intentional button presses. The
message press is of course the special button press message that we want to debounce. The last equation in
the theory DEBOUNCED says that time should not be allowed to advance when a press message has not yet
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been handled.
Now, the actual pattern itself is quite straight forward. The debouncer pattern is a wrapper around an
object that modifies its behavior by filtering messages. Besides the internal configuration, it also adds a
timer attribute, which is needed to filter the debouncing actions correctly. Note, we use parameter |O| as
an instance of the theory DEBOUNCED.
(tomod DEBOUNCER{|O| :: DEBOUNCED} is
pr RT-COMP .
pr DELAY-MSG .
class !Debouncer{|O|} |
inside : NEConfiguration,
timer : Timer .
The tick and mte equations are the intuitive ones, where we must tick the internal configuration according
to its defined semantics as well as the timer stored in the wrapper object.
eq tick(< O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C, timer : TM >, T)
= < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : tick(C, T), timer : tick(TM, T) > .
eq mte(< O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C, timer : TM >)
= minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
Finally, we have the behavioral rules for the object. For receiving messages, all messages that are not
a button press message are forwarded to the internal configuration. Also, all messages output from the
internal object are forwarded to the external wrapper:
crl [forward-in] : IM < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : IM C >
if |dest|(IM) == O /\ IM =/= |press|(O) .
crl [forward-out] : < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : OM C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C > OM
if |dest|(OM) =/= O .
When a button press message is received, the behavior will differ based on the timer. If the timer is not
set, then we have an initial button press event, which is immediately forwarded to the internal configuration.
Furthermore, the timer is set for the maximum bounce duration.
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rl [set-timer] : |press|(O) < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : no-timer, inside : C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : t(|t-space|), inside : |press|(O) C > .
If the timer is set, then the system is within a bounce duration, and the incoming button press event is
ignored.
crl [ignore-press] : |press|(O) < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : TM, inside : C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C >
if TM =/= timer0 /\ TM =/= no-timer .
Finally, when the timer expires, the timer is removed. This is a model-specific construct that allows the
time to advance.
crl [reset-timer] : < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : TM >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : no-timer >
if TM == timer0 .
endtom)
3.3.4 Proof of Correctness of the Debouncer Pattern
The button debouncer should essentially mitigate button bounce faults, but we must make precise this
notion and what it means. We essentially need to define a correspondence between ideal behavior and the
debounce pattern behavior under a faulty input. We must define the two transition systems of interest and
express their correspondence. First, we define appropriate projection operations. We need a message filter
and a wrapper remover. pinf only projects the nonfaulty messages. piw projects the object on the inside of
the wrapper. These two projection operators are defined in Maude as follows:
eq pi-nf(C) = pi-nonpress(C) pi-press(C, get-time(C)) .
eq pi-w(< I:Oid : PressDebouncer | inside : C >) = C .
eq pi-w(C C’) = pi-w(C) pi-w(C’) .
eq pi-w(C) = C [owise] .
Here all these operators are frozen. pi-nonpress projects all the components of the configuration that
are not press messages, and pi-press filters all press messages that are not faulty using the defined times
T-bounce and T-space, and also the timer set on the debounce wrapper to filter initial times.
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Definition. States of the transition system Sideal are system configurations with a single instance of a
wrapped object, and such that the input button press messages are spaced by at least the assumed minimal
time spacing.
States of the transition system Swrapped are system configurations with a single instance of a wrapped
object in a wrapper object, and such that input button press messages are related to an ideal button press
configuration by the button press fault Fbounce.
Define a relation H ⊆ Sideal×Swrapped such that siHsf iff pinf (piw((sf ))) = si and time(sf ) = time(si).
Definition. Consider a system with a wrapped object, which in the most general case is a system configu-
ration of the form
S = { C < O : Wrapper | inside : C ′ , timer : TM > } in time T .
We define the following functions:
• nmsgsto(S) is the number of messages in configuration C being sent to oid O.
• nmsgsfrom(S) is the number of messages in configuration C ′ which is being sent to an oid other than
O.
• χtimer is 1 when the timer TM is set, and 0 when TM is just no-timer.
Theorem 3.3.1. The relation H is a well-founded bisimulation, and thus H defines a stuttering bisimulation
between Sideal and Swrapped when considering natural number time.
Proof. By Theorem 2.3.1, we have that H is a well-founded bisimulation if we can find relations µ and µ′ in
both directions. Furthermore, since we are only considering natural number time, if mte > 0, then we tick
the system by 1 time unit as an atomic transition.
First, we show that a well-founded simulation from Sideal to Swrapped exists.
Define
µ(si, sf ) = 0 and
µ′(si, s′i, sf ) = 2(nmsgsto(sf ) + nmsgsfrom(sf )) + χtimer(sf ).
Suppose that siHsf . We consider possible cases for the transition si → s′i. For convenience, we denote
the object ID of the internal wrapped object to be Ow.
(1) mte(si) = 0 because a message M needs to be delivered in si, we consider the following cases:
(1.a) M is not a message to Ow, and M is in the external configuration of sf , then sf → s′f takes a
corresponding transition by using the same rule, and we have s′iHs
′
f .
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(1.b) M is a message to Ow, and M is in the internal wrapped configuration of sf , then, again, we can
just take a corresponding transition sf → s′f in the wrapped configuration using the same rule, and we have
s′iHs
′
f .
(1.c) M is a message to Ow, and M is in the external configuration of sf , and M is not a press message,
then the [forward-in] rule is used to transition sf → s′f , and we have siHs′f , and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf )
since nmsgsto decreases.
(1.d) M is a message not to Ow but in the internal configuration of sf . Then the [forward-out] rule is
used to transition sf → s′f , we have siHs′f and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf ) since nmsgsfrom decreases.
(1.e) M is a message to Ow in the external configuration of sf , and M is a press message. Since siHsf ,
this means that the timer is not set, and the rule [set-timer] is used to transition sf → s′f . We have
siHs
′
f , and µ(si, s
′
i, s
′
f ) < µ(si, s
′
i, sf ) since 2nmsgsto + χtimer decreases.
(2) if mte(si) > 0, then si → s′i is a tick rule advancing time by one time unit, and we have a few subcases
to consider for possible transitions sf → s′f
(2.a) mte(sf ) > 0, we have a corresponding tick rule sf → s′f by one time that preserves the relation H.
(2.b) mte(sf ) = 0 because the timer in the wrapper has expired. In this case, the only rule to take
is to stop the timer, so sf → s′f only changes the timer from t(0) to no-timer. We have siHs′f and
µ(si, s
′
i, s
′
f ) < µ(si, s
′
i, sf ), since the value of χtimer decreases and all other values stay the same.
(2.c) mte(sf ) = 0 because a message needs to be delivered in sf . Since siHsf , and mte(si) > 0, the
message in sf must have been a button press message, and the wrapper timer must be set to some positive
time. This means, that only the rule [ignore-press] can be used. Thus, in the transition sf → s′f , we still
have siHs
′
f , but µ(si, s
′
i, s
′
f ) < µ(si, s
′
i, sf ), since one message to Ow is removed and nmsgsto decreases.
Now, we show the other direction, namely, that a well-founded simulation exists from Sideal to Swrapped.
Define
ν(sf , si) = 2(nmsgsto(sf ) + nmsgsfrom(sf )) + χtimer(sf ) and
ν(sf , s
′
f , si) = 0.
Let H ′ = H−1, and suppose sfH ′si. We consider the following cases:
(1’) mte(sf ) > 0, and sf → s′f is a tick rule advancing time by one time unit. By the homomorphic
definition of mte, if sfH
′si, then mte(si) > 0, and a corresponding one time unit tick step can be taken
si → s′i with s′fH ′s′i.
(2’) sf → s′f uses the [forward-in] rule. In this case, s′fH ′si, and ν(sf , si) > ν(s′f , si), since nmsgsto
decreases.
(3’) sf → s′f uses the [forward-out] rule. Again, we have s′fH ′si, and ν decreases, since nmsgsfrom
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decreases.
(4’) sf → s′f uses the [ignore] rule. Since sfH ′si, we know that the button press message that was
ignored was not originally in si, and s
′
fH
′si, and ν decreases, since nmsgsto decreases.
(5’) sf → s′f uses the [set-timer] rule. Since sfH ′si, we know that the press message forwarded also
exists in si, and again, s
′
fH
′si, and ν decreases, since 2nmsgsto + χtimer decreases.
(6’) sf → s′f uses the [reset-timer] rule. This does not change anything with the projected configura-
tion, and s′fH
′si and ν decreases, since χtimer decreases.
(7’) sf → s′f has mte(sf ) = 0, and it transitions by a rule not in the debouncing pattern module. We
assume that all zero-time rules not in the debouncing module are about consuming messages by objects, and
additionally that the debouncer wrapper object does not appear on either side of these rules. Since sfH
′si,
we can take a corresponding transition si → s′i using the same rule with s′fH ′s′i.
This shows that H and H−1 are well-founded simulations, and therefore that we have a bisimulation
between the two systems, as desired.
Note that if we don’t have natural number time, then it is not guaranteed that we have a bisimulation.
A simple counter-example would be one where a button bounces an infinite number of times in a finite
time period. Of course, this is due to Zeno behavior. In order to remove Zeno behavior, we can make the
assumption that all events are spaced at least ∆t apart. This means that if we convert all times t into the
natural number dt/∆te, then the relation is still well founded, and the bisimulation result would still hold.
Notice that any atomic proposition AP defined on a state si can be lifted to a property of sf by labelling
sf according to pinf (piw((sf ))).
3.3.5 Model Checking Case Study for the Buttion Debouncer
We have proved that there is a bisimulation between an ideal system and our fault-tolerant system. We
would like to model check this property for a specific instantiation of the pattern and for a specific subset
of execution paths. The model contains the following parts:
• a simple button counter that counts the number of times the button is pressed,
• the debounced version of the button counter obtained by instantiating our debouncer pattern with the
simple button counter as the wrapped object,
• a system that has parallel execution over time of two different models,
• predicates to relate the simple button counter to the debounced button counter
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The model-checking should then check that, given equivalent initial states, the simple button counter
with no faults and the debounced button counter with bounce faults executed in parallel should satisfy the
same predicates over time. Here, the predicate that we are most interested in would be that the value of the
counter is the same for both systems.
For our case study, we use a simple counter that counts the number of times a button has been pressed.
To make the problem more interesting, we also count the number of times the button has been released.
(tomod DUAL-COUNTER is
...
class Counter | press-count : Nat, release-count : Nat .
var O : Oid .
var N : Nat .
var T : Time .
op dest : Msg -> Oid .
eq dest(press(O)) = O .
eq dest(release(O)) = O .
eq tick(< O : Counter | >, T)
= < O : Counter | > .
eq mte(< O : Counter | >)
= INF .
rl press(O) < O : Counter | press-count : N >
=> < O : Counter | press-count : s N > .
rl release(O) < O : Counter | release-count : N >
=> < O : Counter | release-count : s N > .
op counter : -> Oid .
op init-counter : -> Configuration .
eq init-counter = < counter : Counter | press-count : 0, release-count : 0 > .
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op get-press : Object ~> Nat .
eq get-press(< O : Counter | press-count : N >) = N .
endtom)
In order to apply the pattern to this problem, we must set the appropriate parameters. The view from
the theory of a wrapped object for debouncing and the dual counter example is as follows:
(view Counter from DEBOUNCED to DUAL-COUNTER is
class |Wrapped| to Counter .
op |dest| to dest .
op |t-bounce| to bounce-duration .
op |t-space| to space-duration .
msg |press| to press .
endv)
With this view, we can instatiate the pattern, and define an initial state:
(tomod PRESS-DEBOUNCER is
pr DEBOUNCER{Counter}*(class !Debouncer{Counter} to PressDebouncer) .
op init-press-debounce-counter : -> Configuration .
eq init-press-debounce-counter =
< counter : PressDebouncer | inside : init-counter, timer : init-timer > .
endtom)
3.3.6 Model Checking Constructs
We now must consider the question of what exactly is the safety property that we are trying to verify. In
this case, we want to show that the pattern provides an ideal abstraction of system execution while the
system is running. To this end, we are really verifying a correspondence between two systems. An ideal
system, and the nonideal system with our pattern applied. The easiest way to compare two system is of
course to execute them simultaneously and define an equivalence relation that should hold on the two states
as a safety invariant. We first must define what we mean by a simultaneous system, and also specify in
Real-Time Maude how to execute it.
(tomod MATCHING-EXEC is
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pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
sort ConfPair .
subsort ConfPair < Configuration .
op _;;;_ : Configuration Configuration -> ConfPair .
op tick : ConfPair Time -> ConfPair .
op mte : ConfPair -> Time .
vars C C’ : Configuration .
var T : Time .
eq tick(C ;;; C’, T) = tick(C, T) ;;; tick(C’, T) .
eq mte(C ;;; C’) = minimum(mte(C), mte(C’)) .
endtom)
Now, in order to verify by model-checking that, regardless of faults, we always have a correct correspon-
dence between the ideal system and the faulty one wrapped by the pattern, we put everything together, the
input model, the ideal press counter, the fault input model, and the debounce pattern:
(tomod MATCHING-EXEC-TEST is
inc MATCHING-EXEC .
inc DUAL-COUNTER-TEST .
inc BOUNCE-TEST .
endtom)
We then model check that the number of button presses captured by both the ideal system and the
pattern based system is the same:
(tsearch [1] in MATCHING-EXEC-TEST :
{ (to-msgs(test-input,counter) init-counter) ;;;
(to-msgs(bounce-fault(test-input,100,nil),counter) init-press-debounce-counter) }
=>*
{ (C:Configuration O:Object) ;;; (C’:Configuration O’:Object) }
such that
mte(C:Configuration) > 0 /\
mte(C’:Configuration) > 0 /\
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mte(get-inside(O’:Object)) > 0 /\
get-press(O:Object) =/= get-press(get-inside(O’:Object))
in time <= 100 .)
Timed search [1] in MATCHING-EXEC-TEST
{(to-msgs(test-input,counter)init-counter);;; to-msgs(bounce-fault(
test-input,100,nil),counter)init-press-debounce-counter} =>* {(
C:Configuration O:Object);;; C’:Configuration O’:Object}
in time <= 100 and with mode maximal time increase with default 1 :
No solution
We indeed see that no counterexamples were found, and that the two systems always have the same
projected state for every instant in time. Note that the condition of checking mte larger than zero is
necessary, since we only care about the states when they are stabilized, or just before time advances. We
don’t want counterexamples where intermediate values of zero-time rewrite rules cause because the two
states are transiently different.
3.4 Pattern to Address Phantom Faults
3.4.1 Phantom Faults
Slight disturbances in the environment (e.g. EMI, moving parts, etc.) leads to a button being unintentionally
pressed for a very short time.
The domain model is exactly the same as that for button bounce. We consider a button input that we
model as discrete messages, and an object that reacts to button inputs by consuming these messages.
A phantom button fault is a relation Fphantom ⊆ Ivalid × Ivalid (implicitly parameterized by a phantom
press duration Tphantom) where faulty button presses of very short durations may occur that is, more precisely,
(b, bf ) ∈ Fphantom iff
1. b(t) = 1 =⇒ bf (t) = 1 (an intentional button press is always registered)
2. if bf (t) = 1 and b(t) = 0, then t − init(bf , t) < Tphantom (the duration of all phantom presses are
bounded by Tphantom)
op phantom-thresh : -> Time .
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Figure 3.2: The Dephantomizer Pattern
op phantom-fault : Input Input -> Bool .
eq phantom-fault(nil, nil) = true .
eq phantom-fault(I press(T), I’ press(T))
= phantom-fault(I,I’) .
eq phantom-fault(I press(T) release(T’), I’ press(T) release(T’))
= phantom-fault(I,I’) .
ceq phantom-fault(I press(T) release(T’), I’ press(R) release(R’))
= phantom-fault(I,I’ press(R) release(R’))
if T gt R’ /\ T’ lt (T plus phantom-thresh) .
eq phantom-fault(I,I’) = false [owise] .
We have the constant phantom-thresh, which defines the minimal time that a button must be held down
in order to be considered a valid button press. It is assumed that intentional button presses will always last
longer than this duration. The rest of the equations match press and release events and ignore ones that
have too short duration (time spacing between them).
3.4.2 Dephantom Pattern
The pattern for handling phantom button events first requires describing the necessary parameters to fully
define its behavior in the parameter theory PHATOMABLE.
Like the button debouncer pattern, the dephantomizer pattern is parameterized, in this case by the
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PHANTOMABLE input theory that describes the nature of the phantom button press fault and the object which
will be wrapped by the pattern. This includes a class |Wrapped| which specifies which object is subject to
the phantom press fault. The |dest| operator which is again used to find which messages to forward to the
outside configuration. The |press| and |release| messages which describe the actual button press events
subject to phantom press faults.
(oth PHANTOMABLE is
pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
class |Wrapped| .
op |dest| : Msg -> Oid .
op |t-phantom| : -> Time .
msg |press| : Oid -> Msg .
msg |release| : Oid -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
eq mte(|press|(O)) = zero .
endoth)
The dephatomizer pattern takes a PHANTOMABLE theory as input and describes a wrapper pattern to
mitigate phantom button press faults. The wrapper structure is very similar to the button debouncer except
for the logic of handling button presses, which is of course necessary since the fault behavior is different for
the pattern.
(tomod DEPHANTOMIZER{|O| :: PHANTOMABLE} is
pr RT-COMP .
pr DELAY-MSG .
class !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : NEConfiguration,
timer : Timer .
op init-timer : -> Timer .
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eq init-timer = no-timer .
vars T : Time .
var O : Oid .
var TM : Timer .
var C : Configuration .
The equations below defines the wrapper class and the time advancement semantics. This is exactly
the same as the button debouncer case. However, here the timer is used slightly differently to eliminate a
different set of faults. The logic for the timer will be shown later.
eq tick(
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >,
T)
=
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : tick(C, T),
timer : tick(TM, T) > .
eq mte(
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >)
=
minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
The rule set-timer below sets the timer whenever a button press event is received. The timer is
then used to make sure that the button is pressed for sufficiently long before it is actually recognized as
an intentional button press event. The rule non-phantom-release decides the behavior when the system
receives a release after sufficient time has elapsed, and hence the timer is disabled to no-timer. The rule
phantom-release is applied when a release message is received before the timer expires. This means that
insufficient time has elapsed before a button is released and it is considered a phantom event. Thus, the
button press and the release events are hidden from the internal object. Furthermore, the timer is reset.
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The last rule reset-timer is specified when the timer expires. This means that the button press duration
has just passed the threshold to be registered as a valid press. The press event is forwarded to the internal
configuration.
rl [set-timer] : |press|(O) < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : no-timer >
=>
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : t(|t-phantom|)
> .
rl [non-phantom-release] : |release|(O) < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : no-timer, inside : C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : |release|(O) C > .
crl [phantom-release] : |release|(O) < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : TM >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | timer : no-timer >
if TM =/= timer0 /\ TM =/= no-timer .
crl [reset-timer] : < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | timer : TM, inside : C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | timer : no-timer, inside : |press|(O) C >
if TM == timer0 .
The last two rules for forwarding messages in and out from the internal configuration are similar to the
forwarding rules for the debouncer pattern. Indeed, any wrapper that selectively filters certain messages will
have forward rules of this form.
var IM OM : Msg .
crl [forward-in] : IM < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : IM C >
if |dest|(IM) == O /\ IM =/= |press|(O) /\ IM =/= |release|(O) .
crl [forward-out] : < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : OM C >
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=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : C > OM
if |dest|(OM) =/= O .
endtom)
3.4.3 Proof of Correctness of the Dephantomizer Pattern
As with the button debouncer, we would like to establish a correspondence between the execution of an ideal
system and that of a system with input faults but with the pattern applied. Again, the key is to define a
projection relation between the two systems. However, in this case, in addition to the projection operations,
we also need to define a time translation on button press messages to capture the delays of the pattern.
We first start by defining the delay operator.
(tomod DELAY-MSGS is
inc PHANTOM-COUNTER .
op delay-press : Configuration Time -> Configuration .
var CC CC’ : Configuration .
vars C C’ : NEConfiguration .
vars T T’ : Time .
eq delay-press(C C’, T) = delay-press(C, T) delay-press(C’, T) .
eq delay-press(delay(press(counter), t(T)), T’)
= delay(press(counter), t(T plus T’)) .
eq delay-press(press(counter), T’) = delay(press(counter), t(T’)) .
eq delay-press(CC, T) = CC [owise] .
The first transformation operation of interest is the delay-press, which delays all press messages by a
time duration T. This is useful as the dephantom pattern introduces delays in processing the press messages.
Because of this, a delay transformation is required to show an equivalent execution between an ideal system
and a delayed system.
op remove-small : Configuration -> Configuration .
ceq
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remove-small(
delay(press(counter), t(T)) delay(release(counter), t(T’))
CC)
= remove-small(CC)
if (T’ monus T) le phantom-thresh .
ceq
remove-small(CC
delay(release(counter), t(T))
< O : Dephantom |
inside : CC’,
timer : t(T’) >
)
= remove-small(CC
< O : Dephantom |
timer : no-timer >)
if T le T’ .
eq remove-small(CC) = CC [owise] .
The next projection operation is remove-small which removes all press and release events which are
shorter than the phantom threshold duration. Removing messages in the outer configuration is trivial
enough. The subtle part comes when a press has been consumed by the wrapper but the release is still
pending. In this case, we need to use the value of the timer in the dephantom wrapper to decide if the
message duration was too short.
op remove-wrapper : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq remove-wrapper(CC
< O : Dephantom |
inside : CC’,
timer : t(T) >
)
= CC CC’ delay(press(counter), t(T)) .
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eq remove-wrapper(CC
< O : Dephantom |
inside : CC’ >
)
= CC CC’ [owise] .
endtom)
Finally the last projection relation we need is the remove-wrapper operation. This removes the wrapper
by merging the external and internal configurations, and furthermore, uses the value of the timer to decide
if an additional press message needs to be generated in the projected configuration.
The projection piphantom from a phantom input system with a wrapper to an ideal input system with no
wrapper would be the composition remove-small ; remove-wrapper ; delay-press.
Again, we use the same definitions as with the button bounce case:
Definition. States of the transition system Sideal are system configurations with a single instance of a
wrapped (Dephantom) object, and such that the input button press messages are spaced by at least the
assumed minimal time spacing. States of the transition system Swrapped are system configurations with a
single instance of a wrapped object in a wrapper object, and such that input button press messages are
related to an ideal button press configuration by the button press fault Fphantom.
Define a relation H ⊆ Sideal × Swrapped such that siHsf iff piphantom(sf ) = si and time(sf ) = time(si).
Definition. Consider a system with a wrapped object, which in the most general case is a soup of the form
S = { C < O : Wrapper | inside : C ′ , timer : TM > } in time T .
We define the following functions:
• nmsgsto(S) computes the number of messages in configuration C being sent to oid O.
• nmsgsfrom(S) computes the number of messages in configuration C ′ which is being sent to an oid
other than O.
• χtimer is 1 when the timer TM is set, and 0 when TM is no-timer.
Theorem 3.4.1. The relation H is a well-founded bisimulation, and thus H defines a stuttering bisimulation
between Sideal and Swrapped when considering natural number time.
Proof. First, we show that a well-founded simulation from Sideal to Swrapped exists.
Define µ(si, sf ) = 0 and µ
′(si, s′i, sf ) = 2(nmsgsto(sf ) + nmsgsfrom(sf )) + χtimer(sf ).
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Suppose that siHsf . We consider possible cases for the transition si → s′i. For convenience, we denote
the object ID of the internal wrapped object to be Ow.
(1) mte(si) = 0 because a message M needs to be delivered in si, we consider the following cases:
(1.a) M is not a message to Ow, and M is in the external configuration of sf , then sf → s′f takes a
corresponding transition by using the same rule, and we have s′iHs
′
f .
(1.b) M is a message to Ow, and M is in the internal wrapped configuration of sf , then again we can
just take a corresponding transition sf → s′f in the wrapped configuration using the same rule, and we have
s′iHs
′
f .
(1.c) M is a message to Ow, and M is in the external configuration of sf , and M is not a press message,
then the [forward-in] rule is used to transition sf → s′f , and we have siHs′f , and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf )
since nmsgsto decreases.
(1.d) M is a message not to Ow but in the internal configuration of sf . The the [forward-out] rule is
used to transition sf → s′f , we have siHs′f and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf ) since nmsgsfrom decreases.
(1.e) M is a message to Ow in the external configuration of sf , and M is a press message. Since siHsf ,
this means that the timer is not set, and the rule [set-timer] is used to transition sf → s′f . We have
siHs
′
f , and µ(si, s
′
i, s
′
f ) < µ(si, s
′
i, sf ) since 2nmsgsto + χtimer decreases.
(1.f) In the case when M is a release message, since we already concluded that the timer is not set, then
the [non-phantom-release] rule is used, and it will be similar to the [forward-in] case.
(2) if mte(si) > 0, then si → s′i is a tick rule by one time unit, we have a few subcases to consider for
possible transitions sf → s′f
(2.a) mte(sf ) > 0, we have a corresponding tick rule sf → s′f by one time that preserves the relation H.
(2.b) mte(sf ) = 0 because the timer in the wrapper is expired, in this case, the only rule to take
is to stop the timer, so sf → s′f only changes the timer from t(0) to no-timer. We have siHs′f and
µ(si, s
′
i, s
′
f ) < µ(si, s
′
i, sf ) since the value of χtimer decreases and all other values stay the same.
(2.c) mte(sf ) = 0 because a message needs to be delivered in sf . Since siHsf , and mte(si) > 0, the
message in sf must have been a phantom press or release message. If we have a phantom press message,
then the [set-timer] rule is used and 2nmsgsto +χtimer decreases. If we have a phantom release message,
then the wrapper timer must be set to some positive time. This means that the rule [phantom-release]
can be used. Thus, in the transition sf → s′f , we still have siHs′f , but µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf ), since one
message to Ow is removed, and nmsgsto decreases.
Now, we show the other direction, i.e., that a well-founded simulation from Sideal to Swrapped exists.
Define ν(sf , si) = 2(nmsgsto(sf ) + nmsgsfrom(sf )) + χtimer(sf ) and ν(sf , s
′
f , si) = 0. Let H
′ = H−1,
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and suppose sfH
′si. We consider the following cases:
(1’) mte(sf ) > 0, and sf → s′f is a tick rule by 1 time unit. By the homomorphic definition of mte, if
sfH
′si, then mte(si) > 0, and a corresponding 1 time unit tick step can be taken si → s′i with s′fH ′s′i.
(2’) sf → s′f uses the [forward-in] rule. In this case, s′fH ′si, and ν(sf , si) > ν(s′f , si), since nmsgsto
decreases.
(3’) sf → s′f uses the [forward-out] rule. Again, we have s′fH ′si, and ν decreases, since nmsgsfrom
decreases.
(4’) sf → s′f uses the [set-timer] rule. Since sfH ′si, we know that the press message forwarded also
exists in si, and again, s
′
fH
′si, and ν decreases, since 2nmsgsto + χtimer decreases.
(5’) sf → s′f uses the [reset-timer] rule. This actually creates a new press message in the internal
configuration, but this is exactly the message that should have been delayed in the ideal configuration, and
s′fH
′si and ν decreases, since χtimer decreases (not adding a new message to the internal configuration with
destination being the internal wrapped object does not increase the value of nmsgsto or nmsgsfrom.
(6’) sf → s′f uses the [phantom-release] rule. Since sfH ′si, we know that the button press message
that was ignored was not originally in si, and s
′
fH
′si, and ν decreases, since nmsgsto decreases.
(7’) sf → s′f uses the [nonphantom-release] rule. Since sfH ′si, we know that this release is a valid
release message, and it is treated similar to the [forward-out] rule. We have s′fH
′si, and ν decreases, since
nmsgsto decreases.
(8’) sf → s′f has mte(sf ) = 0, and it transitions by a rule not in the pattern module. We assume that
all zero-time rules not in the pattern module are about consuming messages by objects, and additionally
the wrapper object is not on either side of these rules. Since sfH
′si, we can take a corresponding transition
si → s′i using the same rule with s′fH ′s′i.
This shows that H and H−1 are well-founded simulations and, therefore, we have a bisimulation between
the two systems as desired.
3.5 Pattern to Address Stuck Faults
3.5.1 Stuck Faults
When a button is pressed, it may become stuck. This may be caused by deterioration in the spring or sudden
increase in friction due to deformation or adhesives. This results in a persistent logical 1 signal, even though
the button was already released.
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We again have another device-button interaction, and the model is exactly the same as the button bounce
and phantom press cases.
A button stuck fault is a relation Fstuck ⊆ Ivalid× Ivalid such that a faulty button may be held down for
longer durations than intended, or more precisely, (b, bf ) ∈ Fstuck iff:
1. b(t) = 1 =⇒ bf (t) = 1 (a button appears pressed when it is physically pressed, regardless of being
stuck)
2. If bf (t) = 1 and b(t) = 0, then there is a t
′ < t s.t. b(t′) = 1 and bf (t′′) = 1 for all t′′ ∈ [t′, t] (a button
can only become stuck after it has been pressed, and stays stuck for a continuous time interval).
We can again describe this declaratively in Maude:
op stuck-duration : -> Time .
op stuck-fault : Input Input -> Bool .
eq stuck-fault(nil,nil) = true .
eq stuck-fault(I release(T), I’) = same-input(I release(T), I’) .
eq stuck-fault(I press(T), I’ release(T’)) = stuck-fault(I press(T), I’) .
ceq stuck-fault(I, I’) = same-input(I,I’) or stuck-fault(I,I’’)
if I’’ release(T) press(T’) := I’ .
eq stuck-fault(I, I’) = false [owise] .
To simplify things, this describes a model where buttons are permanently stuck if they become stuck.
This means that the equations just amounts to checking that the faulty input sequence is a prefix of the
normal input up to the stuck press event. The stuck-duration is a necessary constant to define the minimal
amount of time before a button is considered stuck. It is assumed that normal use of the button will not
have the button being held beyond stuck duration.
3.5.2 Stuck Detection Pattern
Like the button debouncer pattern, the stuck detector pattern takes an input theory that describes the
nature of the stuck button press fault. This includes a class Wrapped which specifies which object is subject
to the phantom press fault. The dest operator which is again used to find which messages to forward to
the outside configuration. The press and release messages which describe the actual button press events
subject to phantom press faults. Furthermore, we have t-stuck to describe the minimal time that the
button will remain stuck. The input theory for the stuck detector pattern is given as follows.
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Figure 3.3: The Stuck Detection Pattern
(oth STUCKABLE is
pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
class |Wrapped| .
op |dest| : Msg -> Oid .
op |t-stuck| : -> Time .
msg |press| : Oid -> Msg .
msg |release| : Oid -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
eq mte(|press|(O)) = zero .
endoth)
The stuck detector pattern is defined in the STUCK-DETECT module below. takes a STUCKABLE theory as
input and describes a wrapper pattern to detect stuck button press faults. The wrapper structure is again
very similar to the button debouncer wrapper.
(tomod STUCK-DETECT{|O| :: STUCKABLE} is
pr RT-COMP .
pr DELAY-MSG .
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class !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : NEConfiguration,
timer : Timer,
stuck-err : Bool .
op init-timer : -> Timer .
eq init-timer = no-timer .
op init-stuck-err : -> Bool .
eq init-stuck-err = false .
We first define the necessary attributes of the wrapper object. Besides the internal configuration, we have
a timer for keeping track of when the button has been pressed passed its stuck duration. The stuck-err
bit, which when set to true represents detection of the error. The other constants define initialization values
for each of the attributes.
The tick and mte rules are again similar to the other patterns by propagating the operations homomor-
phically to the internal configuration and timers. Their behavior on objects are defined by the equations
below.
eq tick(
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >,
T)
=
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : tick(C, T),
timer : tick(TM, T) > .
eq mte(
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >)
=
minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
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The rules for the behavior under button press events is just forwarding all button press and release
messages normally, but setting and resetting the timers appropriately. The last rule, stuck-event, is
applied whenever a button press event is not followed by a release within t-stuck time units. When this
happens, the stuck-err is set to true to indicate detection.
rl [set-timer] : |press|(O) < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
timer : no-timer,
inside : C >
=>
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
timer : t(|t-stuck|),
inside : |press|(O) C > .
rl [release-event] : |release|(O) < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : C >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : |release|(O) C,
timer : no-timer,
stuck-err : false > .
crl [stuck-event] : < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | timer : TM >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | timer : no-timer, stuck-err : true >
if TM == timer0 .
The forward in and out rules are again similar to the previous two patterns.
var IM OM : Msg .
crl [forward-in] : IM < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : C >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : IM C >
if |dest|(IM) == O /\ IM =/= |press|(O) /\ IM =/= |release|(O) .
crl [forward-out] : < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : OM C >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : C > OM
if |dest|(OM) =/= O .
endtom)
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3.5.3 Proof of Correctness of the Stuck Detection Pattern
The stuck fault is inherently lossy, so the correctness of the pattern is shown in two parts. First, if no stuck
faults occur then we show that the behavior with the pattern is a bisimulation. Second, if a stuck fault
occurs, we can no longer guarantee any correspondence in behavior to the ideal case, but we can guarantee
detection of the fault within a certain time.
For the case with absence of stuck faults, we again show correspondence with a projection relation from
a wrapper system:
op remove-wrapper : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq remove-wrapper(CC
< O : StuckDetector |
inside : CC’ >
)
= CC CC’ .
endtom)
The projection pistuck from a wrapped system for stuck detection to an ideal input system with no
wrapper is just simply the function remove-wrapper.
Again, we use the same definitions as with the button bounce case:
Definition. States of the transition system Sideal are system configurations with a single instance of a
wrapped (StuckDetector) object, and such that the input button press messages are spaced by at least
the assumed minimal time spacing, and the input button press durations (time between consecutive press
and release events) are always at most Tstuck time units apart. States of the transition system Swrapped are
system configurations with a single instance of a wrapped object in a wrapper object, and such that input
button press messages are related to an ideal button press configuration by the button press fault Fstuck.
Define a relation H ⊆ Sideal × Swrapped such that siHsf iff pistuck(sf ) = si and time(sf ) = time(si).
Definition. Consider a system with a wrapped object, which in the most general case is a soup of the form
S = { C < O : Wrapper | inside : C ′ > } in time T .
We define the following functions:
• nmsgsto(S) computes the number of messages in configuration C being sent to oid O.
• nmsgsfrom(S) computes the number of messages in configuration C ′ which is being sent to an oid
other than O.
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• χtimer is 1 when the timer TM is set, and 0 when TM is just no-timer.
Theorem 3.5.1. The relation H is a well-founded bisimulation, and thus H defines a stuttering bisimulation
between Sideal and Swrapped when considering natural number time.
Proof. First, we show that a well-founded simulation from Sideal to Swrapped exists.
Define µ(si, sf ) = 0 and µ
′(si, s′i, sf ) = 2(nmsgsto(sf ) + nmsgsfrom(sf )) + χtimer.
Suppose that siHsf . We consider possible cases for the transition si → s′i. For convenience, we denote
the object ID of the internal wrapped object to be Ow.
(1) mte(si) = 0 because a message M needs to be delivered in si, we consider the following cases:
(1.a) M is not a message to Ow, and M is in the external configuration of sf , then sf → s′f takes a
corresponding transition by using the same rule, and we have s′iHs
′
f .
(1.b) M is a message to Ow, and M is in the internal wrapped configuration of sf , then, again, we can
just take a corresponding transition sf → s′f in the wrapped configuration using the same rule, and we have
s′iHs
′
f .
(1.c) M is a message to Ow, and M is in the external configuration of sf , and M is not a press message,
then the [forward-in] rule is used to transition sf → s′f , and we have siHs′f , and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf )
since nmsgsto decreases.
(1.d) M is a message not to Ow but in the internal configuration of sf . Then the [forward-out] rule is
used to transition sf → s′f , we have siHs′f and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf ) since nmsgsfrom decreases.
(1.e) M is a message to Ow in the external configuration of sf , and M is a press. The rule [set-timer]
can be applied to transition sf → s′f . In this case, we have siHs′f , and µ(si, s′i, s′f ) < µ(si, s′i, sf ) since
2nmsgsto + χtimer decreases.
(1.f) In the case that M is a release message, then the [release-event] rule is used, and it will be
similar to the [forward-in] case with a possible added decrease in the value of χtimer.
(2) if mte(si) > 0, then si → s′i is a tick rule advancing time by one time unit, and we have a few subcases
to consider for possible transitions sf → s′f . Note that in this case, by the strict nature of the projection
relation, there cannot be any messages waiting to be delivered in sf .
(2.a) mte(sf ) > 0, we have a corresponding tick rule sf → s′f by one time that preserves the relation H.
(2.b) mte(sf ) = 0 because the timer in the wrapper is expired, in this case, the only rule to take is to
stop the timer, so sf → s′f changes the timer from t(0) to no-timer and changes the value of stuck-err.
We have siHs
′
f and µ(si, s
′
i, s
′
f ) < µ(si, s
′
i, sf ), since the value of χtimer decreases and all other values stay
the same.
Now, we show the other direction, namely, that a well-founded simulation from Sideal to Swrapped exists.
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Define ν(sf , si) = 2(nmsgsto(sf ) + nmsgsfrom(sf )) + χtimer(sf ) and ν(sf , s
′
f , si) = 0. Let H
′ = H−1,
and suppose sfH
′si. We consider the following cases:
(1’) mte(sf ) > 0, and sf → s′f is a tick rule by 1 time unit. By the homomorphic definition of mte, if
sfH
′si, then mte(si) > 0, and a corresponding 1 time unit tick step can be taken si → s′i with s′fH ′s′i.
(2’) sf → s′f uses the [forward-in] rule. In this case, s′fH ′si, and ν(sf , si) > ν(s′f , si), since nmsgsto
decreases.
(3’) sf → s′f uses the [forward-out] rule. Again, we have s′fH ′si, and ν decreases, since nmsgsfrom
decreases.
(4’) sf → s′f uses the [set-timer] rule. Since sfH ′si, we know that the press message forwarded also
exists in si, and again, s
′
fH
′si, and ν decreases, since 2nmsgsto + χtimer decreases.
(5’) sf → s′f uses the [release-event] rule. We have s′fH ′si and ν decreases, since 2nmsgsto + χtimer
decreases.
(6’) sf → s′f uses the [stuck-event] rule. We have s′fH ′si and ν decreases, since χtimer decreases.
(7’) sf → s′f has mte(sf ) = 0, and it transitions by a rule not in the pattern module. We assume that
all zero-time rules not in the pattern module are about consuming messages by objects, and additionally
the wrapper object is not on either side of these rules. Since sfH
′si, we can take a corresponding transition
si → s′i using the same rule with s′fH ′s′i.
This shows that H and H−1 are well-founded simulations, and therefore, we have a bisimulation between
the two systems as desired.
This shows that under a strict relation H that does not allow for differences in the faulty model (i.e. no
stuck faults occur), then the behavior is a bisimulation, and the added wrapper makes no changes to the
behavior of the system. However when a button does become stuck, we can no longer give any guarantees
about correct behavior, but we can still detect it.
Theorem 3.5.2. Consider a system in Swrapped. If we have a stuck fault such that there exist two consecutive
press and release events on the input delay(press, t) delay(release, t′) such that t′ − t > Tstuck then
the wrapper attribute stuck-err will be set after t+ Tstuck time units.
Proof. First, notice that by the characterization of inputs, the press and release events must alternate. Thus,
at t time units, we either have the first press event, in which case the timer is initalized to no-timer, or
we have the press event following a previous release event which must have been consumed by applying
the [release-event] rule, in which case the timer attribute is still set to no-timer. Thus upon receiving
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the press event at time t, the rule [set-timer] must be applied. This will set the timer value to be Tstuck
and at t + Tstuck time units, we still have received a release message since t
′ > t + Tstuck. Thus, the rule
[stuck-event] will be applied, and the stuck-err attribute is set to true at t+ Tstuck time units.
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Chapter 4
A Device Level Safety Pattern
4.1 Safety of Life-Critical Medical Devices
In this chapter we describe in detail a safety pattern called the Command-Shaper Pattern for Medical Devices
that we have found applicable to a range of medical devices. However, before we can talk about a generic
safety pattern, we must first discuss a generic notion of safety for a certain class of medical devices receiving
commands that may be unsafe in some circumstances.
When studying medical device operation, we have found a recurring pattern of command restrictions.
Consider the following three examples:
• Infusion pumps for pain medication are normally incorporated into Patient Controlled Analgesia (PCA)
systems, where the patient can demand additional bolus doses of drugs with the push of a button.
If the patient pushes the button too often, this will clearly lead to depression of the central nervous
system and even death. The PCA needs some safety mechanism to make sure that not too many bolus
doses are administered.
• Pacemakers normally need to adapt the heart rate to the amount of patient activity. However, pace-
maker activity sensors often pick up false positives during bumpy car rides or from noisy vacuum
cleaners. Pacing a heart at high rates for a prolonged period of time could lead to patient discomfort
or even cardiac arrest. Thus, pacemakers must have safety mechanisms to prevent them from pacing
too fast for too long.
• A ventilator machine may need to be turned off temporarily for another piece of equipment to work.
Sometimes medical personnel will forget to turn the ventilator machine back on, potentially causing
brain damage to the patient due to oxygen deprivation. The ventilator should have time triggers to
make sure that it does not turn off too often or for too long.
Intuitively these examples illustrate some common theme with medical devices: human bodies are nor-
mally self stabilizing, and our bodies can normally be placed under some stress temporarily, provided they
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are given sufficient time to recover.
Thus, for the medical device examples presented above, all of the device states can be partitioned into
two types: stressed states and relaxed states. Stressed states are states where the patient cannot stay for
too long (heart pacing too fast, holding breath for too long, etc.) because permanent physical harm may
result for the patient. Relaxed states are states that allow the patient to recover over time from a previous
period of stressed states.
Although the partitioning of device states into stressed and relaxed states is common to many devices, it
should be noted that not all devices can be placed into this category. For example, a glucose-insulin pump
does not have any static relaxed states. There always exist patient contexts where any potential device
state: infuse insulin, infuse glucose, or do nothing could be considered an unsafe action. These devices,
which depend on external context and sensor information for their safety, are not addressed by the safety
pattern that we present in this chapter.
4.2 A Wrapper Pattern for Safety Monitoring
4.2.1 Patterns as Parameterized Specifications
Parameterized modules are very powerful constructs, since a parameterized module really defines a wide
range of modules, one for each possible correct instantiation of its input theories. This means that any
stable theorems we prove about a parameterized module should hold no matter what instantiation of the
input theories are given. This has a nice correspondence with design patterns (design structures that can
be reused within different contexts). If a design pattern can be formalized as a parametrized module and
we prove a safety property for it, then whenever we apply the pattern to a system (assuming the context
satisfies all the preconditions specified by the input theories), we can be sure that the safety property holds
in the instantiated system also.
4.2.2 Overall Idea of the Command-Shaper Pattern
The key idea of the command-shaper pattern is that commands from external devices should only be taken
as suggestions. Figure 4.1 shows this pattern applied in the form of a wrapper around a pacing module in
a cardiac pacemaker. If a command is detected to be deviating or unsafe, the command-shaper can either
ignore the command, or more generally, modify the command into something more reasonable. To do this,
we must first come up with a general definition of which commands are safe, and also, of how to respond to
commands that are unsafe.
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Figure 4.1: Command-Shaper Wrapper Pattern for the Pacemaker
The relavant notion of safety is defined via stressed and relaxed states. Consider the heart rate at which
a pacemaker is pacing the heart. We assume that the doctors customized the pacemaker’s parameters to
adapt to the patient’s normal expected heart rythm. There is a base rate that is assumed to be a safe
minimal heart rate for an inactive patient. In this list of parameters there should also be a threshold heart
rate above which pacing is considered fast. Any heart rate above this threshold will be considered stressed.
Also, any heart rate below this threshold will be considered relaxed. Suppose the patient’s threshold heart
rate is 100 bpm. Every time the heart rate rises above 100 bpm a stress event is recorded in the model. Every
time the heart rate decreases below 100 bpm a relax event is recorded. Assuming all other bodily functions
are operating normally, a log of stress and relax events over time can determine whether the patient is safe
or not. That is, safety can be defined as a function of the stress and relax events recorded over time. For
example if too much time elapses after a stress event and before a relax event, then this is unsafe. This
means that the patient has been in a stressed state too long. Similarly, if very little time elapses after a
relax event followed by a stress event, then this is also unsafe. This is the same as the intuitive notion that
we have too little time to relax before becoming stressed again. Thus, any reasonable definition of safety
must satisfy these two properties.
One more point for safety is that, normally, for proper device operation continuous states should change
gradually in order for the patient to adapt to the effects. For example, in a pacemaker, if the pacing rate
of 100 bpm immediately drops to 60 bpm over 1 second, the patient may start to feel a bit light headed.
Patient safety in this case requires constraining how fast the pacing rate can change over time.
Now that the appropriate notion of safety has been analyzed, we can also describe how to detect whether
a command will be safe or not. Any command that takes the system into a relaxed state is by default safe,
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because the longer we stay in relaxed states the safer the operation. The only commands we need to worry
about are those that take us into stressed states. To detect whether these commands are safe or not, we
must consider whether complying with a command to enter a stressed state will still allow the system to
go back to a relaxed state in the short period of time that is considered safe. If the command violates this
condition, then the system should immediately start to bring the system back to a relaxed state if it was
not already in a relaxed state to begin with.
4.2.3 Formal Models of Event Streams
In any system, changes in untimed state are caused by significant events that occur in the system. Many times
it is useful to keep track of these significant events. These can either be used as auxiliary model elements
to define safety properties during model checking, or they can be part of the system implementation itself
(e.g. black-box recording). Events of interest differ based on where they are used. Therefore, an event
stream is parametrized by the set of events that the system handles. This can be captured by the following
parameterized module EVENT-LOG (note that the sort Mt-Log (empty log) is added to ensure that the empty
log nil will have a least sort when there are multiple distinct instances of EVENT-LOG):
(fmod EVENT-LOG{X :: TRIV} is pr RT-COMP .
sorts NoEventType{X} EventType{X} Event{X} .
sorts Mt-Log Stopped-Event-Log{X} Event-Log{X} .
subsorts X$Elt NoEventType{X} < EventType{X} .
subsort Mt-Log < Stopped-Event-Log{X} < Event-Log{X} < RT-Comp .
op none : -> NoEventType{X} [ctor] .
op E : X$Elt Clock -> Event{X} [ctor] .
op type : Event{X} -> X$Elt .
op elapsed : Event{X} -> Time .
op stop : Event{X} -> Event{X} .
op stopped? : Event{X} -> Bool .
op tick : Event{X} Time -> Event{X} .
op mte : Event{X} -> Time .
var EV : Event{X} . var ET : X$Elt .
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var C : Clock . var L L’ : Event-Log{X} .
var SL : Stopped-Event-Log{X} .
var T T’ : Time .
eq type(E(ET, C)) = ET .
eq elapsed(E(ET, C)) = value(C) .
eq stop(E(ET, C)) = E(ET, stop(C)) .
eq stopped?(E(ET, C)) = stopped?(C) .
eq tick(E(ET, C), T) = E(ET, tick(C, T)) .
eq mte(E(ET, C)) = mte(C) .
op nil : -> Mt-Log [ctor] .
op __ : Event{X} Stopped-Event-Log{X} -> Event-Log{X} [ctor] .
op stop : Mt-Log -> Mt-Log .
op stop : Event-Log{X} -> Stopped-Event-Log{X} .
op append : Mt-Log Mt-Log -> Mt-Log .
op append : Event-Log{X} Stopped-Event-Log{X} -> Event-Log{X} .
cmb EV SL : Stopped-Event-Log{X} if stopped?(EV) .
op log : Mt-Log NoEventType{X} -> Mt-Log .
op log : Event-Log{X} EventType{X} -> Event-Log{X} .
op tick : Mt-Log Time -> Mt-Log .
op tick : Event-Log{X} Time -> Event-Log{X} .
op mte : Event-Log{X} -> Time .
eq stop(nil) = nil .
eq stop(EV L) = stop(EV) stop(L) .
eq append(nil, L) = L .
eq append(EV L , L’) = EV append(L, L’) .
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Figure 4.2: Event Example
eq log(L, none) = L .
eq log(L, ET) = E(ET, clock0) stop(L) [owise] .
eq tick(nil, T) = nil .
--- only the latest event needs to be ticked
--- remaining event clocks are stopped
eq tick(EV L, T) = tick(EV, T) L .
eq mte(nil) = INF .
eq mte(EV L) = mte(EV) .
endfm)
To understand event logs it is helpful to provide an example of how one such log is represented. Figure
4.2 shows a stream of events (with event names A!, B!, C!, D!) and the time durations between them. Also,
there is a reference point to the current time the system is at. To represent this set of events, we first need
to instantiate the set of event names with an appropriate module and view:
(fmod ABCD-EVENT is
sort EventName .
ops A! B! C! D! : -> EventName .
endfm)
(view ABCD-Event from TRIV to ABCD-EVENT is
sort Elt to EventName .
endv)
(fmod ABCD-EVENT-LOG is
pr EVENT-LOG{ABCD-Event} .
55
pr POSRAT-TIME-DOMAIN-WITH-INF .
op events : -> Event-Log{ABCD-Event} .
eq events =
E(D!, c(4, run)) E(C!, c(6, stop)) E(B!, c(4, stop))
E(A!, c(5, stop)) nil .
endfm)
The constant events corresponds exactly to the graphical representation of the events in Figure 4.2.
Furthermore, ticking events increases the time elapsed for the latest event:
reduce in ABCD-EVENT-LOG :
tick(events,10)
result Event-Log{ABCD-Event} :
E(D!,c(14,run))E(C!,c(6,stop))E(B!,c(4,stop))E(A!,c(5,stop))nil
Finally, adding an event to the log locks (stops all the clocks for) the time elapsed of all previous events
and starts a clock for the newest event:
reduce in ABCD-EVENT-LOG :
log(tick(events,10),A!)
result Event-Log{ABCD-Event} :
E(A!,c(0,run))E(D!,c(14,stop))E(C!,c(6,stop))E(B!,c(4,stop))E(A!,c(5,
stop))nil
We would also like to highlight a particularly important type of event log for the medical device wrapper,
namely, the stress-relax log. An example of a stress-relax log is shown in Figure 4.3. Given a critical threshold
for a value that changes over time, a !stress event is recorded whenever the value crosses above the threshold,
and a !relax event is recorded whenever the value crosses below the threshold. Also, we assume that the
system starts at a value below the threshold. Notice that a stress-relax log imposes additional structure on
top of event logs:
1. The first event logged must be a !stress event
2. Events must alternate between !stress and !relax events over time
These constraints, and the notion of a stress-relax log, are both captured by the following parameterized
instantiation (plus additional constraints) on event logs:
56
Figure 4.3: Stress Relax Event Log
(fmod STRESS-RELAX-EVENT is
sort SREvent .
ops !stress !relax : -> SREvent [ctor] .
endfm)
(view SREvent from TRIV to STRESS-RELAX-EVENT is
sort Elt to SREvent .
endv)
(fmod STRESS-RELAX-LOG is
inc EVENT-LOG{SREvent} .
sorts Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log Stress-Relax-Log .
subsorts Mt-Log
< Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
< Stopped-Event-Log{SREvent} .
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subsorts Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
< Stress-Relax-Log < Event-Log{SREvent} .
op tick : Stress-Relax-Log Time -> Stress-Relax-Log .
var C C’ : Clock .
var SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
cmb E(!stress, C) nil : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
if stopped?(C) .
cmb E(!stress, C) E(!relax, C’) SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
if E(!relax, C’) SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
/\ stopped?(C) .
cmb E(!relax, C) E(!stress, C’) SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
if E(!stress, C’) SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log
/\ stopped?(C) .
mb E(!stress, C) nil : Stress-Relax-Log .
cmb E(!stress, C) E(!relax, C’) SL : Stress-Relax-Log
if E(!relax, C’) SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log .
cmb E(!relax, C) E(!stress, C’) SL : Stress-Relax-Log
if E(!stress, C’) SL : Stopped-Stress-Relax-Log .
endfm)
4.2.4 Abstract Safety Definition
It would be absurd to define a safety pattern without first defining what it means to be safe. Furthermore,
it would be desirable to develop a generic form of safety for the class of devices receiving potentially unsafe
commands that we are considering so that, once instantiated, it can be used as an input to derive a concrete
design. This derivation of a design from safety definitions is exactly what is captured in the notion of a
formal safety pattern. This subsection describes the generic theory of safety for the class of medical devices
described in Section 4.1.
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Devices and their states are modeled as objects. For a device that has statically enforceable safety,
we characterize states by a totally ordered set of values with an upper and lower bound, vmax and vmin,
respectively. Intuitively, the order compares the relative safety of two states, with smaller values being safer
than larger values. Any state outside the upper and lower bound is assumed to be invalid. From now on, we
assume that only valid device states are set. Furthermore, there is a critical value vcrit such that any valid
value v, is considered relaxed when v ≤ vcrit, and is considered stressed when v > vcrit.
As a brief example, a pacing module with the state being the pacing rate may have vmin = 60bpm,
vmax = 120bpm, and vcrit = 90bpm. Thus, a rate of 40bpm or 200bpm is invalid, a rate of 70bpm is relaxed,
and a rate of 100bpm is stressed.
Furthermore, we want to have a generic way of characterizing the safe amount of time that devices can re-
main in relaxed and stressed states. This is captured by a predicate safe? defined on the Stress-Relax-Log
of the system state. Implicitly, it is assumed that a !stress event is recorded when the device state rises
above vcrit, and a !relax event is recorded when the state falls to or below vcrit. The safe? predicate is left
generic, so that arbitrarily complex conditions on time bounds can be defined on stress and relax intervals
because the Stress-Relax-Log maintains all the history. However safe? should satisfy some monotonicity
assumptions based on our knowledge of the domain. Some of these assumptions include that staying in a
stress situation for a longer amount of time cannot make a device safe when it was unsafe before. Also,
staying in a relax situation for a longer amount of time should keep the device safe if it was safe before.
The detailed requirements for state safety are captured in the following theory SAFE-STATE, whose axioms
are discussed subsequently.
(fth SAFE-STATE is
inc TOTAL-ORDER * (
sort Elt to Val,
op _<=_ to _<=risk_
) .
pr STRESS-RELAX-LOG .
ops min-val max-val crit-val safe-val : -> Val .
eq min-val <=risk safe-val = true .
eq safe-val <=risk crit-val = true .
eq crit-val <=risk max-val = true .
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op period : -> Time . --- period of wrapper dispatch
op delta : Val Val -> Val .
op tdelta-min : Val Val -> TimeInf .
...
op safe? : Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
op norm : Stress-Relax-Log -> Stress-Relax-Log .
...
endfth)
The SAFE-STATE theory defines an operator <=risk, which we shall write as ≤risk, where A ≤risk B
means that A is safer or less risky than B. Furthermore, in terms of risk, there are four key constants
vmin ≤risk vsafe ≤risk vcrit ≤risk vmax as described before. The relations between these values are described
by the following equations:
eq min-val <=risk safe-val = true .
eq safe-val <=risk crit-val = true .
eq crit-val <=risk max-val = true .
Real-time systems normally require a period of operation. Here, period, conventionally denoted T , is
assumed to have sort Time and defines a constant period of execution. For two values V, V ′, the operator
delta(V, V ′), which we will write as ∆(V, V ′), defines the value maximally changed from V towards the
direction of V ′ in one period. The tdelta-min(V, V ′), which we write as t∆min(V, V ′), defines the minimum
amount of time it will take to change from V to V ′. Because values are assumed to be modified only during
dispatch, which occurs once every period, it follows that t∆min must be a multiple of the period. The
functions ∆(V, V ′) and t∆min(V, V ′) are related by the following equations:
var V V’ V’’ : Val .
eq [no-delta] : delta(V, V) = V .
ceq [delta-bound] :
((V <=risk V’’) and (V’’ <=risk V’)) or
((V’ <=risk V’’) and (V’’ <=risk V)) = true
if delta(V, V’) = V’’ .
ceq [delta-mono] : delta(V, V’) <=risk delta(V, V’’) = true if V’ <=risk V’’ .
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ceq [delta-max] : delta(V,V’) = delta(V,V’’) = true
if delta(V,V’) =/= V’ /\ V’ <=risk V’’ .
eq [no-tdelta] : tdelta-min(V, V) = zero .
ceq [ind-tdelta] : tdelta-min(V, V’) = tdelta-min(delta(V,V’), V’) plus period
if V =/= V’ .
ceq [tdelta-mono] : tdelta-min(V’, V) le tdelta-min(V’’, V) = true
if V <=risk V’ /\ V’ <=risk V’’ .
The first few equations state that ∆ must change V towards V ′ without going over. That is, if V ≤risk V ′,
then V ≤risk ∆(V, V ′) ≤risk V ′′. If V ′ ≤risk V , then V ′ ≤risk ∆(V, V ′) ≤risk V . Also, we have a delta-max
constraint, which essentially states that if a value is changing to become a safe value, it should change at a
maximal rate, unless the target value can be reached in one step.
The next set of equations describe how t∆min relates to ∆. Essentially, to change from V to V
′, the time
t∆min(V, V
′) is inductively characterized (equation ind-tdel) by the number periods required for to reach
V ′ using ∆. The final tdel-mono constraint makes sure that the minimum time taken to reach a safer value
cannot be larger than closer values.
It is important to note that if repeated applications of ∆ from V towards V ′ never reach V ′, then it
should be the case that t∆min(V, V
′) = INF. The equations still hold in this case because of the equality
INF+T = INF. Normally, we do not have to worry about INF, when all values are eventually reachable from
every other value.
The most important function in SAFE-STATE is the predicate safe? which characterizes whether a
Stress-Relax-Log is safe (intuitively describing the time bounds on stressed states for safety). Furthermore,
we define a norm operator, which will shorten the length of a Stress-Relax-Log without influencing the
value of the safe? predicate over time. The definition of safe? must satisfy the following conditions:
var T T’ : Time .
var CA : ClockAttr .
var SRE : SREvent .
var L L’ : Stress-Relax-Log .
eq [initially-safe] : safe?(nil) = true .
--- instantaneous safety equivalent to safety with stopped time
eq [stopped-safe] : safe?(E(SRE, c(T, CA)) L) =
safe?(E(SRE, c(T, stop)) L) .
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--- safety implies safety of all sub-logs
eq [sub-safe] : safe?(E(SRE, c(T, CA)) L)
implies safe?(L) = true .
--- decreasing stress durations preserves safety
ceq [stress-safe] : safe?(E(!stress, c(T’, CA)) L) implies
safe?(E(!stress, c(T, CA)) L) = true
if T’ ge T .
--- safety is preserved while in a relaxed state
eq [relax-safe] : safe?(E(!relax, c(T, CA)) L) =
safe?(L) .
A Stress-Relax-Log is assumed to be initially nil, so the equation initially-safe states that the
system is assumed to satisfy safe? initially. The equation stopped-safe states the simple fact that
stopping the duration of the last event does not affect the value of safe?. The next three equations define
the monotonic property of safe?. The equation sub-safe states that any sub-log of a log satisfying safe?
must also satisfy safe?. The equation stress-safe states that if a stress duration is made shorter, it
cannot make the system unsafe if it was safe before. The equation relax-safe states that adding any
relaxed duration will be safe if the log was safe before.
The last operator norm is really a modeling construct used for efficiency of representation. Instead of
maintaining an unbounded list of events that grows over time, it is often possible to contract or normalize
the history of events to a list of bounded size. This is also important to ensure that term sizes and the
untimed state space are not unbounded (in the latter case, the equations defining the norm operator can be
thought of as an equational abstraction).
--- normalization preserves log structure
--- norm-tick-sort
cmb tick(norm(L), T) : Stress-Relax-Log
if tick(L, T) : Stress-Relax-Log .
--- norm-app-sort
cmb append(L’, stop(norm(L))) : Stress-Relax-Log
if append(L’, stop(L)) : Stress-Relax-Log .
--- normalization preserves safety
eq [norm-tick-safe] : safe?(tick(norm(L), T)) =
safe?(tick(L, T)) .
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ceq [norm-log-safe] : safe?(append(L’, stop(norm(L)))) =
safe?(append(L’, stop(L)))
if append(L’, stop(L)) : Stress-Relax-Log .
--- normalization is idempotent
eq [norm-tick] : norm(tick(norm(L), T)) = norm(tick(L, T)) .
eq [norm-app] : norm(append(L’, stop(tick(norm(L), T))))
= norm(append(L’, stop(tick(L, T)))) .
The first two membership statements are requirements on the sort-preserving (i.e. data-structure-
preserving) property of norm. These state that norm preserves the Stress-Relax-Log structure of the
list. The next few equations state that norm will not affect the value of safe?. The last equations norm-tick
and norm-app state that norm is idempotent, in that applying norm is not affected by also applying norm
to any sub-logs. It can be shown, based on the equational requirements of norm, that applications of norm
cannot alter the value of safe? on a list, regardless of how it is interleaved with applications of the tick
operator.
4.3 Command Shaper Pattern as a Parametrized Specification
Now that we have a formal definition of what we are considering for safety. We describe the pattern that
addresses all of these safety requirements in a medical device. Mostly intercepting commands to medical
devices so that:
• device operation stay within minimum and maximum thresholds,
• device operation does not exceed maximum rate of change requirements,
• device operation satisfies timing requirements defined by stress-relax requirements.
4.3.1 Wrapped Object Theory
Before we describe a wrapper, it is necessary to describe exactly what it is that we are wrapping. As already
mentioned, the wrapped object is assumed to have a state and to receive external messages to change this
state. Furthermore, it may also send output messages to interact with its environment. We define the
WRAPPED-OBJECT theory as follows:
(oth WRAPPED-OBJECT is
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inc SAFE-STATE .
inc TICK-MTE-SEM .
class Wrapped | set-val : Val .
sort InMsg .
sort OutMsg .
subsorts InMsg OutMsg < Msg .
msg set-val : Oid Val -> InMsg .
var O : Oid .
vars V V’ : Val .
eq mte(set-val(O, V)) = zero .
rl [wrapped-recv] : set-val(O, V)
< O : Wrapped | set-val : V’ >
=> < O : Wrapped | set-val : V > .
--- assumes that all messages sent to external objects are of sort OutMsg
--- assumes that set-val is the only message of sort InMsg sent from external objects
endoth)
The wrapped object is of class Wrapped, and has a single attribute set-val for its state (recall that this is
the totally ordered set of values with the order operator ≤risk from the theory SAFE-STATE). We distinguish
messages into input and output messages. This is so that the wrapper knows which messages to forward to
the external configuration. A message set-val is assumed to be the only message of sort InMsg. Also, the
behavior when receiving the message is fixed, and it is assumed that the wrapped object will immediately
set the state to the new state specified by the message. The fact that the message is immediately delivered is
specified by the fact that mte is 0, so that time will not be allowed to advance until the message is received.
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4.3.2 Parameterized Wrapper Object
The wrapper class structure is parametrized based on an instance of the WRAPPED-OBJ theory. The definition
of the wrapper is split up into three modules for ease of readability. The first part of the wrapper defines
the wrapper object itself with the appropriate accessor and modifier operations for each attribute. This is
shown in the parametrized EPR-WRAPPER module:
(tomod EPR-WRAPPER{X :: WRAPPED-OBJECT} is
class EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : NEConfiguration,
next-val : X$Val, val : X$Val, disp : Timer,
stress-intervals : Stress-Relax-Log .
op _get-next-val : Object ~> X$Val [frozen] .
op _get-val : Object ~> X$Val [frozen] .
op _set-next-val_ : Object X$Val ~> Object [frozen] .
op _set-val_ : Object X$Val ~> Object [frozen] .
op _log-stress_ : Object EventType{SREvent} ~> Object [frozen] .
op _norm-stress : Object ~> Object [frozen] .
op _deliver : Object ~> Object [frozen] .
var O : Oid .
var V V’ : X$Val .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
var E : EventType{SREvent} .
var C : NEConfiguration .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : V > get-next-val = V .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V > get-val = V .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : V > set-next-val V’
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : V’ > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V > set-val V’
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V’ > .
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eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : L > log-stress E
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : log(L, E) > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : L > norm-stress
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : norm(L) > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C, val : V > deliver
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : (set-val(O, V) C) > .
endtom)
The EPR-Wrapper class has four attributes. The inside attribute defines the internal wrapped configu-
ration. This is assumed to contain an instance of an object of the instantiated class Wrapped and possibly
various messages of type InMsg and OutMsg. The next-val and val attributes describe the next requested
(target) state and the current state respectively. The last attribute stress-intervals is the log of stress
and relaxed events used to evaluate safety. All the operators perform the intuitive operations of accessing
and modifying objects. Notice how they are all frozen in order to prevent any rewrites while we are trying
to obtain the attributes for the wrapper object.
4.3.3 Safety Envelope Calculations for the Wrapper
It is useful to have a parametrized module to describe various auxiliary operations based on the operations
defined in the theory SAFE-STATE:
(fmod WRAPPER-AUX{X :: WRAPPED-OBJECT} is inc EPR-WRAPPER{X} .
op cap : X$Val -> X$Val .
op stress? : X$Val -> Bool .
ops toStress? toRelax? : X$Val X$Val -> Bool .
op inEnv? : X$Val Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
var V V’ : X$Val .
ceq cap(V) = min-val if V <=risk min-val .
ceq cap(V) = max-val if max-val <=risk V .
eq cap(V) = V [owise] .
eq stress?(V) = not (V <=risk crit-val) .
66
eq toStress?(V, V’) = not stress?(V) and stress?(V’) .
eq toRelax?(V, V’) = stress?(V) and not stress?(V’) .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
ceq [inenv-unreachable] : inEnv?(V, L) = false
if tdelta-min(V, crit-val) == INF /\ stress?(V) .
ceq [inenv-stress] : inEnv?(V, L) = safe?(L) and
safe?(log(tick(L, tdelta-min(V, crit-val) plus period), !relax))
if stress?(V) /\ tdelta-min(V, crit-val) :: Time .
ceq [inenv-relax] : inEnv?(V, L) = safe?(L) if not stress?(V) .
endfm)
The operator cap changes the value to be within the min and max risk range, if it was originally outside
of that range. The predicates toStress? and toRelax? describe when a value has crossed the crit-val
threshold in the more risky direction or less risky direction, respectively.
The last predicate inEnv?, which is an abbreviation for inside the envelope, is one of the most important
predicates for the pattern. It is used to detect whether a configuration can persistently satisfy the safe?
predicate in the future by performing a look ahead to see the shortest time it will take to reach a relaxed
state. It is worthwhile to discuss the properties of the inEv? predicate in more detail.
It is easy to see that inEnv? is a stronger predicate than safe?. All the equations for inEnv? can
be written in the form inEv?(V,L) = safe?(L) ∧ t (where t is an abitrary boolean term). Essentially,
inEnv? strengthens safe? so that it becomes inductive for each step of system execution. That is, if
inEv?(V,L) = true, then there always exists a controllable path of operation for the system to remain safe.
Figure 4.4 provides an intuition for this as a device state can only be in the envelope when it has sufficient
time to transition back to a safe state. The top part of the figure shows the shaded regions satisfying safe?,
and the bottom part of the figure shows the shaded regions satisfying inEv?.
4.3.4 Wrapper Execution
Finally, with all the auxiliary functions and the wrapper object fully defined, we can now describe how a
wrapper object should execute. Intuitively, the wrapper should filter and correct improper settings for the
state, so that the system always remains safe.
The wrapper executes with periodicity given by the period defined in the input theory SAFE-STATE.
During each period of execution, the wrapper must update the set state so that safety is maintained. The
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Figure 4.4: Characterization of the Stress Envelope
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wrapper also logs events !stress or !relax whenever the value of the predicate stress? changes for the
state of the system. Furthermore, any messages the wrapper receives will be buffered immediately in the
attribute next-val, but this attribute will not be used until the next dispatch time corresponding to the
period of execution. This means that if multiple messages are received, only the last buffered message is
used in the computation of the next state. The specification of the wrapper execution is describe in the
module EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC:
(tomod EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC{X :: WRAPPED-OBJECT} is
inc WRAPPER-AUX{X} .
op log-entry : X$Val X$Val ~> EventType{SREvent} .
op next-val : Object ~> X$Val [frozen] .
var O : Oid .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
var V V’ V’’ : X$Val .
var T T’ : Time .
ceq log-entry(V, V’) = !stress if toStress?(V, V’) .
ceq log-entry(V, V’) = !relax if toRelax?(V, V’) .
eq log-entry(V, V’) = none [owise] .
ceq next-val(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V, next-val : V’, stress-intervals : L >
= delta(V, safe-val)
if not inEnv?(delta(V, V’), log(L, log-entry(V, delta(V, V’)))) .
ceq next-val(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V, next-val : V’, stress-intervals : L >)
= delta(V, V’) if inEnv?(delta(V, V’), log(L, log-entry(V, delta(V, V’)))) .
var C : NEConfiguration .
var M : X$OutMsg .
crl [dispatch] :
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< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | disp : t(T), val : V, next-val : V’ >
=> (< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | disp : t(period), next-val : V’’, val : V’’ >
log-stress log-entry(V, V’’)) norm-stress deliver
if V’’ := next-val(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | >) /\ T == zero .
rl [recv] : set-val(O, V) < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | >
=> < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : cap(V) > .
rl [forward] : < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C M >
=> < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C > M .
eq mte(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C, disp : t(T) >)
= minimum(T, mte(C)) .
eq tick(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : L,
disp : t(T), inside : C >, T’)
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : tick(L, T’),
disp : tick(t(T), T’), inside : tick(C, T’) > .
endtom)
The first few equations describe how to log the values into the stress-intervals attribute of a wrapper,
and also how to advance to the next state taking into account the suggestions of the buffered input value.
The rule dispatch describes how to update all the attributes inside a wrapper. The rule recv will buffer any
messages to set the next state immediately (without processing it). Finally, the rule forward will forward
messages in the internal configuration of sort OutMsg as defined in the theory WRAPPED-OBJ. The last few
equations for mte and tick propagate these functions to the internal configuration. This is in accordance
with the requirements in Theorem 4.5.15 for ensuring time robustness.
An important minor detail to notice is that the buffered suggestion for the next state is overwritten
with the next state set upon dispatch. This means that, to maintain a target trajectory for the state, a
controller for the state must continue to send messages to the wrapper with target values. This is important
for effective operation, because if a controller disconnects, then the next suggested state is soon overwritten
and no obsolete commands are stored.
4.3.5 Some Pattern Instantiations
At this point, we have fully defined the formal Command Shaper Pattern. Furthermore, any instantiation of
the pattern has provably nice properties for safety as will be shown in Section 4.5.6. In this subsection, we
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show some instantions of the pattern to a cardiac pacemaker and to an infusion pump. Once instantiated, the
specifications also become executable, so we are able to use model checking to validate with the Real-Time
Maude tool that, for given initial states, our specifications are indeed safe.
Pacemaker Instantiation
The pacemaker system represents a quite general application of the Command Shaper Pattern. It preserves
the structure of the pattern without introducing any collapsing of terms or degeneracies, so it is a good test
case to completely cover most constructs of the pattern.
We assume that the instantiation is customized to a specific patient, where the specific patient safety
properties are as follows (since pacing periods are more naturally modelled than a pacing rate, we set the
constraints on pacing periods):
1. Only pacing periods in the range between 500ms (120 bpm) and 1000ms (60 bpm) are considered valid.
2. Any pacing period below 660ms (above 90bpm) is considered stressful.
3. The pacemaker should not pace continuously at stressful rates for more than one minute.
4. Once the pacemaker’s pacing rate drops down from stressful rates, the pacing rate should remain
relaxed for a duration proportional to twice the previous stress interval.
5. The pacing period can be updated at most once every second.
6. An updated pacing period can increase the period by at most 30ms from the previous pacing period,
or it can decrease the period by at most 20ms from the previous pacing period.
All of these pacing requirements are captured in the module SAFE-PACEMAKER-DURATION with each time
unit representing 10ms.
(fmod SAFE-PACEMAKER-DURATION is
pr STRESS-RELAX-LOG .
--- time unit: 10ms
op _<=risk_ : Time Time -> Bool .
ops max-risk-dur min-risk-dur crit-dur safe-dur : -> Time .
var D D’ : Time .
eq D <=risk D’ = D ge D’ . --- longer duration are less risky
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Requirements 1 and 2 constraining the pacing periods are specified as follows:
eq min-risk-dur = 100 . --- x 10ms = 60 bpm
eq safe-dur = 75 . --- x 10ms = 80 bpm
eq crit-dur = 66 . --- x 10ms = 90 bpm
eq max-risk-dur = 50 . --- x 10ms = 120 bpm
Requirements 5 and 6 constraining the rate of change can be specified as follows:
op period : -> Time .
op risk-dec-max : Time -> Time .
op risk-inc-max : Time -> Time .
eq period = 100 . --- x 10ms = 1s
eq risk-dec-max(D) = 2 . --- x 10ms = 20ms
eq risk-inc-max(D) = 3 . --- x 10ms = 30ms
op del : Time Time -> Time .
op del-inc-risk : Time Time -> Time .
op del-dec-risk : Time Time -> Time .
ceq del(D, D’) = del-inc-risk(D, D’) if (D <=risk D’) .
eq del(D, D’) = del-dec-risk(D, D’) [owise] .
ceq del-inc-risk(D, D’) = D’ if (D - D’ <= risk-inc-max(D)) .
eq del-inc-risk(D, D’) = D - risk-inc-max(D) [owise] .
ceq del-dec-risk(D, D’) = D’ if (D’ - D <= risk-dec-max(D)) .
eq del-dec-risk(D, D’) = D + risk-dec-max(D) [owise] .
op ndel-min : Time Time -> Nat .
op tdel-min : Time Time -> TimeInf .
--- assumes that ndel-min recurrence terminates
--- which is the case with the current definition
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--- subtle issue : could appear to converge but not terminate
eq ndel-min(D, D) = 0 .
ceq ndel-min(D, D’) = s ndel-min(del-inc-risk(D, D’), D’) if
(D <=risk D’) and (D <=risk del-inc-risk(D, D’)) [owise] .
ceq ndel-min(D, D’) = s ndel-min(del-dec-risk(D, D’), D’) if
(D’ <=risk D) and (del-dec-risk(D, D’) <=risk D) [owise] .
ceq tdel-min(D, D’) = ndel-min(D, D’) * period if
ndel-min(D, D’) :: Nat .
eq tdel-min(D, D’) = INF [owise] .
Finally, requirements 3 and 4, which are a bit more verbose to specify due to the generality of the input
theory, are shown below:
op max-stress-interval : -> Time .
op min-relax-interval : Time -> Time .
op safe? : Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
op norm : Stress-Relax-Log -> Stress-Relax-Log .
var T : Time .
eq max-stress-interval = 6000 . --- x 10ms = 1 min
eq min-relax-interval(T) = 2 * T .
vars C C’ C’’ : Clock .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
eq safe?(nil) = true .
eq safe?(E(!stress, C) L) = safe?(L) and
value(C) <= max-stress-interval .
eq safe?(E(!relax, C) E(!stress, C’) L) =
safe?(E(!stress, C’) L) .
eq safe?(E(!stress, C’’) E(!relax, C) E(!stress, C’) L) =
safe?(E(!stress, C’) L) and
value(C’’) <= max-stress-interval and
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value(C) >= min-relax-interval(value(C’)) .
eq norm(nil) = nil .
ceq norm(E(!stress, C) L) = E(!stress, C) nil if
safe?(E(!stress, C) L) .
eq norm(L) = L [owise] .
endfm)
Notice that, in addition to requirements 3 and 4, we also included a definition of norm which will throw
away all history aside from the current stress duration if everything is already safe. This makes sense, since
for the defined pacemaker safety properties, there is no need to keep track of previous stress durations that
the patient has already had sufficient time to recovered from.
After safety has been defined for the pacemaker, we can specify how the internal (wrapped) pacing
module behaves. Notice that a module called EXTERNAL-CONFIGURATION is included. This is used for
creating emulations, introducing sorts InExtMsg and OutExtMsg for external input and output messages
respectively. These can be treated as just normal messages for the time being.
(omod WRAPPED-PACING-MODULE is
pr SAFE-PACEMAKER-DURATION .
inc EXTERNAL-CONFIGURATION .
sort SetMsg PropMsg .
subsort SetMsg PropMsg < InExtMsg .
class Pacing-Module | nextPace : Timer, period : Time .
msg set-period : Oid Time -> SetMsg .
op pace : -> OutExtMsg .
var O : Oid .
var TM : Timer .
var T T’ : Time .
eq tick(< O : Pacing-Module | nextPace : TM >, T)
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= < O : Pacing-Module | nextPace : tick(TM, T) > .
eq mte(< O : Pacing-Module | nextPace : TM >)
= mte(TM) .
rl [set-period] :
set-period(O, T) < O : Pacing-Module | period : T’ >
=> < O : Pacing-Module | period : T > .
crl [reset-next-pace] :
< O : Pacing-Module | nextPace : TM, period : T >
=> < O : Pacing-Module | nextPace : t(T) > pace
if TM == timer0 .
endom)
Notice that many of the defined parameters have names which are different from the original default
names in the pattern definition. This renaming is conveniently taken care of in the view from our module
to the input theory for the pattern.
(view Safe-Pacer from WRAPPED-OBJECT to WRAPPED-PACING-MODULE is
sort Val to Time .
sort SetMsg to SetMsg .
sort PropMsg to PropMsg .
sort InMsg to InExtMsg .
sort OutMsg to OutExtMsg .
op min-val to min-risk-dur .
op max-val to max-risk-dur .
op crit-val to crit-dur .
op safe-val to safe-dur .
class Wrapped to Pacing-Module .
attr Wrapped . set-val to period .
msg set-val to set-period .
endv)
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Now that the view to the pattern’s input theory is fully specified, we can finally instantiate the pattern
to an executable system specification:
(tomod PARAM-PACEMAKER is
pr EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC{Safe-Pacer} .
pr PM-LEAD-SAFETY-PROP .
pr PM-PACING-MODULE .
pr DELAY-MSG .
op init : -> Configuration .
op wrapper-init : -> Object .
op extern-init : -> Object .
op msgs-init : -> Configuration .
ops wrapper pacing-module lead : -> Oid .
op shock : -> OutExtMsg .
eq pace = shock .
eq init = msgs-init wrapper-init extern-init .
eq msgs-init =
delay(set-period(pacing-module, 50), t(99))
... --- more delayed messages delivered at different times
delay(set-period(pacing-module, 50), t(899)) .
eq wrapper-init =
< pacing-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pacer} |
inside :
< pacing-module : Pacing-Module | nextPace : t(0), period : safe-dur >,
val : safe-dur, next-val : safe-dur, disp : t(period),
stress-intervals : (nil).Event-Log{Stress-Relax} > .
eq extern-init =
< lead : Lead |
shocks : (nil).Event-Log{Shock} > .
endtom)
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An important thing to notice is that the object ID of the wrapper module is exactly the same as the
internal module being wrapped. This is needed for modularity. Essentially, this allows the wrapper object to
be used wherever the original (wrapped) object can be used, receiving the exact same set of input messages.
The model also includes in its initial state the term msgs-init which is a set of initial delayed messages
to simulate external input and an external environment model extern-init which includes the pacemaker
lead delivering the shock.
Infusion Pump Instantiation
The instantiation of the infusion pump is similar to that of the pacemaker. However, continuous infusion
rates can normally be abstracted into three states: no infusion, base infusion, and bolus infusion. For
example, in patient controlled analgesia, base infusion specifies a minimal infusion rate that is safe and able
to keep a resting patient reasonably sedated, and bolus infusion specifies a temporary high infusion rate to
relieve immediate pain. With these state abstractions, what happens is that we obtain a degenerate view
of the pattern, where different terms in the input theory actually get collapsed to a same term through
the view. Of course, this is perfectly legitimate instantiation, and it shows how a generic pattern can be
instantiated to a more constrained system.
We assume that the base infusion rates and bolus infusion rates are customized for each individual
patient (depending on age, medical conditions, and other factors). An example safety property instantiation
of an infusion pump for an analgesic (e.g. morphine sulfide) is as follows (since the timing constraints are
relative, all the timing intervals have been shortened to the order of seconds to allow for faster testing during
emulation):
1. Bolus doses do not last longer than 2 seconds
2. Two consecutive bolus doses must be separated by an interval of at least 8 seconds
3. There is a maximum of 3 bolus doses for any time window of one minute
The safety definition of the pump is similar to the pacemaker definition. We allow the pump state to be
updated every minute and allow the pump to change states without delay between updates.
(fmod SAFE-PUMP is
pr STRESS-RELAX-LOG .
--- time unit: 1s
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sort PumpState .
ops stop base bolus : -> PumpState .
op _<=risk_ : PumpState PumpState -> Bool .
var S S’ : PumpState .
eq S <=risk bolus = true .
eq stop <=risk S = true .
eq base <=risk base = true .
eq S <=risk S’ = false [owise] .
op period : -> Time .
eq period = 1 . --- 1s
op del : PumpState PumpState -> PumpState .
eq del(S, S’) = S’ .
op tdel-min : PumpState PumpState -> TimeInf .
eq tdel-min(S, S) = 0 .
ceq tdel-min(S, S’) = period if S =/= S’ .
op max-stress-interval : -> Time .
op min-relax-interval : -> Time .
op window-size : -> Time .
op max-in-window : -> Nat .
op safe-duration? : Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
op safe-freq? : Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
op stress-interval-window : Stress-Relax-Log Nat -> TimeInf .
op safe? : Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
The infusion pump safety properties are then defined as follows. Again, the specification is somewhat
verbose due to the generality of the safe? operator. In this case, we must define auxiliary operators to
capture the semantics of at most 3 bolus doses per minute. Furthermore, the norm operator is also more
complicated to define, as we can discard all events that happened more than one minute ago or all stress
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events aside from the three most recent.
op keep-latest : Stress-Relax-Log Time -> Stress-Relax-Log .
op norm : Stress-Relax-Log -> Stress-Relax-Log .
var T : Time .
eq max-stress-interval = 2 . --- 2 seconds
eq min-relax-interval = 8 . --- seconds
eq window-size = 60 . --- 1 minute
eq max-in-window = 3 . --- 3 times per minute
vars C C’ C’’ : Clock .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
eq safe?(L) = safe-duration?(L) and safe-freq?(L) .
eq safe-duration?(nil) = true .
eq safe-duration?(E(!stress, C) nil) =
value(C) <= max-stress-interval .
eq safe-duration?(E(!stress, C) E(!relax, C’) L) =
safe-duration?(L) and
value(C) <= max-stress-interval and
value(C’) >= min-relax-interval .
eq safe-duration?(E(!relax, C) E(!stress, C’) L) =
safe-duration?(E(!stress, C’) L) .
eq safe-freq?(nil) = true .
eq safe-freq?(E(!relax, C) L) =
safe-freq?(L) .
eq safe-freq?(E(!stress, C’) L) =
safe-freq?(L) and
stress-interval-window(E(!stress, C’) L, max-in-window)
>= window-size .
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var N : Nat .
eq stress-interval-window(nil, N) = INF .
eq stress-interval-window(E(!stress, C) L, 0) = 0 .
eq stress-interval-window(E(!stress, C) L, s N)
= stress-interval-window(L, N)
+ value(C) .
eq stress-interval-window(E(!relax, C) L, N)
= stress-interval-window(L, N)
+ value(C) .
eq keep-latest(nil, T) = nil .
eq keep-latest(E(!stress, C) L, 0) = nil .
ceq keep-latest(E(!stress, C) L, T)
= E(!stress, C) keep-latest(L, T monus value(C))
if T > 0 .
ceq keep-latest(E(!relax, C) L, T) = nil
if value(C) >= T .
ceq keep-latest(E(!relax, C) L, T)
= E(!relax, C) keep-latest(L, T monus value(C))
if value(C) < T .
ceq norm(L) = keep-latest(L, window-size) if safe?(L) .
eq norm(L) = L [owise] .
endfm)
The internal object definition and view definition are quite similar to the pacemaker example, so we omit
them for brevity. We show the final executable system model. To simulate the external environment, we
have provided a simple patient model which keeps track of the amount of chemicals present in the patient’s
body given the infusion rates and the patient’s metabolic rates.
(tomod PARAM-PUMP is
pr EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC{Safe-Pump} .
pr DELAY-MSG .
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pr PUMP-EMU .
op init : -> Configuration .
op wrapper-init : -> Object .
op extern-init : -> Object .
op msgs-init : -> Configuration .
ops pump-module patient : -> Oid .
eq init = msgs-init wrapper-init extern-init .
eq msgs-init =
delay(set-mode(pump-module, bolus), t(9))
... --- more messages delivered at different times
delay(set-mode(pump-module, stop), t(61)) .
eq wrapper-init =
< pump-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pump} |
inside :
< pump-module : Pump-Module | mode : base > base,
val : base, next-val : base, disp : t(period),
stress-intervals : (nil).Stress-Relax-Log > .
eq extern-init = < patient : Patient-Sim |
amount : 0, infusion-rate : 0, metabolic-rate : 2,
base-rate : 1, bolus-rate : 7 > .
endtom)
4.4 Model Checking Completeness and Verification
4.4.1 Completeness of Compositional Nested Systems
In general, Real-Time Maude provides sound but incomplete model checking for system specifications [42].
That is, all counterexamples found will be real, but some counterexamples may not be found. However, if
time advancement strategies and propositions satisfy the properties of time robustness and tick invariance
(i.e., no important system states are missed due to the time advancement strategy), then the timed model
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checking results are sound and complete [42].
We take a short detour to discuss the issue of completeness of model checking of timed systems in more
detail. In [42], Theorem 14 provided a simple criterion for verifying that flat object-oriented specifications
are time-robust. However, for many practical application we have nested or wrapped objects, in which case
Theorem 14 does not apply. We provide a proof sketch of a refined Theorem in Section 4.5.7 which gives
sufficient criteria for ensuring completeness of model checking in configurations with nested objects.
4.4.2 Model Checking of Instantiations
As we shall show in Section 7, our Command Shaper Pattern described in Section 4.2 is provably safe, so
naturally, all instantiations should satisfy the necessary safety properties. However, since we already have
executable instantiations available for certain medical devices, we can also use model checking as an extra
level of validation for the correctness of our pattern given certain initial states. Furthermore, the safety
properties described in the pattern are sometimes not the ultimate safety properties for the patient (for
example, there may be delays between when the device state changes and when the change actually affects
the patient), so it is also desirable to model check that these patient level safety properties are also satisfied
as a consequence of the pattern for certain initial states.
Model Checking the Pacemaker
Given the module PARAM-PACEMAKER described in Section 4.3.5, we can immediately model check that the
safety log of events in the wrapper always satisfies the defined safety properties of the pacemaker by searching
for a violation of such properties.
Maude> (tsearch [1] in PARAM-PACEMAKER : {init} =>*
{C:Configuration
< pacing-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pacer} |
A:AttributeSet, stress-intervals : L::Stress-Relax-Log >}
such that not safe?(L::Stress-Relax-Log) in time <= 10000 .)
rewrites: 1077615 in 1379ms cpu (1419ms real) (780999 rewrites/second)
Timed search [1] in PARAM-PACEMAKER
{init} =>* {C:Configuration
< pacing-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pacer}| A:AttributeSet, stress-intervals :
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Figure 4.5: A state change in the system may not be immediately reflected in the patient. There may be
some delay.
L::Stress-Relax-Log >}
in time <= 10000 and with mode maximal time increase :
No solution
This at least tells us that the pattern instantiation does indeed perform what it is meant to do with
the given initial state up to a given time bound. However, safety is defined for the patient and not for the
device; so is patient safety the same as device safety? For pacemaker operation, patient safety is closely
related to device safety but with some time delays as illustrated in Figure 4.5. Thus, to capture the actual
events affecting the patient, we create a model of a pacemaker lead (the bioelectrical element that actually
stimulates heart contractions by creating an activation potential on muscle tissue). In our case, the model of
the lead is quite simple: whenever it receives a !shock event (from the pacing module), it will log the event.
Thus, the model of the lead effectively keeps track of all the heart beats stimulated by the pacemaker.
(omod PM-LEAD is
pr EVENT-LOG{Shock} .
class Lead | shocks : Event-Log{Shock} .
op shock : -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
var L : Event-Log{Shock} .
var T : Time .
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eq tick(< O : Lead | shocks : L >, T)
= < O : Lead | shocks : tick(L, T) > .
eq mte(< O : Lead | >) = INF .
rl [recv-shock] :
shock < O : Lead | shocks : L >
=> < O : Lead | shocks : log(L, !shock) > .
endom)
Now, we have a lead model with a log of heart beats and the intervals between them, but it is now
necessary to define patient safety in terms of heart beat intervals. These corresponding safety properties are
somewhat more tedious to specify, since we are at a much lower level of abstraction, but their specification
is essentially straightforward.
(omod PM-LEAD-SAFETY-PROP is pr PM-LEAD .
ops min-period max-period crit-period : -> Time .
eq max-period = 100 . --- x 10ms = 60 bpm
eq min-period = 50 . --- x 10ms = 120 bpm
eq crit-period = 66 . --- x 10ms = 90 bpm
var T T’ : Time .
op stressed? : Time -> Bool .
eq stressed?(T) = T < crit-period .
ops dec-max inc-max : -> Time .
eq dec-max = 3 . --- x 10ms = 20ms
eq inc-max = 2 . --- x 10ms = 30ms
op max-stress-dur : -> Time .
op min-relax-dur : Time -> Time .
eq max-stress-dur = 6000 . --- x 10ms = 1 min
eq min-relax-dur(T) = 2 * T .
op pm-safe? : Object ~> Bool .
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op log-range-safe? : Event-Log{Shock} -> Bool .
op range-safe? : Time -> Bool .
op log-change-safe? : Event-Log{Shock} -> Bool .
op change-safe? : Time Time -> Bool .
op log-stress-safe? : Event-Log{Shock} Time Time -> Bool .
op stress-safe? : Time Time -> Bool .
var O : Oid .
var E E’ : Event{Shock} .
var L : Event-Log{Shock} .
eq pm-safe?(< O : Lead | shocks : L >) =
log-range-safe?(L) and log-change-safe?(L)
and log-stress-safe?(L, min-relax-dur(max-stress-dur), 0) .
--- periods must be within range
eq log-range-safe?(nil) = true .
eq log-range-safe?(E L) =
(not stopped?(E) or range-safe?(elapsed(E)))
and log-range-safe?(L) .
eq range-safe?(T) = T >= min-period and T <= max-period .
--- periods cannot change too fast
eq log-change-safe?(nil) = true .
eq log-change-safe?(E nil) = true .
eq log-change-safe?(E E’ L) =
(not stopped?(E) or change-safe?(elapsed(E), elapsed(E’)))
and log-change-safe?(E’ L) .
ceq change-safe?(T, T’) = T - T’ <= inc-max if T >= T’ .
ceq change-safe?(T, T’) = T’ - T <= dec-max if T <= T’ .
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--- periods cannot remain stressed too often
eq log-stress-safe?(nil, T, T’) = true .
ceq log-stress-safe?(E L, T, T’) =
log-stress-safe?(L, T, T’ + elapsed(E))
and stress-safe?(T, T’ + elapsed(E))
if stressed?(elapsed(E)) and stopped?(E) .
ceq log-stress-safe?(E L, T, T’) =
log-stress-safe?(L, elapsed(E), 0)
if not (stressed?(elapsed(E)) and stopped?(E)) and T’ > 0 .
ceq log-stress-safe?(E L, T, T’) =
log-stress-safe?(L, T + elapsed(E), 0)
if not (stressed?(elapsed(E)) and stopped?(E)) and T’ == 0 .
eq stress-safe?(T, T’) =
T >= min-relax-dur(T’)
and T’ <= max-stress-dur .
endom)
Now, we can perform model checking using the patient safety requirements to verify that the system
indeed still satisfies the true safety requirements in spite of the delays.
Maude> (tsearch [1] in PARAM-PACEMAKER : {init} =>*
{C:Configuration < lead : Lead | A:AttributeSet >}
such that not pm-safe?(< lead : Lead | A:AttributeSet >) in time <= 10000 .
rewrites: 6179398 in 4763ms cpu (5202ms real) (1297300 rewrites/second)
Timed search [1] in PARAM-PACEMAKER
{init} =>* {C:Configuration
< lead : Lead | A:AttributeSet >}
in time <= 10000 and with mode maximal time increase :
No solution
86
The reason that safety still holds despite delays is because the wrapper pattern implicitly assumed that
a delay of at most one period may be required for actuation (notice the plus period).
ceq [inev-stress] : inEv?(V, L) = safe?(L) and
safe?(log(tick(L, tdel-min(V, crit-val) plus period), !relax))
if stress?(V) /\ tdel-min(V, crit-val) :: Time .
In the pacemaker the period was 1 second, and each heart beat was at most 1 second apart (60 bpm),
so the delay in pacing could not exceed 1 second.
Model Checking the Infusion Pump
As with the pacemaker example, we can immediately check that the device satisfies the predefined safety
properties for a given initial state up to a certain time bound.
Maude> (tsearch [1] in PARAM-PUMP : {init} =>*
{C:Configuration
< pump-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pump} |
A:AttributeSet, stress-intervals : L::Stress-Relax-Log >}
such that not safe?(L::Stress-Relax-Log) in time <= 10000 .)
rewrites: 4906764 in 7239ms cpu (7285ms real) (677739 rewrites/second)
Timed search [1] in PARAM-PUMP
{init} =>* {C:Configuration
< pump-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pump}| A:AttributeSet, stress-intervals :
L::Stress-Relax-Log >}
in time <= 10000 and with mode maximal time increase with default 1 :
No solution
Again, this form of safety verification may not be convincing enough as the end safety is about the
patient. Thus, we create another patient model in this case. For infusion pumps administering an analgesic,
it is required that concentrations of the analgesic do not exceed certain quantities in the patient’s body. This
is done through a delicate balance of infusion rate and patient metabolism. The model of this is captured
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by a Patient-Sim object which specifies the patient’s metabolic rate along with various set infusion rates
and keeps track of the amount of analgesic in the body.
(tomod PUMP-EMU is
pr WRAPPED-PUMP-MODULE .
class Patient-Sim |
amount : Rat,
infusion-rate : Rat,
metabolic-rate : Rat,
base-rate : Rat,
bolus-rate : Rat .
var O : Oid .
vars R R’ R’’ : Rat .
var T : Time .
rl [stop-rate] :
stop
< O : Patient-Sim |
infusion-rate : R >
=> < O : Patient-Sim |
infusion-rate : 0 > .
rl [base-rate] :
base
< O : Patient-Sim |
infusion-rate : R, base-rate : R’ >
=> < O : Patient-Sim |
infusion-rate : R’ > .
rl [bolus-rate] :
bolus
< O : Patient-Sim |
infusion-rate : R, bolus-rate : R’ >
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=> < O : Patient-Sim |
infusion-rate : R’ > .
eq tick(< O : Patient-Sim |
amount : R, infusion-rate : R’, metabolic-rate : R’’ >, T)
= < O : Patient-Sim |
amount : (R + R’ * T) monus R’’ * T > .
eq mte(< O : Patient-Sim | >)
= INF .
endtom)
The infusion pump specification in Section 4.3.5 already defines a Patient-Sim object with the various
attributes set. In this case, we model check if the amount of analgesic in the patient can exceed 5 mg.
Maude> (tsearch [1] in PARAM-PUMP : {init} =>*
{C:Configuration
< patient : Patient-Sim |
A:AttributeSet, amount : R:Rat >}
such that R:Rat > 5 in time <= 10000 .)
rewrites: 4653017 in 7261ms cpu (7493ms real) (640744 rewrites/second)
Timed search [1] in PARAM-PUMP
{init} =>* {C:Configuration
< patient : Patient-Sim | A:AttributeSet, amount : R:Rat >}
in time <= 10000 and with mode maximal time increase with default 1 :
No solution
However if the threshold were to be 4 mg, then model checking shows that it is possible for a sequence
of bolus doses to overdose the patient.
Maude> (tsearch [1] in PARAM-PUMP : {init} =>*
{C:Configuration
< patient : Patient-Sim |
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A:AttributeSet, amount : R:Rat >}
such that R:Rat > 4 in time <= 10000 .)
rewrites: 117481 in 292ms cpu (296ms real) (401020 rewrites/second)
Timed search [1] in PARAM-PUMP
{init} =>* {C:Configuration
< patient : Patient-Sim | A:AttributeSet, amount : R:Rat >}
in time <= 10000 and with mode maximal time increase with default 1 :
Solution 1
A:AttributeSet --> base-rate : 1, bolus-rate : 7, infusion-rate : 7,
metabolic-rate : 2 ; C:Configuration --> delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),
t(1))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),t(2))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),t(3))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),t(10))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),t(20))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),t(40))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,bolus),t(50))
delay(set-mode(pump-module,stop),t(51))
< pump-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pump}| disp : t(0), inside : < pump-module :
Pump-Module | mode : bolus >, next-val : bolus, stress-intervals : E(
!stress,c(1,run))nil, val : bolus > ; CLASS_OF_patient:Patient-Sim -->
Patient-Sim ; R:Rat --> 5 ; TIME_ELAPSED:Time --> 10
This just goes to show that even though the Command Shaper Pattern will satisfy the defined safety
properties for a device, the device’s safety properties do not immediately ensure safety of the patient if the
appropriate patient context is not taken into account. In this case, the patient is overly sensitive to the
analgesic, so either bolus doses should be disallowed, or lower infusion rates should be set for bolus doses.
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4.5 Correctness of the Command Shaper Pattern
In this section, we proceed to prove the correctness of the command shaper. We start by showing that the
our equational definition of safe? is sensible as a safety property, and we also take a slight detour to prove
that normalization operations on event logs will not change the evaluation of safety. After we have proved
these properties about our definition of safety, we then show that system execution defined by the command
shaper does indeed satisfy the preserve the safety invariant using induction on possible execution steps (i.e.
rewrite rules).
4.5.1 Stability of the Safety Property
Lemma 4.5.1. Consider any term L of sort Stress-Relax-Log, any term Esr of sort SREvent, and any
term T of sort Time.
If safe?(L) = false, then it must be the case that:
1. safe?(log(L,Esr)) = false, and
2. safe?(tick(L, T )) = false.
Proof. For ease of readability, we use “;” to denote the concatenation of events in event logs.
safe?(nil) = true by the equational axiom initially-safe in the theory SAFE-STATE, so we only need
to consider a nonempty list L.
For the first condition, if safe?(log(L,Esr)) = true, then
safe?(E(Esr, c(0)); stop(L)) = true (by using the equational definition of log)
safe?(stop(L)) = true (by the equational axiom sub-safe in SAFE-STATE)
safe?(L) = true (by the axiom stopped-safe in SAFE-STATE), a contradiction.
For the second condition, there are two possibilities for nonempty L. For some T ′ of sort Time,
and some L′ or sort Stress-Relax-Log, either L = E(!stress, T ′);L′ or L = E(!relax, T ′);L′. If L =
E(!stress, T ′);L′ = false, then T ′ + T ≥ T ′ (using a linear time model), so
safe?(tick(L, T )) = safe?(E(!stress, T ′ + T );L′) = false (by equation stress-safe)
On the other hand, if L = E(!relax, T ′);L′, then
safe?(tick(L, T )) = safe?(E(!relax, T ′ + T );L′) (by definition of tick)
= safe?(L′) = safe?(E(!relax, T ′);L′) (by two applications of the equation relax-safe).
Showing that safe?(tick(L, T )) = safe?(L) = false in this case.
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Lemma 4.5.1 shows that during execution where system transitions only modify a Stress-Relax-Log by
applications of the operators log and tick, it is sufficient to check that the safe? predicate holds over a
countable number of time instances St such that for any time t there is a time t
′ ∈ St such that t′ > t. This
also shows the tick stabilizing property for the predicate safe?. Also, by Theorem 4.5.15, assuming that we
have defined our system to satisfy all the preconditions, our system should also be time robust. This means
that all untimed model checking on the predicate safe? of a system is both sound and complete.
4.5.2 Safety Preserving Property of the norm Operator
Next we consider the norm operation. We show that applying norm cannot affect the satisfaction of safe.
Notation. In this section, we rely heavily on reasoning with subterms and term substitution, so it is
appropriate for us to introduce some notation to make discussions more compact.
Given terms t and u and a position p, we write tp for the subterm at position p of t, and we write t[u]p for
the term t where the subterm at position p is replaced by u. For position p, we use the conventional repre-
sentation where p is a string of natural numbers corresponding to branch traversal of the tree representation
of a term.
For example, if t = h(f(x, g(x, y))) and u = z and p = 1.2, then tp = g(x, y), and t[u]p = h(f(x, z)).
Definition. An unreduced log is a term t of sort Stress-Relax-Log where for all positions p in t, the
subterm t′ = tp either has the form
1. t′ = nil or
2. t′ = log(L,Esr) or
3. t′ = tick(L, T )
where subterm L in (2) and (3) is of sort Stress-Relax-Log, Esr of sort SREvent, and T of sort Time.
Intuitively, t is constructed from only using the nil, log, and tick operators.
Furthermore, we define an unreduced normalized log to be a term t of sort Stress-Relax-Log, the
subterm t′ = tp can have the form t′ = norm(L) in addition to all the subterm forms for an unreduced log.
Lemma 4.5.2. If L is a term of Stress-Relax-Log, then tick(tick(L, T ), T ′) = tick(L, T + T ′).
Proof. Straightforward using structural induction on L.
Lemma 4.5.3. If L,L′, L′′ are terms of sort Event-Log{X} with L 6= nil, and append(L,L′) is of sort
Event-Log{X}, then
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1. tick(append(L,L′)) = append(tick(L), L′)
2. stop(append(L,L′)) = append(stop(L), L′)
3. append(append(L,L′), L′′) = append(L, append(L′, L′′))
Proof. Straightforward using structural induction on L and applying equational definitions of the operators.
Lemma 4.5.4. Let t be an unreduced log. For any position p in t, with the subterm t′ = tp, we have one of
the following equalities:
1. t = tick(t′, T ) or
2. t = append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ))).
for some nonempty log L of sort Log{SREvent} and some T of sort Time.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the lenght of the position p as a string.
When p = nil, the topmost postion, t′ = t, and we trivially have t = tick(t, 0) (the first form of the
equivalence).
Now, assuming the statement holds for positions of length n. For p of length n + 1, it must be of the
form p = q.r. We need to consider two cases:
If t = tick(t′′, T ), then t′ = t′′r . To use the inductive hypothesis, we must consider two subcases:
If t′′ = tick(t′, T ′), then t = tick(t′′, T ) = tick(tick(t′), T ), T ′) = tick(t′, T + T ′) (Lemma 4.5.2).
If t′′ = append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ′))), then t = tick(append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ′))), T )
= append(tick(L, T ), stop(tick(t′, T ′))) = append(L′, stop(tick(t′, T ′))) (using Lemma 4.5.3 and making
the substitution L′ = tick(L, T )).
Now consider the case when t = log(t′′, Esr). Again we have t′ = t′′r , and we must consider two subcases
for t′′:
If t′′ = tick(t′, T ′), then t = log(tick(t′, T ′), Esr) = E(Esr, c(0)); stop(tick(t′, T ′))
= append(E(Esr, c(0)); nil, stop(tick(t
′, T ′)) = append(L′, stop(tick(t′, T ′))).
If t′′ = append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ′))), then t = log(append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ′))), Esr)
= E; stop(append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ′)))) = E; append(stop(L), stop(tick(t′, T ′)))
= append(E; stop(L), stop(tick(t′, T ′))) = append(L′, stop(tick(t′, T ′)))
(applying Lemma 4.5.3 multiple times).
Thus, we have proved the inductive step considering all cases.
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Definition. If t is an unreduced log, then a subnormalized log from t is a term tnormp s.t. the subterm
t′ = tp is replaced by norm(t′). I.e., tnormp = t[norm(tp)]p.
Lemma 4.5.5. Let t be an unreduced log, and tnormp its subnormalized log. We have the following equivalence:
norm(tnormp ) = norm(t)
Proof. We have shown in Lemma 4.5.4, for t with a subterm t′ = tp, t has one of two possible forms.
If t = tick(t′, T ), then tnormp = tick(norm(t
′), T ). By the equation norm-tick, we immediately have,
norm(tnormp ) = norm(tick(norm(t
′), T )) = norm(tick(norm(t′), T )) = norm(tick(t′, T )) = norm(t).
If t = append(L, stop(tick(t′, T ))), then
tnormp = append(L, stop(tick(norm(t
′), T ))).
By the equation norm-app, we immediately have,
norm(tnormp ) = norm(append(L, stop(tick(norm(t
′), T ))))
= norm(append(L, stop(tick(norm(t′), T )))) = norm(append(L, stop(tick(t′, T )))) = norm(t)
Definition. For an unreduced normalized log, define the function stripnorm recursively as follows.
1. stripnorm(nil) = nil
2. stripnorm(log(L,Esr)) = log(stripnorm(L), Esr)
3. stripnorm(tick(L, T ) = tick(stripnorm(L), T )
4. stripnorm(norm(L)) = stripnorm(L)
Thus, for an unreduced normalized log t, stripnorm(t) is an unreduced log that removes all the applications
of norm from t.
Lemma 4.5.6. Let t be an unreduced normalized log with the topmost application of norm at position p,
then stripnorm(t) = t[stripnorm(tp)]p.
Proof. Straight forward by induction on the depth of p and considering all possible forms of the top-most
term.
Lemma 4.5.7. Let t be an unreduced normalized log, then norm(stripnorm(t)) = norm(t).
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of norm operators present in t.
If t has no norm operators, then of course, stripnorm(t) = t.
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Assume that the statement holds when for any term with n norm operators in subterms. If t has n + 1
norm operators, then consider the topmost norm operator position p. So t′ = tp = norm(t′′), and by the
inductive hypothesis, t′′ has n norm operators, so t′ = norm(stripnorm(t
′′)) = norm(t′′).
Now using Lemma 4.5.6, we can define u = t[t′′]p = stripnorm(t).
We have that unormp = t[norm(stripnorm(t
′′))]p is a subnormalized log, and we have that norm(unormp ) =
norm(u) by Lemma 4.5.5.
Thus, summarizing everything, we have
norm(stripnorm(t)) = norm(u) = norm(u
norm
p )
= norm(t[norm(stripnorm(t
′′))]p) = norm(t[norm(t′′)]p) = norm(t).
Theorem 4.5.8. Let t be an unreduced normalized log, then safe?(t) = safe?(stripnorm(t)).
Proof. Consider the position p of the topmost norm operator in t, and let t′ = tp = norm(t′′). Now define,
u = t[stripnorm(t
′′)]p = stripnorm(t), and using Lemma 4.5.7, we have u
norm
p = t[norm(stripnorm(t
′′))]p =
t[norm](t
′′)p = t.
For u′ = up = stripnorm(t
′′), we know from Lemma 4.5.4, that u has one of two forms.
For the first case, if u = tick(u′, T ), then by application of equation norm-tick-safe in the SAFE-STATE
theory
safe?(stripnorm(t)) = safe?(u) = safe?(tick(stripnorm(t
′′), T )) = safe?(tick(stripnorm(t
′′), T ))
= safe?(tick(norm(stripnorm(t
′′)), T )) = safe?(unormp ) = safe?(t).
For the second case, if
u = append(L, stop(tick(u′, T ))), then by application of the equation norm-app-safe in the SAFE-STATE
theory
safe?(stripnorm(t)) = safe?(u) = safe?(append(L, stop(tick(stripnorm(t
′′), T ))))
= safe?(append(L, stop(tick(norm(stripnorm(t
′′)), T )))) = safe?(unormp ) = safe?(t).
We have shown that contracting or normalizing a log based on the requirements of the norm operation
cannot affect the result of the safe? predicate. This means that for the remainder of the section, we can
essentially “ignore” applications of norm, and assume that an unbounded length list is maintained even
though only a bounded length list is maintained for efficient implementation.
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4.5.3 Persistence of Safety using Safety Envelopes
Definition. Consider a term L of sort Stress-Relax-Log and a term V of sort Val. L is said to faithfully
follow V iff
1. when V ≤ vcrit, we have L = E(!relax, T );L′, and
2. when V > vcrit, we have L = E(!stress, T );L
′.
Here, L′ is a term or soft Stress-Relax-Log, and T is a term of sort Time.
An pair (V,L) that satisfies this definition is called a sensible pair.
Lemma 4.5.9. If (V,L) is a sensible pair with V > vcrit, and V
′ is of sort Val with V ′ < vcrit, then
inEnv?(∆(V, vcrit), tick(L, period)) = true ⇔ inEnv?(∆(V, V ′), tick(L, period)) = true.
Proof. Notice that by the axioms del-mono, we have ∆(V, V ′) ≤ ∆(V, vcrit).
If ∆(V, vcrit) 6= vcrit, then by del-max we have ∆(V, vcrit = ∆(V, V ′), from which the implication trivially
follows because the left hand sides of the two equations are then equal. This means that we only need to
consider the case where ∆(V, vcrit) = vcrit. In this case, we have ∆(V, V
′) ≤ ∆(V, vcrit) = vcrit, so the
only conditional equational axiom that can be applied is inev-relax, which again trivials guarantees the
equivalence by:
inEnv?(∆(V, V ′), tick(L, period)) = safe?(tick(L, period)) = inEnv?(∆(V, vcrit), tick(L, period))
Lemma 4.5.10. Let (V,L) be a sensible pair with V > vcrit and inEnv?(V,L) = true. If V
′ ≤ vcrit, then
inEnv?(∆(V, V ′), tick(L, period)) = true.
Proof. Since inEnv?(V,L) = true and V is a stress state, it must be the case that equation inev-stress
was applied. This of course means that
safe?(L) = true and safe?(log(tick(L, t∆min(V, vcrit)+period), !relax)) = true, and t∆min is finite.
By Lemma 4.5.9, it is sufficient to just consider the case where V ′ = vcrit.
We first show the simple property safe?(tick(L, period)) = true. From Lemma 4.5.1, we directly have:
safe?(log(tick(L, t∆min(V, vcrit) + period), !relax)) = true
⇒ safe?(tick(L, t∆min(V, vcrit) + period))
= safe?(tick(tick(L, period), t∆min(V, vcrit))) = true
⇒ safe?(tick(L, period)) = true
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By the inductive definition of tdel-min, t∆min, by equation ind-tdel, we have t∆min(∆(V, vcrit), vcrit)+
period = t∆min(V, vcrit) (recall that V > vcrit by definition of a stressed state). Since t∆min(V, vcrit) is
finite, t∆min(∆(V, vcrit), vcrit) must also be finite. Furthermore, we have:
safe?(log(tick(tick(L, period), t∆min(∆(V, vcrit), vcrit) + period), !relax))
= safe?(log(tick(tick(L, period), t∆min(V, vcrit)), !relax))
= safe?(log(tick(L, t∆min(V, vcrit)) + period, !relax)) = true.
We have shown that all conditions for inEnv?(∆(V, vcrit), tick(L, period)) evalutate to true.
4.5.4 System Execution Assumptions
Correspondence Between Tick Rules and System Time Elapse
We model all time-evolving behavior in a system by terms of sort Timer and Clock. It is necessary to show
that these entities indeed behave as their intuitive names suggest. This means that when time elapse occurs
in Real-Time Maude, the corresponding time should decrease in a timer or increase in a non-stopped clock.
We only have one timed rewrite rule in our system:
crl [advance] : {C} => {tick(C, T)} in time T if T le mte(C) [nonexec] .
This means that (deterministic) time evolution of the system is fully captured by the tick operator. It
is assumed that all timed values in the system are affected by rewrites corresponding to the advancement of
the system time in Real-Time Maude.
4.5.5 Wrapper Dispatch and Well-Behaved Rule Applications
After knowing that timers are faithfully represented, we show that certain system behaviors may only occur
periodically with fixed period durations.
Definition. A sensible configuration is a term C of sort Configuration, where any top-level object O
in C has a unique oid (object identifier).
For a sensible configuration, we define Oid(C) to denote the unique subterm, if it exists, of C representing
the object having id as its oid. If a top-level object of id does not exist, then we say that Oid(C) is undefined.
Furthermore, if a is an attribute of an object with oid id, and given a configuration C, then we write
Oid.a(C) to denote the value of attribute a in the object instance Oid(C) when it is defined.
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For an object with oid w of class EPR-Wrapper, we use the following conventions when referencing
attributes of Ow:
• Ow.disp represents the timer in attribute dispatch
• Ow.next represents the value of attribute next-val
• Ow.val represents the current value of attribute val
• Ow.log represents the stress-relax log of attribute stress-intervals
• Ow.Cin represents the internal configuration of attribute inside
We will also write Ow.Static to refer to the set of attributes {Ow.disp,Ow.next,Ow.val, Ow.log} (not
including Ow.Cin).
Notice that, since we sometimes have nested objects, some object attributes may be configurations, so if
pacemaker is the oid of an object in Ow.Cin, then we can write Opacemaker.rate(Ow.Cin(C)) to unambigu-
ously reference the set rate of a pacemaker in system {C}. For the internal wrapped class with oid v, we
use Ov.val to denote the value of attribute of set-val.
Furthermore, for a one-step rewrite C → C ′, when Oid.a(C) = Oid.a(C ′), we say that Oid.a does not
change under C → C ′. Also, for a rewrite rule l : t → t′, we say that Oid.a does not change under l if for
any configuration C, such that l has a rewrite C → C ′, then Oid.a(C) = Oid.a(C ′).
Definition. Fix an oid w for an object of sort EPR-WRAPPER.
An w-execution state (or just execution state) is a term {C} of sort System such that C is a sensible
configuration and Ow(C) is defined. An initial state is an execution state {C} s.t. vmin ≤ Ow.val(C) ≤risk
vcrit and Ow.log(C) = nil and vmin ≤risk Ow.next(C) ≤risk vmax.
We define a corresponding proposition init (implicitly parameterized on some fixed w):
{C} |= init⇐⇒ (vmin ≤ Ow.val(C) ≤risk vcrit) ∧ (Ow.log(C) = nil) ∧ (valid(Ow.next(C)))
Definition. Fix an oid w for an object of sort EPR-WRAPPER.
A w-sensible transition system (or just sensible transition system) is a transition system on w-
execution states such that if a one-step transition δ exists from execution states {C} → {C ′}, then either:
1. Ow.static(C) = Ow.static(C
′), or
2. C ′ = tick(C, T ) where T ≤ mte(C), or
3. Ow(C)→ Ow(C ′) is a one-step rewrite applying the rule dispatch, or
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4. C → C ′ is a one-step rewrite applying the rule recv.
In case the transition δ has C ′ = tick(C, T ) with T > 0, then we say that δ is a timed transition with
time elapse te(δ) = T .
A rewriting logic system module is also said to be a w-sensible system module if it’s induced transition
system on the sort System is an w-sensible transition system.
4.5.6 Correctness of the Command Shaper Pattern
From our earlier discussions, safety of medical devices boils down to three important properties that we must
check:
1. The state must remain in some valid risk range between vmin and vmax;
2. The state must satisfy the rate of change requirements. That is, for any state V to change to a state
V ′, we can change by at most ∆(V, V ′) in one operation period;
3. The states cannot remain stressed for too long. That is for a log of stress and relax events a predicate
safe? satisfying monotonicity properties must hold for the entire execution of the system (assuming
some initial safety properties).
We start with the first property. For notational compactness, we will use ≤ in place of ≤risk.
Definition. A state v is called valid if vmin ≤ v ≤ vmax.
Theorem 4.5.11. For an w-sensible system module, any execution state {C} reachable from an initial state
has both Ow.val(C) and Ow.next(C) valid.
Proof. We prove this by induction on the number of transitions (i.e., rule applications in our case).
Ow.val(C) and Ow.next(C) are clearly both valid for {C} being an initial state.
For the inductive step, suppose that Ow.val(C
′) and Ow.next(C ′) are both valid for an execution state
{C ′}, and {C ′} → {C} via a valid transition. Of the three possible cases for transitions in sensible transition
systems:
The two easy cases, if C = tick(C ′) or Ow(C) = Ow(C ′), then Ow.static(C) = Ow.static(C ′), and the
statement holds.
If the transition occurs as a result of applying the rule dispatch, then by the form of the rhs of the rule,
we either have Ow.val(C) = Ow.next(C) = ∆(Ow.val(C
′), Ow.next(C ′)) or Ow.val(C) = Ow.next(C) =
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∆(Ow.val(C
′), vsafe). It is clear from applications of the equation del-bound in theory SAFE-STATE that
both ∆(Ow.val(C
′), Ow.next(C ′)) and ∆(Ow.val(C ′), vsafe) provide valid values.
If the transition occurs as a result of applying the rule recv, then of course Ow.val(C) = Ow.val(C
′).
Also, by the form of the rhs of the rule, Ow.next(C) = cap(v) for some term v of sort Val. cap(v) will always
be a valid value.
Next we tackle the property that the values satisfy the rate of change requirements. Whatever the ∆
function defines, we must make sure a wrapped system will not change its state faster than this per period
of operation.
Definition. In an w-sensible transition system, a state {C ′} is reachable from {C} in τ time units denoted
{C} τ−→ {C ′}, if there is path in the underlying transition δ1 . . . δn such that the timed transitions δi1 . . . δim
in this path satisfy the equality τ = te(δi1) + . . .+ te(δim).
Theorem 4.5.12. For an w-sensible system module, then if {C} τ−→ {C ′} with τ < period, it must be the
case that Ow.val(C
′) = ∆(Ow.val(C), v′) for some value v′.
Proof. If Ow.val was unchanged, then of course we have Ow.val(C
′) = ∆(Ow.val(C), Ow.val(C)).
The value of Ow.val only changes by the dispatch rule. This is only applied when the attribute Ow.disp
is t(0), and this same rule resets the timer to be t(period). Since no other rules can modify Ow.disp aside
from the time advancement rules which decrements the timer by the amount of real-time elapsed, after each
change of Ow.val, the time advancement rules must advance time by period time units before changing
again. This shows that the intervals between updates of the attribute Ow.disp is at exactly period time
units.
Furthermore, an application of the dispatch rule will reset Ow.val to either ∆(Ow.val, Ow.nextval) or
∆(Ow.val, vsafe) each of these expressions satisfy the ∆ requirement by definition.
Now, we get to the most important and non-trivial theorem that says that the system will never remain
in a stressed state for too long to be considered unsafe (based on the definition of the safe? predicate). We
first define the following auxiliary predicates on a system.
Definition. For an w-sensible system module, define the proposition safehist (implicitly parameterized on
w) as follows:
{C} |= safehist ⇐⇒ safe?(Ow.log(C))
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Lemma 4.5.13. For an w-sensible system module, consider a state {C}. Let V = Ow.val(C) and L =
Ow.log(C), and let (V,L) be a sensible pair. Furthermore, let inEnv?(V,L) = true, and mte(Ow.disp(C)) =
period. If {C} reaches {C ′′} in period time with any application of the dispatch rule, and if {C ′′} → {C ′}
with an application of the dispatch rule, then with V ′ = Ow.val(C ′) and L′ = Ow.log(C ′), we have that
(V ′, L′) is a sensible pair, and inEnv?(V ′, L′) = true.
Proof. We show inEnv?(V ′, L′) = true by case analysis.
Recall that stress?(v) = true⇔ v >risk vcrit, and relax?(v)⇔ not(stress?(v)).
Case 1: relax?(V ) = true and relax?(V ′) = true.
Because V is a relaxed state, we must have either L = nil or L = E(!relax, c(T ));L′′ for some time T
and log L′′. Since V ′ is also a relaxed state, no new event is logged during the application of the dispatch
rule, and L′ = tick(L, period) due to the accumulation of timed rules with tick applications. Thus, (V ′, L′)
is still a sensible pair. Notice that, since V is a relaxed state, we must have applied the equation inev-relax
to evaluate to true, or safe?(L) = true. Now we have:
inEnv?(V ′, L′) = safe?(L′) = safe?(tick(L, period)) = safe?(tick(E(!relax, c(T ));L′′, period))
= safe?(E(!relax, c(T + period));L′′) = safe?(L′′) = safe?(E(!relax, c(T );L)) = safe?(L) = true.
Here we used the equations relax-safe to show the equivalence to safe?(L′′).
Case 2: stress?(V ) = true and stress?(V ′) = true.
The initial and final states are both stressed, so again the log does not add any new events. (V ′, L′) is again
a sensible pair. In this case, L′ = tick(L, period). Now, we have V ′ = ∆(V,Ow.next), if Ow.next ≤ vcrit,
then we directly use Lemma 4.5.10 to conclude that inEnv?(V ′, L′) = true. On the other hand, if we have
Ow.nextval > vcrit, then it must be the case that inEnv?(V
′, L′) = true; otherwise, the set value would be
vsafe ≤ vcrit.
Case 3: stress?(V ) = true and relax?(V ′) = true.
The final state becomes relaxed. This is almost a directl consequence of Lemma 4.5.10, but we have to
allow for the extra event being added to the log. In this case, L′ = E(!relax, c(0); stop(tick(L, period)).
Again (V ′, L′) is a sensible pair. We know from Lemma 4.5.10 that inEnv?(V ′, tick(L, period)) = true.
This transforms into our desired result by the following equalities (using applications of equations relax-safe
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and stopped-safe):
inEnv?(V ′, L′) = inEnv?(V ′, E(!relax, c(0); stop(tick(L, period))))
inEnv?(V ′, stop(tick(L, period))) = inEnv?(V ′, tick(L, period)) = true.
Case 4: relax?(V ) = true and stress?(V ′) = true.
In this last case, we must reason about the conditional fragments on equations that lead to the stressed
state in the first place. If the initial state was relaxed and the final state is stressed, it must be the
case that inEnv?(V ′, log(tick(L, period), !stress)) evaluated to true before an application of dispatch,
otherwise we would end up in the final state V ′ = ∆(V, vsafe), which would not be stressed. However, after
an application of dispatch; we would have set L′ = log(tick(L, period), !stress). This means that we
conditionally checked that transitioning to a stressed state would satisfy inEnv? before taking the transition,
and thus, trivially by just looking ahead, inEnv?(V ′, L′) = true. Of course, (V ′, L′) is still a sensible pair
in this last case.
Theorem 4.5.14. In a w-sensible system module, if {C} initially satisfies predicates init and safehist, then
the future states will always satisfy safehist. More precisely:
{C} |= (init ∧ safehist)→ safehist.
Proof. As always, we proceed by induction on the number of application of rewrite rules applied to C to
prove safehist. The base case is trivial as it is part of the hypothesis.
For one transition C → C ′. The only rules that can make Ow.log(C ′) different from Ow.log(C) are
dispatch and the time advancement rule advance. The dispatch timer Ow.disp(C) must be t(0) when
dispatch is applied. Furthermore, when Ow.disp(C)) = t(0), the advance rule cannot advance the system
(except by idempotent 0 time ticks).
We first show that the starting point of the system reduces to considering a system with Ow.disp(C) =
t(0) by advancing time until the timer expires. Suppose that Ow.disp(C) = t(T ) with T > 0, then the
advance rule must be applied before we can apply the dispatch rule. Of course, tick(nil, T ′) = nil, so
Ow.log will remain unchanged. Furthermore, Ow.val does not change with time advancement. Finally, by
Theorem 4.5.11, Ow.next will remain valid. Thus, after many applications of rules other than dispatch, the
configuration C will still satisfy the init proposition. Thus, we only have to consider the case of the system
starting with Ow.disp(C) = t(0).
We have reduced the problem to where C starts with an expired timer. Let tr denote the real time of
the system C, and define the initial time (when Ow.disp first expires) to be tr = 0. Since Ow.disp ticks
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with real-time, and only the dispatch rule modifies Ow.disp from t(0) to t(period), it must be the case
that dispatch is applied exactly once every period. This means that the dispatch rule is applied at times
tr = n × period, where n is a natural number. Let C(tr) be the system configuration at time tr. We now
show that inEnv?(Ow.val(C(tr)), Ow.log(C(tr))) = true for all tr ∈ {n× period|n ∈ N}.
For n = 0, it is clear that inEnv?(Ow.val(C(0)), Ow.log(C(0))) = true just by definition and the con-
ditions of the init predicate. For the inductive step, using Lemma 4.5.13 we can check that the inductive
hypothesis is indeed satisfied in each step, so each application of the dispatch rule will preserve the truth
value of inEnv?.
Now, we have inEnv?(Ow.val(C(tr)), Ow.log(C(tr))) = true from all times tr = n × period. It then
follows that safe?(Ow.log(C(tr))) = true. Since safe? is stably invalidated as shown in Lemma 4.5.1, for
every time tr, there is an n such that tr < n×period, we have that safe?(Ow.log(C(tr))) holds for all times
tr ≥ 0. Showing that C(tr) |= safehist for all reacheable times tr.
4.5.7 Model Checking Completeness of Nested Object Configurations
This section proves that, as already stated in Section 4.4, the model checking analysis performed in Real-
Time Maude for the nested object configurations corresponding to instantiations of the Command-Shaper
Pattern are complete, that is, if it does not find a counterexample within a given time bound, no such
counterexample exists, for such a bound. The result we give here is more general, and therefore applies to
the modeling checking of other systems involving nested object configurations, such as those associated to
the patterns in Chapters 3 and 5.
Theorem 4.5.15. Consider a rewrite theory R in Real-Time Maude.
Let St be a set of timed sorts such that for all s ∈ St the operators tick : s Time → s and mte : s →
TimeInf exist. Let St0 ⊆ St be the set of timed sorts such that for all terms t of any sort s ∈ St0, t does
not contain a proper subterm of any sort in St. Also, let all instantaneous rewrite rules have left hand sides
with sort s ∈ St.
Furthermore, assume that for any function symbol f that is not the system encapsulation function { },
if f : s1 ...sn -> s has si ∈ St for any i, then s ∈ St − St0. Assume that the following equations are
satisfied by R for any f with a domain sort in St:
tick(f(t1, . . . , tn), T ) = f(t
′
1, . . . , t
′
n), where t
′
i = tick(ti, T ) if ti is a term of sort s ∈ St and t′i = ti
otherwise,
and mte(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = min{mte(ti)|ti is of sort s ∈ St}.
Finally, let there be only one timed rewrite rule in R:
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var C : Configuration . var T : Time .
crl [advance] : {C} => {tick(C, T)} in time T if T le mte(C) [nonexec] .
Then, R is time-robust (see [44]) if the following conditions are satisfied for all appropriate ground terms
t of a sort s ∈ St and r , r′ of sort Time:
1. mte(tick(t, r)) = mte(t)−˙r for all r ≤ mte(t)
2. tick(t, 0) = t
3. tick(tick(t, r), r′) = tick(t, r + r′), for r + r′ ≤ mte(T )
4. mte(σ(l)) = 0 for each ground instance σ(l) of a left-hand side of an instantaneous rewrite rule.
Furthermore, it is sufficient to consider conditions 1-3 for t of sort s ∈ St0.
Proof Sketch. Most of the proof from Theorem 19 in [44] extends almost directly to the definitions here.
The only subtle part is the proof of time robustness property TR4: if t
r−→ t′ is a tick step with r > 0, and
t′ inst−−→ t′′ is an instantaneous one-step rewrite, then t r−→ t′ is a maximal tick step.
Let {ttop} be the top-level encapsulated term of sort System. If an instantaneous rule applies to {ttop},
then by the assumptions on the format of instantaneous rewrite rules some subterm t′ of sort s ∈ St must
match a substitution of the left hand side of a rewrite rule. By Condition 4, this means that mte(t′) = 0. If
mte(ttop) > 0, by an inductive argument, mte is propagated from the minimum among all timed subterms
to the top-most term. Thus, it must be the case that mte(t′) ≥ mte(ttop) > 0, a contradiction.
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Chapter 5
A Pattern for Network Safety
Medicine is all about interactions. The patient’s health is improved by interactions with treatment. Of
course, treatments often interact with each other and present the possibility of adverse interactions. Drug
contraindications and conflicts are commonplace in the area of medical drugs. A similar phenomenon happens
in medical devices. In this chapter, we consider safety of device interactions, and in particular mutual
exclusion constraints. We give a practical example involving laser airway surgery. We look at network faults
that can make designing protocols difficult and can lead to unsafe situations. We discuss a formal pattern
that will allow the system to operate safetly under message loss failures, and we describe how this pattern
can be used to deal with mutual exclusion constraints.
5.1 Airway Laser Fires - A Case Study
Consider a typical airway laser surgery scenario. A surgical laser is used to perform surgery on a patient’s
airway. However, the flow of oxygen is not stopped, and the heat from the surgical point can start a fire.
Many times these fires can be dealt with, without any permanent harm to the patient, but sometimes these
airway fires can lead to unfortunate fatalities [50].
Airway laser fires occur frequent enough, that methods have been developed to deal with these prob-
lems with human protocols [46]. However, the safety of preventing fires can further be improved by using
automated controls and interlocks between oxygen supply devices and active surgical equipment.
5.2 The Issue of Open Loop Safety
It is easy enough to design a protocol to prevent the airway laser surgery scenario. Always make sure that
the laser is turned off before the oxygen is turned on. Figure 5.1 shows the simple first step implementation
of a potential laser oxygen interlock protocol. The laser requests for the oxygen to turn off, and it will wait
for the oxygen to return an acknowledgement. Once the oxygen acknowledges, then the laser will turn on
safely after some delay. When the oxygen timer runs out, then it will request the laser to turn off again,
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Figure 5.1: Simple Laser Protocol
and it will turn back on the oxygen before further harm comes to the patient.
On a purely logical viewpoint, there is nothing wrong with the laser oxygen interlock. However, from
a fault tolerance standpoint, it can be a very dangerous protocol. Once we consider message loss in the
system, then all bets are off. Once the oxygen turns off, the network can fail and prevent any further
messages from being sent. The oxygen will continue to try to send messages requesting the laser to turn off,
but no messages will delivered. After a certain time, we are left with a lose-lose situation. If the oxygen
stays off, then permanent brain damage can result due to the lack of oxygen, but if the oxygen turns on,
then a potential case of airway fire can occur. This dilemma is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
So how can a protocol be designed so that we never get into these unsafe situations? This is the idea of
designing for open loop safety.
5.3 The Heartbeat Pattern
5.3.1 Modeling Network Faults
We move from discussing a single device interface and interface faults to networks of devices. In order to
start thinking about the problems that occur in networked configurations, it suffices to start considering two
communicating entities. Essentially, a network can be thought of as many pairs of communicating entities.
We first focus exclusively on the fault of message loss during communication. Although this seems
like a very specific fault, many of the known existing network faults can be abstracted into this type. Of
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Figure 5.2: Network Loss and Failures
course, not receiving or dropping a message is clearly a message loss, but what about other faults such as
message corruption and delayed messages? For message corruption, in order for the system to deal with it
correctly, either error detection or error recovery must be implemented. If a message error is detected and
not correctable, then we just have a useless message and this is equivalent to a message loss. If the message
error is recoverable, then we have the original message as if no errors occurred. In terms of delayed messages,
since we are dealing with real-time systems (medical devices that must operate in a timely manner) then
not receiving the message in time can also be considered a message loss. For many other types of network
faults the same reasoning can be used to reasonably abstract them to a message loss fault.
We can model a message loss fault in the Maude object-oriented actor model with a single rule:
crl M => none if lossy?(M) = true .
Here a message is just removed form the configuration if it satisfies the predicate lossy?.
5.3.2 Transient Commands and Fail-Safe Modes
Consider the case study of turning off a ventilator for a short period of time in order to perform some other
medical procedure. This is a transient command as it should only be performed temporarily, and a turn
on message must be sent after this short window of time to restart the ventilator. However, if the network
drops this turn on message, then the ventilator may never turn on, and we enter an unsafe situation. In
order to deal with this error, we cannot rely on the network for delivering critical messages on time, and
there must be some intrinsic behavior in the ventilator for falling back to the fail-safe mode itself.
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Figure 5.3: The Heartbeat Protocol
There are many ways to acheive this, and actually, we have already solved this exact problem as an
instance of the Command-Shaper Pattern before. The Command-Shaper focused on the level of safety
that can be guarateed from a single device receiving commands from unknown sources, and in a sense, the
wrapped device acts somewhat autonomously. This makes analyzing the individual device easier since it
no longer depends completely on the network, but it makes analyzing networked behaviors difficult since
they may or may not behave according to the commands issued. However, if we also control the behavior of
the sender of these commands, then it is possible to design something that is still safe, but much easier to
analyze from a network perspective.
5.3.3 The Heartbeat Protocol
We present a well known pattern for handling unreliable network communication, while still providing safe
fall-back modes. The overall structure of our heartbeat protocol is shown in Figure 5.3.
The heartbeat protocol essentially creates a pair of wrappers around a sender-receiver pair. It classifies
the messages into repeated and non-repeated messages. The messages that are repeated are exactly the ones
that are for keeping devices in transient states as discussed above. The receiver will only stay in a transient
state if it continues to receive the repeated messages within a certain time. The sender will periodically send
the repeated messages. The idea is that if too many messages get dropped, then the receiver wrapper will
time out on receiving the repeated message and will automatically send a fall back message to the internal
configuration.
To capture the required information for the heartbeat protocol in Maude, we specify the following theory:
(oth COMM-PAIR is
inc LTIME-INF .
class Sender .
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class Receiver .
op dest : Msg -> Oid .
op sid : -> Oid .
op rid : -> Oid .
op repeat-msg? : Msg -> Bool .
msg safe-msg : Oid -> Msg .
op repeat-time : -> Time .
op timeout : -> Time .
eq repeat-time lt timeout = true .
op init-sender : -> Configuration .
op init-receiver : -> Configuration .
endoth)
Of course, this theory assumes that the system is modeled based on an object-oriented actor model with
linear time semantics. First, the Sender and Receiver classes are identified as the classes for the objects to
be wrapped. The dest operator is used to extract the destination object id from a message (since message
format is unknown). The sid and rid identify the specific object ids for the sender and receiver to be
wrapped. The repeat-msg? predicate determines which messages should be repeated (i.e. which messages
are only setting transient states). The safe-msg operator defines the message to the fall-back mode. The
repeat-time sets the period in which the sender will resend repeated messages, and the timeout defines how
long the receiver will receive a message before it performs the fail-safe actions. Of course, the assumption
is that the sender repeat time is smaller than the receiver timeout otherwise, the receiver will just timeout
before the sender even gets a chance to send. The remaining parameters are for setting the initial states of
the system.
Using the above input theory LTIME-INF, we can define the wrapper objects of the Heartbeat protocol
in a parameterized module:
(tomod REPEATER{X :: COMM-PAIR} is
pr DELAY-MSG .
class SenderWrap | internal : Configuration, time : Timer,
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repeat-msg : Configuration .ing
class ReceiverWrap | internal : Configuration, time : Timer,
repeat-msg : Configuration .
The internal attribute stores the wrapped configuration. Timers are used to both know when to send
a repeated message and when to time out for the receiver. The repeat-msg attribute is used to store
what message is currently being repeated. But the crucial aspect of the protocol is its real-time behavior
as fromally specified by rewrite rules. To illustrated the subtleties involved, we first present a flawed first
attempt, and then give the correct rules.
5.3.4 An Intuitive Yet Flawed First Attempt
The heartbeat protocol is intuitive enough. If we assume that messages received are idempotent (as is the
case for our case study: two turn off messages is the same as one), we just need to repeat messages until
the next one is sent. The important heartbeat rules specified in our first attempt to specify the protocol as
a parameterized module in Maude are as follows.
If the sender needs to send a repeated message, then the message is forwarded, and the repeat timer is
set, and the repeated message is buffered to be retransmitted.
crl < sid : SenderWrap | internal : M C, time : TM >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M > M
if dest(M) =/= sid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = true .
If the repeat timer times out, then retransmit the buffered message.
crl < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM, repeat-msg : M >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M > M
if TM = timer0 .
If the receiver receives a repeated message then reset the timeout timer and deliver the message.
crl M < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C, time : t(timeout) >
if dest(M) = rid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = true .
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If the receiver timer timesout, then go to a fall-back mode.
crl < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : safe-msg(rid) C, time : no-timer >
if TM = timer0 .
This description follows immediately form the intuitive description of the pattern. For model checking,
we let the sender turn the receiver off from time 0 to 50, then turn the receiver back on after time 50. We are
not even considering message loss yet, this is merely a check of the pattern’s correctness in behavior under
normal conditions. In the model checking, we look for points where the receiver is still turned off after time
50. We checked up to time 100, and we get many counter examples, the last one being
Solution 61
C’:Configuration --> < receiver : Receiver | state : on >
< sender : Sender | receiver : receiver,state : on >; C:Configuration --> <
receiver : ReceiverWrap | internal : < receiver : Receiver | state : off >
,time : no-timer >
< sender : SenderWrap | internal : < sender :
Sender | receiver : receiver,state : on >,repeat-msg : none,time : no-timer >
; TIME_ELAPSED:Time --> 100
No more solutions
This means that it is possible that at time 100 the receiver was still off, and indeed looking into the
details of the counter example, the receiver will be off indefinitely. The reason for this is that messages can
be reordered, and the repeated message can become out of order with a normal command message overriding
that command. This shows the importance of encoding patterns formally and not just relying on intuitive
descriptions for safety critical designs. Designs should be provably safe.
5.3.5 Ironing Out The Kinks
The disastrous counterexample that we have just seen has two fundamental causes. One is that the mes-
sages can be reordered; the other is that repeated messages are indistinguishable from original commands.
Addressing each of these points can solve the problem.
To get rid of the problem of message reordering, we can add time stamps, for example the first sender
rule now becomes
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crl < sid : SenderWrap | internal : M C, time : TM,
time-stamp : N >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M, time-stamp : up(N) >
(if dest(M) == rid then stamp(rid, M , N) else M fi)
if dest(M) =/= sid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = true .
We of course needed to change the sender and receiver attributes to add in the time stamp. We also need
to introduce a new message format with time stamps. And we must also ensure that forwarding to internal
wrapped objects also preserves the desired order. After all these changes to the protocol, model checking
this system does remove all the counterexamples. However, the time stamp based approach does have
it’s drawbacks. Of course the system becomes more complicated and, furthermore, the timestamps cause
the untimed state space to become infinite, which makes complete model checking more difficult without
good abstraction techniques. Furthermore, this increase in state space and context complicates the proof of
correctness, and it makes many more assumptions and constaints on the design.
Thus, it is better to proceed based on the second approach of distinguishing repeated messages from
original commands. Using the repeated messages only to reset timeouts but not to be delivered to the
internal configuration. The complete specification of this design is as follows:
op repeated : Oid Msg -> Msg .
op repeated? : Msg -> Bool .
vars M M’ : Msg .
var C : Configuration .
var TM : Timer .
var T : Time .
var O : Oid .
eq dest(repeated(O,M)) = O .
eq repeat-msg?(repeated(O,M)) = false .
eq repeated?(repeated(O,M)) = true .
eq repeated?(M) = false [owise] .
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eq mte(< sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM >)
= minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
eq mte(< rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >)
= minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
eq tick(< sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM >, T)
= < sid : SenderWrap | internal : tick(C,T), time : tick(TM, T) > .
eq tick(< rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >, T)
= < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : tick(C, T), time : tick(TM, T) > .
op init-sender-wrap : -> Configuration .
eq init-sender-wrap =
< sid : SenderWrap | internal : init-sender, time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none > .
op init-receiver-wrap : -> Configuration .
eq init-receiver-wrap =
< rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : init-receiver, time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none > .
--- send a nonrepeated message
crl [send-nonrepeat] : < sid : SenderWrap | internal : M C, time : TM >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none > M
if dest(M) =/= sid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = false .
--- send a repeated message
crl [send-repeat] : < sid : SenderWrap | internal : M C, time : TM >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M > M
if dest(M) =/= sid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = true .
--- need dest(M) = rid ???
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--- repeat a message
crl [repeat] : < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM, repeat-msg : M >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M > repeated(dest(M), M)
if TM = timer0 .
--- forward msg to sender
crl [fwd-to-sender] : M < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C M >
if dest(M) = sid .
--- forward a message that will be repeated
crl [fwd-with-repeat] : M < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C, time : t(timeout),
repeat-msg : M >
if dest(M) = rid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = true .
--- forward a message that is not repeated
crl [fwd-no-repeat] : M < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C, time : no-timer >
if dest(M) = rid /\ repeat-msg?(M) = false /\ repeated?(M) = false .
--- receiving a message repeat that was seen
rl [repeated-seen] : repeated(rid,M) < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM,
repeat-msg : M >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | time : t(timeout) > .
--- receiving a message repeat that was not seen
crl [repeat-not-seen] : repeated(rid,M) < rid : ReceiverWrap | repeat-msg : M’ >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | >
if M =/= M’ .
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--- repeat message timeout
crl [repeat-timeout] : < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : safe-msg(rid) C, time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none >
if TM = timer0 .
--- forward out from receiver
crl [fwd-from-recv] : < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C > M
if dest(M) =/= rid .
endtom)
The modelchecking for this new protocol also generates no counterexamples, and has the advantage of
being much simpler than the design using time stamps.
5.3.6 Proof of Correctness
We show that under the condition of no message loss our pattern gives the exact behavior as an ideal
communicating pair. Again, this requires us to prove a stuttering bisimulation, and the first step in to
establish the bisimulation relation H.
The only difference between our system and the ideal system is that the sender and receiver are wrapped
and there are more types of messages. Thus we define the projection relation as follows:
vars C C’ : Configuration .
vars NC NC’ : NEConfiguration .
op proj-wrapped : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq proj-wrapped(NC NC’) = proj-wrapped(NC) proj-wrapped(NC’) .
eq proj-wrapped(< receiver : ReceiverWrap | internal : C >) = C .
eq proj-wrapped(< sender : SenderWrap | internal : C >) = C .
eq proj-wrapped(repeated(O:Oid, M:Msg)) = none .
eq proj-wrapped(NC) = NC [owise] .
Thus giving two systems, an ideal one s = {C} and a wrapped one s′ = {C ′}. We have that sHs′ iff
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C =proj-wrapped(C ′).
In order to show this, we must first show that under normal operation (no dropped messages and no out
of order delivery), the wrapped receiver will never take the fall back mode. That is the rule repeat-timeout
should never be applied starting in a proper initial state and when no messages are lost.
Definition. Let s be a wrapped system of the form
C < O : SenderWrapper | internal : C ′, time : TM, repeat-msg : M >
< O′ : ReceiverWrapper | internal : C ′′, time : TM ′, repeat-msg : M ′ >
s is a proper initial state iff
1. C contains no messages of the form repeated(Oid,Msg) and no other objects of type SenderWrapper
and ReceiverWrapper
2. TM = TM ′ = no-timer
3. M = M ′ = none
Also, define a relation < for timers such that t(T ) < t(T ′) when T < T ′ and also t(T ) < no-timer.
With the proper definition of an initial state, we have the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.3.1. Let s0 be a proper initial state of a wrapped sender-receiver pair. Let s be a any state
reacheable from s0 by the rewrite rules in the module REPEATER. s will have the form
C < O′ : ReceiverWrapper | time : TM ′, ...>, and TM ′ > t(0)
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of rewrite rules applied from the module REPEATER. We use
the stronger induction hypothesis that any reacheable state has the form
s = C < O : SenderWrapper | time : TM, repeat-msg : M, ...>
< O′ : ReceiverWrapper | time : TM ′, repeat-msg : M ′, ...>
and one of the following must hold
1. TM ′ = no-timer
2. C = C ′ repeated(O′, M ′) and M = M ′ and TM ′ > t(0)
3. C = C ′M ′′ where repeat-msg?(M ′′) = false and M = none
4. TM ′ > TM .
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The initial state clearly satisfies the induction hypothesis.
Now, we reason on each of the rules. Notice that since we assume in order delivery of messages the send
and receive rules are usually taken in pairs. Consider the step s′ → s.
Notice that the timer for the sender, when set, is always set to t(repeat-time), and the timer for the
receiver, when set, is always set to t(timeout). Also, since values of timers can never increase, we always
have TM ′ ≤ t(timeout), and TM ≤ t(repeat-time). We also have t(repeat-time) < t(timeout) by the
requirements of the input theory COMM-PAIR.
If the last rewrite rule taken was send-nonrepeat, then by the form of the right hand side of the rule, s
satisfies case 3 of the induction invariant.
If the last rewrite rule taken was send-repeat or repeat, then by the form of rewrite rule, s should
satisy case 2 of the induction invariant.
If the last rewrite rule taken was fwd-with-repeat, and assuming s′ only had one instance of a repeated
message, then the sender must have sent a repeated message by the rules send-repeat or repeat. Since
time cannot elapse while a message is in the configuration, the sender timer must be TM = t(repeat-time),
and the receiver timer is set to TM ′ = t(timeout), and we have TM ′ > TM .
If the last rewrite rule taken was fwd-no-repeat, then the receiver timer is set to TM ′ is no-timer, and
s satisfies case 1.
If the last rewrite rule was repeated-seen, then the sender has just sent a repeated message, and the
sender timer must be set. The receiver timer is set to t(timeout) (largest possible time to set for any sender
or receiver timer), and we have TM ′ > TM .
Any other rewrite rule, including fwd-to-sender or fwd-from-recv, should not modify the attributes
of the SenderWrapper and ReceiverWrapper objects, and also should not add any repeated messages into
the external configuration. The rule repeat-not-seen should never be taken if the messages are delivered
in order, and the rule repeat-timeout will of course never be taken as the inductive hypothesis always has
TM ′ 6= t(0).
Thus considering all possible rewrite rules, we see that the time attribute for the ReceiverWrapper
object never reaches t(0).
The important implication of this Lemma is that we no longer have to consider the case where the
ReceiverWrapper timesout by not receiving a repeated message. Thus, in reasoning about the case where
no messages are lost in communication, it means that we do not have to consider transitions taken by the
rule repeat-timeout.
With this knowledge, we are ready to prove the bisimulation result between an ideal communicating pair,
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and a wrapped communicating pair.
We again use the notion of a well-founded simulation to show a bisimulation. First, we define some
important values associated with the states.
Definition. Let a wrapped system s have the form:
{ C < O : SenderWrapper | internal : C ′, time : TM, repeat-msg : M >
< O′ : ReceiverWrapper | internal : C ′′, time : TM ′, repeat-msg : M ′ > }
Let nmsgts(s) be the number of messages in C to the sender object O.
Let nmsgtr(s) be the number of messages in C to the receiver object O
′.
Let nmsgfs(s) be the number of messages in C
′ where the destination is not the sender object O.
Let nmsgfr(s) be the number of messages in C
′′ where the destination is not the receiver object O′.
Let χrepeat be an indicator value that is set to 1 when TM = t(0) and 0 otherwise.
Also, in order for the wrapper to function correctly, we must satisfy the condition of no messages bypassing
the sender wrapper. The state of s actually has enough information to define the condition of no bypass
without considering time. Let nobypass(s) be true iff
1. C contains no messages to the receiver O′
2. C contains a message MR to the receiver, and M = MR
Define the relation H ⊆ Sideal×Swrapped such that {C}H{C ′} iff C =proj-wrapped(C ′)∧nobypass(C).
We have already defined a proper inital state for wrapped systems earlier. For an ideal system, define
a proper inital state to be a configuration with a sender and reciever (to be wrapped) and no messages in
transit.
Theorem 5.3.2. The relation H is a well-founded bisimulation (when restricted to all the reachable states
from proper inital states).
Proof. We first show the well-founded simulation form Sideal to Swrapped.
Define µ(si, sf ) = 0 and µ(si, s
′
i, sf ) = 3nmsgfr(sf )+2χrepeat+2nmsgfs(sf )+nmsgts(sf )+nmsgtr(sf ).
Suppose that siHsf , we consider possible transitions si → s′i.
Let sf have the following form
{ C < Os : SenderWrapper | internal : Cs, time : TM, repeat-msg : Mr >
< Or : ReceiverWrapper | internal : Cr, time : TM
′, repeat-msg : M ′r > }
Let nmsgts(s) be the number of messages in C to the sender
(1) mte(si) = 0 and a message M is delivered in s
′
i, we consider the following cases:
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(1.a) M is not a message to or from Os or Or, and thus M is also in the external configuration of sf ,
then sf → s′f takes a corresponding transition by using the same rule, and we have s′iHs′f .
(1.b) M is a message to Os, and M is in Cs, then, again, sf → s′f takes a corresponding transition using
the same rule, and we have s′iHs
′
f .
(1.c) M is a message to Os, and M is in C, then we can apply the fwd-to-sender rule, and nmsgts
decreases, and thus µ′ decreases as required.
(1.d) M is a message to Or, and M is in Cr, this is similar to case (1.b)
(1.e) M is a message to Or, and M is in C, and repeat-msg?(M) =true, the fwd-with-repeat rule
applies, and siHs
′
f and nmsgtr decreases.
(1.d) M is a message to Or, and M is in C, and repeat-msg?(M) =false, the fwd-no-repeat rule
applies, and siHs
′
f and nmsgtr decreases.
(1.f) M is a message from Os, and M is in Cs, M must be forwarded by either rules send-nonrepeat
or send-repeat. In any case, siHs
′
f and nmsgfs decreases by 1, and nmsgtr or nmsgts (not both) may
increase by 1, but this will still decrease µ′.
(1.g) M is a message from Or, and M is in Cr, M must be forwarded by the rule fwd-from-recv. siHs
′
f
and nmsgfs decreases by 1, and nmsgts may increase by 1, but we have a net decrease in µ
′.
(1.h) M is a message from Os or Or, but M is in C. This will be subsumed under the previous cases
unless the destination of M is not Os or Or, in which case sf will take a corresponding rewrite rule siHs
′
f .
(2) mte(si) > 0, and si → sf is a tick rule advancing time by one time unit. We consider a few subcases
for the transition of sf .
(2.a) mte(sf ) > 0, then we also apply a one time unit tick rule to have siHsf .
(2.b) mte(sf ) = 0 because the sender repeat timer TM has expired. In this case, the rule repeat is used,
and we have siHs
′
f and χrepeat decreases, and nmsgtr increases; a net decrease in µ
′.
(2.e) mte(sf ) = 0 because a message M needs to be delivered. The only new messages that can be in sf
and not si are repeated messages, and so the rule repeated-seen can be applied, and we have a decrease
in nmsgtr.
This covers all the cases for showing a well-founded simulation from Sideal to Swrapped. Now for the other
direction.
We define ν(sf , si) = 3nmsgfr(sf ) + 2ξrepeat + 2nmsgfs(sf ) + nmsgts(sf ) + nmsgtr(sf )
and ν′(sf , s′f , si) = 0.
Let H ′ = H−1, and suppose sfH ′si.
We consider the following cases:
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(1’) mte(sf ) > 0, and sf → s′f is a tick rule advancing time by one time unit. By the homomorphic
definition of mte, if sfH
′si, then mte(si) > 0, and a corresponding one time unit tick step can be taken
si → s′i with s′fH ′s′i.
In the next set of cases, we consider transitions that occur by the rules in module REPEATER. Note that
none of the rules modify the states of internal objects, and they only generate new message of the form
repeated. Thus, s′fH
′si holds for all these cases by the nature of the projection relation. Thus, we only
have to show that ν decreases.
(2’) s′f is reached by rule send-nonrepeat. nmsgfs decreases by 1 while nmsgtr or nmsgts (but not
both) may increase by 1 resulting in a net decrease of ν.
(3’) s′f is reached by rule send-repeat. Even though internal object parameters are set differently,
externally, this looks the same as case (2’).
(4’) s′f is reached by rule repeat. χrepeat decreases by 1 and nmsgtr increases by 1 resulting in a net
decrease of ν.
(5’) s′f is reached by rule fwd-to-sender. nmsgts decreases.
(6’) s′f is reached by rule fwd-with-repeat or fwd-no-repeat or repeated-seen. nmsgtr decreases.
(7’) s′f is reached by rule fwd-from-recv. nmsgfr decreases by 1 while nmsgtr or nmsgts (but not both)
may increase by 1 resulting in a net decreases of ν.
The last case to consider is when mte(sf ) = 0 and a rule outside the REPEATER module is applied. We
assume that none of these rules have terms containing SenderWrapper, ReceiverWrapper, or repeated. In
this case, si should also be able to match the left hand side of the same rule, and we have s
′
fH
′S′i.
Note that for all these cases, we were able to ignore the rules repeat-timeout and repeat-not-seen in
the case by case analysis by the results of Lemma 5.3.1, and since we only consider proper initial states.
We have shown that H is a well-founded bisimulation, and thus, we have a bisimulation between ideal
communicating pairs and wrapped sender and receiver configurations.
5.3.7 Proof of Robustness
What we have just proved is the correctness of the Heartbeat pattern when the network does not fail. This
is good in showing that under normal operating conditions our pattern does not deviate from the ideal
behavior. However, our pattern should do much more than that under failure situations. Note that in cases
where faults occur, there is really no ideal behavior to compare to since the fault has already deviated from
ideal conditions. Furthermore, message loss over the network, and real-time constraints means that the
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system must make automated safe transitions even when they are not required.
Intuitively, a receiver is safe if it reacts to all the critical commands. In our pattern, the critical command
is captured by safe-msg. A receiver reacting to a critical message would then mean that when a sender
sends a safe-msg, then the receiver will receive the safe-msg at most some Tmax time units later. This
brings us to the following theorem.
Theorem 5.3.3. Consider a sender and receiver configuration with view form COMM-PAIR. Now, consider a
wrapped configuration
{ C < Os : SenderWrapper | internal : Cs, time : TM, repeat-msg : Mr >
< Or : ReceiverWrapper | internal : Cr, time : TM
′, repeat-msg : M ′r > }
If the receiver object last received a repeated message M with repeat-msg?(M) = true, and if the sender
object with oid sid in Cs sends a message of type safe-msg at time t1, and the sender object sends no
other messages in time betwenn t1 and t1+timeout, then the receiver object with oid rid in Cr will receive
a message of type safe-msg no later than t1+timeout.
This occurs even if we have the message loss rule at the top most level of the configuration:
rl [drop-msg] : { M:Msg C:Configuration } => { C:Configuration } .
Proof. Suppose that the sender sends a safe-msg at time t1, and since there are no other messages being
sent by the sender at time t1, then the configuration must be of the form:
{ C
< Os : SenderWrapper | internal : Cs safe-msg(Or), time : TM, repeat-msg : Mr >
< Or : ReceiverWrapper | internal : Cr, time : TM
′, repeat-msg : M ′r > }
where Cs, C, and Cr contains no messages from Os to Or.
For simplicity we assume that the safe-msg is not repeated, that is, repeated-msg?(safe-msg) =
false. This means that the rule send-nonrepeat will eventually be applied (assume the configuration we
described is the last state before the rule was applied, and we have a configuration of the form:
{ C < Os : SenderWrapper | internal : Cs, time : no-timer, repeat-msg : none >
safe-msg
< Or : ReceiverWrapper | internal : Cr, time : TM
′, repeat-msg : M ′r > }
Now, there are two cases, one is to apply the rule fwd-no-repeat, in which case safe-msg ends up in
the internal configuration of the receiver, eventually getting consumed by the receiver object. In this case,
the statement of the theorem is trivially satisfied. The second case is that the rule drop-msg is applied, and
we are left with the configuration:
{ C < Os : SenderWrapper | internal : Cs, time : no-timer, repeat-msg : none >
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safe-msg
< Or : ReceiverWrapper | internal : Cr, time : TM
′, repeat-msg : M ′r > }
Since C contains no messages, and since the last message received by the receiver was repeated, it must
be that timer TM ′ is set. Furthermore, the maximum value of TM ′ is t(timeout), and no rules can be
applied to reset TM ′ as all rules to reset the value requires a message from Os to Or in configuration C.
This means that eventually TM ′ will expire in at most timeout time units, and the rule repeat-timeout
will be used. This rule generates a safe-msg in the receiver configuration, and again the statement of the
theorem is satisfied in this case.
5.4 A Safe Laser Surgery Protocol - An Application of the
Heartbeat Pattern
We have described in detail a heartbeat pattern that can provide timely message delivery guarantees for
critical messages even when the network may be faulty and drop messages. We have described in the
beginning a laser surgery example that needs specific safety considerations when messages can be dropped.
Clearly, creating a safe design for such a system is nontrivial and, furthermore, even if such a safe design
was acheived, it is unclear how future changes in the code and protocols can affect the safety of the system.
This is a perfect opportunity to apply the Heartbeat Pattern that we just described. It will provide safety
guarantees while still maintaining flexibility of the internal logic.
The general idea of using the heartbeat pattern as a solution for faulty networks is to use the property
guaranteed by Theorem 5.3.3. Clearly, the critical message that can be missed by the laser is the message
to turn off. Thus, if we assign as the safe-cmd the turn off command for the laser, then we will be able to
design a safe system taking into account timing delays. Recall that from Theorem 5.3.3, the maximum time
from sending a safe-cmd to receiving it is at most timeout time units. Thus, we know that the laser must
turn off within timeout time units if we use the pattern, and we are able to use this to guarantee the safety
property that the oxygen and the laser will never be on at the same time.
A simple description of the laser oxygen system is shown below:
(tomod LASER is
pr DELAY-MSG .
pr POSRAT-TIME-DOMAIN-WITH-INF .
122
sort State .
ops on off : -> State .
class Oxygen | state : State, receiver : Oid, turn-on-timer : Timer,
buffer-timer : Timer .
class Laser | state : State .
ops oxygen laser : -> Oid .
op off-time : -> Time .
eq off-time = 100 .
op buffer-time : -> Time .
eq buffer-time = 10 .
op set : Oid State -> Msg .
vars S S’ : State .
var O O’ : Oid .
rl set(O, off)
< O : Oxygen | state : S’, receiver : O’ >
=> < O : Oxygen | state : off, turn-on-timer : t(off-time) >
set(O’, on) .
rl set(O, on)
< O : Oxygen | state : S’, receiver : O’ >
=> < O : Oxygen | state : S’, turn-on-timer : no-timer,
buffer-timer : t(buffer-time) >
set(O’, off) .
rl < O : Oxygen | state : off, turn-on-timer : t(0), receiver : O’ >
=> < O : Oxygen | state : off, turn-on-timer : no-timer,
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buffer-timer : t(buffer-time) >
set(O’, off) .
rl < O : Oxygen | state : off, buffer-timer : t(0) >
=> < O : Oxygen | state : on, buffer-timer : no-timer > .
rl set(O, S)
< O : Laser | state : S’ >
=> < O : Laser | state : S > .
var T : Time .
vars TM TM’ : Timer .
eq mte(< oxygen : Oxygen | buffer-timer : TM, turn-on-timer : TM’ >)
= minimum(mte(TM), mte(TM’)) .
eq tick(< oxygen : Oxygen | buffer-timer : TM, turn-on-timer : TM’ >, T)
= < oxygen : Oxygen | buffer-timer : tick(TM, T), turn-on-timer : tick(TM’, T) > .
eq mte(< laser : Laser | >) = INF .
eq tick(< laser : Laser | >, T) = < laser : Laser | > .
endtom)
The laser and oxygen systems are both modelled as having two states on and off. The oxygen system has
safety requirements to not turn off for too long. This is captured in the turn-on-time constant. A timer
in the oxygen system will ensure that the oxygen turns back on in a desired time window. Furthermore, in
order to compensate for command delays to the laser, the oxygen sysetm also has a buffer-time that it
must also time before making state transitions. The rules are effectively describing changing states based
on messages received as well as setting these timers appropriately. When the oxygen system wants to turn
back on, it will send a message to the laser, as well as wait for the required buffer-time. Of course, this
system by itself is clearly not safe, since the laser has no automated means to turn off once the network fails.
Indeed, model checking a simple configuration gives many counter examples:
(tsearch { init-sender init-receiver init-msg }
=>* { C:Configuration } s.t.
get-state(oxygen, C) == on /\ get-state(laser, C) == on
in time <= 100 .)
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Timed search in TEST-TEST
{init-sender init-receiver init-msg} =>* {C:Configuration}
in time <= 100 and with mode default time increase 1 :
Solution 1
C:Configuration --> < laser : Laser | state : on > < oxygen : Oxygen |
buffer-timer : no-timer,receiver : laser,state : on,turn-on-timer :
no-timer > ; TIME_ELAPSED:Time --> 60
...
Now, we apply the heartbeat pattern, and automatically transition the receiver (the laser) to safe states
when needed. First, we need to define all the parameters for the view.
(tomod LASER-AUX is
inc LASER .
op repeat-msg? : Msg -> Bool .
var O : Oid .
eq repeat-msg?(set(O, on)) = true .
eq repeat-msg?(set(O, off)) = false .
op dest : Msg -> Oid .
eq dest(set(O, S:State)) = O .
op safe-msg : Oid -> Msg .
eq safe-msg(O) = set(O, off) .
op timeout : -> Time .
eq timeout = 8 .
op repeat-time : -> Time .
eq repeat-time = 5 .
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op init-sender : -> Configuration .
op init-receiver : -> Configuration .
eq init-sender =
< oxygen : Oxygen |
state : on, receiver : laser, turn-on-timer : no-timer,
buffer-timer : no-timer > .
eq init-receiver = < laser : Laser | state : off > .
endtom)
(view SimpleCommPair
from COMM-PAIR
to LASER-AUX is
class Sender to Oxygen .
class Receiver to Laser .
op sid to oxygen .
op rid to laser .
op repeat-msg? to repeat-msg? .
msg safe-msg to safe-msg .
op repeat-time to repeat-time .
op timeout to timeout .
op init-sender to init-sender .
op init-receiver to init-receiver .
endv)
Essentially, we are just providing the key information required before using the pattern correctly. The
sending and receiving object ids and the appropriate timeouts to use. We also identify the set(O, off)
message to be the safe-msg, and, naturally, since we only have two types of messages, the set(O, on)
message is the repeated message. Note that the timeout is set to 8 time units, while the buffered state
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transition delay for the oxygen is 10 time units, and by Theorem 5.3.3 this is sufficient waiting time.
Instantiating the pattern is pretty much completely done by the parameterized REPEATER specification.
We just need to define the initial states for execution.
(tomod TEST-TEST is
inc REPEATER{SimpleCommPair} .
op init : -> Configuration .
eq init = init-sender-wrap init-receiver-wrap .
op init-msg : -> Configuration .
eq init-msg = delay(set(oxygen, off), t(0)) delay(set(oxygen, on), t(50)) .
Furthermore, aside from instantiating the model, we model the message loss fault by a rule that will
remove messages in the outermost configuration. Note that we only remove messages in the outer-most
configuration, the inner configurations must still reliably deliver messages in order for the behavior to make
sense. It is assumed that the inner configurations receive messages locally and not across the network.
rl { M:Msg C:Configuration } => { C:Configuration } .
For model checking purposes, we also define an operator get-state to probe the internal states of the
objects.
op get-state : Oid Configuration -> State .
op err : -> State .
var O : Oid .
vars C C’ : Configuration .
var S : State .
eq get-state(O, < O : ReceiverWrap | internal : C > C’) = get-state(O, C) .
eq get-state(O, < O : Laser | state : S > C) = S .
eq get-state(O, < O : SenderWrap | internal : C > C’) = get-state(O, C) .
eq get-state(O, < O : Oxygen | state : S > C) = S .
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eq get-state(O, C) = err [owise] .
endtom)
Thus, we have finally instantiated our laser-oxygen example, added the rule for the faults, given the
information for an initial state, and provided the necessary operators to define the safety predicate. We can
use a timed search to perform the model checking of the safety invariant that the laser and oxygen are never
on at the same time.
(tsearch { init init-msg }
=>* { C:Configuration } s.t.
get-state(oxygen, C) == on /\ get-state(laser, C) == on
in time <= 100 .)
We find that, indeed, our system with the initial conditions defined has no counter examples:
Timed search in TEST-TEST
{init init-msg} =>* {C:Configuration}
in time <= 100 and with mode default time increase 1 :
No solution
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Chapter 6
Formal Model Based Device
Emulation
Currently, all of our models execute in simulation time. In general for modeling and verification, this is
a desirable feature, as simulation time can advance much faster than real time, and we may be able to
simulate 1 hour of behavior in a few seconds and analyze it. However, Maude inherently provides us with
the ability to execute our specifications, and the sockets API also allow the model to communicate with the
outside world. This brings up the question of whether we can use the model not only as a simulation but
an emulation of the software itself. That is, if we model a control algorithm for a medical device, what is
to stop us from using this model as a real-time software controller? It turns out that the Maude framework
has already laid out all the foundations for this to happen, and we just need to put them all together.
6.1 Distributed Emulation of Safe Medical Devices
We now discuss the transformation of the model to execute in real world time with physical devices in a
medical device emulation environment. For this purpose we take the model of the wrapped pacemaker
and wrap it again in an external execution wrapper (Figure 6.1). The execution wrapper is responsible for
conveying to the model the notion of real world time as well as providing a communication interface to
the external world. A dedicated timer thread is responsible for “ticking” the model by sending a minimal
number of messages to advance the model’s logical time. The timer thread also intercepts all asynchronous
(interrupt) messages and relays them to the model. Another aspect of the execution wrapper is the ability
to map external I/O messages to communicate with the external devices. For example, in the pacemaker
specification an internal message called paceVentricle may be mapped into an entire client configuration to
send a message for setting the final voltage on a pacing lead.
The external execution wrapper is an object that encapsulates the original model. It is primarily respon-
sible for interfacing constructs between the physical world (the real interfaces to devices) and the logical
world (the world as seen by the model). In particular, the execution wrapper is responsible for conveying
the measurement of real time elapsed to the model and also mapping logical communication messages to
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Figure 6.1: Real-Time Model Execution Wrapper
communication configurations that can deliver the message. The most important feature of the external
execution wrapper is its modularity. Aside from adding the minimal information about how to map external
I/O to messages in the model, no further specifications are required to execute the logical model with an
external environment.
6.2 Mapping Internal Messages to External I/O
Validating the design of a device in an execution environment requires handling its outputs. After all, the
end validation of a system’s behavior is based on its outputs. Thus, it seems reasonable to talk about how
internal messages in the model can be converted into messages for communicating with the external world.
This section also serves as an explanation for unfamiliar readers of how Maude sockets are used.
In order to talk about external communication, we must first define in the model what is external. The
model will have an internal distributed actor configuration with internal messages as well as messages to be
output to the external world. Thus, the first definition is EXTERNAL-CONFIGURATION, which defines a sort
of external messages ExtMsg as a subsort of Msg. Furthermore, external messages are classified in terms of
incoming external messages InExtMsg and outgoing external messages OutExtMsg. A configuration is called
open if there are external messages present in the configuration: either an incoming external message has
not been delivered, or an outgoing external message has not been sent. The predicate open? is defined
accordingly.
subsorts InExtMsg OutExtMsg < ExtMsg < Msg .
op open? : Configuration -> Bool .
eq open?(C C’) = open?(C) or open?(C’) .
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eq open?(O) = false .
eq open?(M) = M :: ExtMsg .
Actually sending an external message may be more complex than just forwarding the message through the
gateway object. External messages may not be represented in the same way in the internal configuration.
For example, a simple output message in the internal configuration may need to be mapped to a client
object that initiates the communication to deliver the message. Operators in-adapter and out-adapter
are defined to perform these mappings from external message client configurations to internal messages.
An example of an output adapter for a pacemaker message to beat the heart may be:
eq out-adapter(shock)
= createSendReceiveClient(pacer-client, "localhost", 4451, "SetLeadVoltage 5V")
In this example, the message shock is transformed into a client object which sends a message on port
4451 with the string "SetLeadVoltage 5V" indicating that the proxy server will then proceed to set a 5V
voltage on the pacemaker lead.
6.2.1 One-Round Communication Clients
Once the external message is mapped into a client configuration, we define the rewrite rules to specify how the
communication protocol works with the external device. Here we describe a simple SEND-RECEIVE-CLIENT
which is responsible for establishing communication, sending a message, receiving a reply, and then closing
the communication. Although simple, this type of protocol is sufficient for most of the communication for
medical devices we have used in our case studies.
(mod SEND-RECEIVE-CLIENT is ...
op createSendReceiveClient : Oid String Nat String -> Configuration .
eq createSendReceiveClient(CLIENT, ADDRESS, PORT, SEND-CONTENTS)
= < CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... >
createClientTcpSocket(socketManager, CLIENT, ADDRESS, PORT) .
op msg-received : Oid String -> InExtMsg .
...endm)
After creating the client and establishing communication, the client goes into one round of sending and
receiving before the socket is closed. Once the socket is closed, the entire client object is converted into one
reply message to be delivered to the internal configuration using the operator msg-received.
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--- send contents
rl createdSocket(CLIENT, socketManager, SOCKET-DST)
< CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... send-contents : SEND-CONTENTS >
=> < CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... > send(SOCKET-DST, CLIENT, SEND-CONTENTS) .
--- receive contents
rl sent(CLIENT, SOCKET-DST) < CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... >
=> < CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... > receive(SOCKET-DST, CLIENT) .
--- close socket
rl received(CLIENT, SOCKET-DST, RECEIVE-CONTENTS) < CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... >
=> < CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... recv-contents : RECEIVE-CONTENTS >
closeSocket(SOCKET-DST, CLIENT) .
--- done
rl closedSocket(CLIENT, SOCKET-DST, "")
< CLIENT : SendReceiveClient | ... recv-contents : RECEIVE-CONTENTS >
=> msg-received(CLIENT, RECEIVE-CONTENTS) .
6.3 Mapping Logical Time to Physical Time
As mentioned earlier, time advancement of the system is achieved by defining the tick and mte operators.
Ideally the system continuously evolves over time (possibly nondeterministically). Of course, we cannot
capture the notion of continuous time without abstractions in the model, so to advance time discretely, an
mte (maximum time elapsable) operator is introduced. A correctly defined mte operator ensures that if a
system is in state S, then for any time T < mte(S), no 0-time rewrite rules (state transitions) can apply to
tick(S, T ). That is, if a system is in state S, and T ≤ mte(S), then tick(S, T ) will be equivalent to the state
S advancing in continuous time for T time units. This ideal semantics of time is shown on the left side of
Figure 6.2. The figure shows that 0-time rewrite rules are assumed to take zero time, and ideally, the system
continuously evolves over time between the 0-time rewrite rules.
Of course, in a real execution of the model, the ideal notion of time with 0-time rewrite rules and time-
advancing rules is only an idealized abstraction. Performing rewrites cannot take zero time, and we cannot
continuously rewrite states of the system over time. We could of course create a model in discrete time
with very fine time granularity and drive it by a high frequency clock like in hardware. However, this would
introduce a lot of unnecessary overhead in terms of communication of timing messages and performing
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Figure 6.2: From Ideal Time Advancement Semantics to Physical Time Advancement
rewrite rules to change the model for every clock tick. We resolve this problem by observing that the
actual internal state of the model is not important at most instants in time, unless it is communicating with
the external world. The model states only generate output messages with 0-time rewrite rules, so we can
essentially let the model in state S remain unaffected by the passage of time until the next time instant in
which a 0-time rewrite rule can be applied; this is exactly mte(S) time units later. This method of driving
execution is shown in the right part of Figure 6.2. We have created a dedicated timer server thread (in Java)
that has access to the system time. When the execution of the wrapped model starts, it will send a start
request which includes the time units of the model or the minimum granularity of time for model execution
in milliseconds. Once the timer thread processes all the initial information, it will send a Go! message
to signal the model to start executing. The model then calculates the maximum time elapsable (which is
10 seconds in the example) and sends this information to the timer thread. The model then proceeds to
sleep until the timer thread wakes it in time for the next 0-time rewrite rule. The process then continues.
There are two key points to notice about this example. The input and output messages from the model may
be delayed by an amount of time equal to the communication jitter plus the time to complete rewriting.
Normally this delay is on the order of 10 ms, but this is still suitable for medical devices, which normally
receive commands on the order of seconds or more. Also, the timer thread sets the timeout from the last
time it sent a time advancement message to the model and not from the time it receives the mte message
from the model. This ensures that clock skew and jitter are bounded over time.
6.3.1 Synchronous Timed Execution
The communication wrapper (commwrap) is represented as an object with the attributes for the communica-
tion state, the socket information for communication, and the internal wrapped (Real-Time Maude) system
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model being executed. The top level system is of sort CommWrapConfiguration for any communicating
model.
op commwrap : Configuration -> CommWrapConfiguration .
op wrap-client : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq wrap-client(C) = < client : TickClient |
state : start, internal : [ {C} in time 0 ], socket-name : no-oid > .
op init-client : -> CommWrapConfiguration .
eq init-client = commwrap( <> wrap-client(internal)
createClientTcpSocket(socketManager, client, addr, port) ) .
The communication wrapper initializes a wrapped communication client that receives messages from
the tick server (a Java thread executing in real-time that sends it messages for time advancement). After
creating the TCP socket, the first message sent from the client to the tick server is the time-granularity
(time-grain), which is a rational number specifying the number of milliseconds in one time unit. Then,
the actual execution starts when the communication wrapper receives a GO message from the tick server.
The time when the tick server sends the GO message is the starting point from which time elapses are being
measured. Upon receiving the GO message, the formal model will immediately start to execute (state :
run).
rl [send-init] :
commwrap( <> createdSocket(...) < client : TickClient | ... > )
=> commwrap( <> < client : TickClient | ... > send(..., string(time-grain)) ) .
rl [wait-for-go] :
commwrap( <> sent(...) < client : TickClient | ... > )
=> commwrap( <> < client : TickClient | ... > receive(...) ) .
rl [start-running] :
commwrap( <> received(..., "GO\r\n") < client : TickClient | ... > )
=> commwrap( <> < client : TickClient | state : run, ... > .
The formal model executes until mte becomes non-zero (no other 0-time rewrite rules can be applied),
and the model sends a message to request the next time advancement message after the maximum time
elapse and blocks. After sending this waiting duration, the tick server will sleep for this time duration and
then send a time advancement message when the time has expired. The model will then advance time (tick)
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the model for the time duration expired and perform 0-time rewrite rules. The model now blocks again for
the next mte, and the cycle repeats.
crl [request-wait-timer] :
commwrap( <>
< client : TickClient |
state : run,
internal : [ {C} in time T ], ... > )
=> commwrap( <>
< client : TickClient |
state : request, ... >
send(..., string(mte(C, T))) )
if mte(C,T) :: TimeInf /\ mte(C,T) > 0 /\ not open?(C) . ...
rl [block] :
commwrap( <> sent(...)
< client : TickClient |
state : request, ... > )
=> commwrap( <>
< client : TickClient |
state : wait, ... >
receive(SOCKET-NAME, client) ) .
rl [wake-up] :
commwrap( <> received(..., ADV-STR)
< client : TickClient |
state : wait, ... > )
=> commwrap( <>
< client : TickClient |
state : run,
internal : [ {tick(C, rat(ADV-STR))} in time rat(ADV-STR) in time T ], ... > ) .
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Figure 6.3: Handling Interrupts and Asynchronous Communication Semantics
6.3.2 Handling Asynchronous External Events
So far, the model can only handle synchronous events (polling and blocking communication). However, in
general a useful design must be able to react to external events from the environment. For example, an EKG
sensor detects a QRS waveform, and sends this information to the pacemaker. This points to the fact that
our model needs to be able to handle external events asynchronously.
An external message would trigger a 0-time rewrite rule to receive the message by some object and process
it. More precisely, if we have CM and CExt as the model configuration and the external (environment) config-
uration respectively, the maximum time elapse for the system CMCExt should be min(mte(CM ),mte(CExt)),
where mte(CExt) denotes time duration before the next interrupt message. This semantics is captured by
having interrupt messages forwarded by the timer thread, as shown in Figure 6.3. The timer thread will
only check for interrupts when it is waiting for the next timeout, so when the interrupt message arrives, it
will wake up and immediately forward the interrupt message to the model with the amount of time that has
elapsed. Any future timeouts are canceled. Introducing the notion of interrupts requires us to modify the
wake-up rule for the model to not only advance time, but also check for potential interrupt messages as well.
rl [wake-up] :
commwrap( <> received(client, SOCKET-NAME, INTR-STR)
< client : TickClient |
state : wait,
internal : [ {C} in time T ],
socket-name : SOCKET-NAME > )
=>
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commwrap( <> < client : TickClient |
state : run,
internal : [
{tick(C, recv->rat(INTR-STR)) recv->conf(INTR-STR)}
in time recv->rat(INTR-STR) in time T
],
socket-name : SOCKET-NAME > ) .
6.4 Case Studies
The model execution framework works for all Real-Time Maude specifications that use only one tick rule.
Since the Command Shaper Pattern described in Section 4.2 was specified in this manner, we can directly
use instances of the pattern to validate our Real-Time Maude emulation capabilities.
6.4.1 Pacemaker Simulation Case Study
We first apply the Command Shaper to the pacemaker pattern described in Section 4.3.5. Recall, the final
wrapper object provided by the pattern is something of the form:
(tomod PARAM-PACEMAKER is pr EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC{Safe-Pacer} ...
eq wrapper-init =
< pacing-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pacer} |
inside :
< pacing-module : Pacing-Module |
nextPace : t(0),
period : safe-dur >,
val : safe-dur,
next-val : safe-dur,
disp : t(period),
stress-intervals : (nil).Event-Log{Stress-Relax} > .
... endtom)
The wrapper is placed around a pacing module, and the initial pacing rate is set as the default safe-
duration (safe-dur is 750 ms or 80 heart beats per minute). We have of course verified this instantiation
in Section 4.3.5. However, with the power of the model emulation framework, we can immediately use this
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specification to run with an actual pacemaker. In this paper we demonstrate this emulation capability not
on an actual pacemaker but on a pacemaker simulator (a Java widget that receives messages about when
to pace and draws a simple line graph resembling an ECG trace). Before the system can be emulated with
the pacemaker simulator, some interface information must be provided. The entire module providing all the
necessary interface information is shown below:
(mod CREATE-TICKER is
inc PARAM-PACEMAKER .
inc TIME-CLIENT .
inc SEND-RECEIVE-CLIENT .
eq addr = "localhost" .
eq port = 4444 .
eq def-te = 1 .
eq max-te = INF .
eq time-grain = 10 . --- milliseconds
op pacer-client : -> Oid .
eq internal = wrapper-init .
eq out-adapter(shock)
= createSendReceiveClient(pacer-client, "localhost", 4451, "shock") .
eq in-adapter(msg-received(pacer-client, "shocked\n"))
= set-period(pacing-module, 50) .
endm)
The module first indicates that the TCP socket interface to the pacemaker simulator is localhost on port
4444. The default time elapse for one tick is 1 time unit. The maximum time elapse for one tick step
is infinity (i.e. there is no maximum). The duration of one time unit is 10 milliseconds. The time units
are in terms of milliseconds since the minimum time granularity provided by the Java time interfaces is 1
millisecond.
The equation for internal specifies that the internal configuration to be executed is the configuration
defined by wrapper-init (as defined in PARAM-PACEMAKER). Also, the last two equations specify that the
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Figure 6.4: Trace from Pacemaker Simulator
output message shock should be mapped to a string “shock” sent over the socket, and upon receiving the
acknowledgment message “shocked” set the pacing period to 500 ms (120 bpm - a really fast heart rate). The
last equation creates the scenario where a stressful heart rate is always being sent to the pacing module. Since
the command shaper pattern should prevent this unsafe behavior, we should see the pacing automatically
slow down from 120 bpm after some time interval.
The module is executed by first reflecting the CREATE-TICKER module down to Core Maude (with the
command show all CREATE-TICKER), and executing with the erew command. A snapshot of the “ECG”
trace of the pacemaker simulator is show in Figure 6.4. For validation we measured the jitter for executing
such a system – the physical time required to completely execute 0-time rules and finish communication
(Figure 6.5). The results were obtained from a 1.67 GHz Dual-Core Intel Centrino with Maude running in
Windows through Cygwin (tracing was turned off). The main thing to notice is that the jitter is mostly
below 0.1 seconds and almost never exceeds 0.2 seconds. This amount of jitter is tolerable, since most
medical devices need to respond in the order of seconds. The pacemaker is a bit more strict in terms of its
timing requirements. To evaluate the suitability for the pacemaker, we plotted the recorded physical time
duration between pacing events (Figure 6.6). Notice that in this example the heart rate increases (duration
decreases) up to a limit and then the heart rate starts to decrease (duration increases) and the cycle repeats.
The jitter in control seems tolerable, since there are no sharp spikes in the graph of the pacing durations.
6.4.2 Syringe Pump Case Study
The pacemaker emulation example was demonstrated through a simulated pacemaker, mostly because cur-
rent pacemakers do not have external interfaces for setting when to pace (and rightly so). However, for
devices such as electronic syringe pumps these interfaces are available. Recall our instantiated pump from
4.3.5 summarized below:
(tomod PARAM-PUMP is
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Figure 6.5: Model Execution Jitter Distribution
Figure 6.6: Pacing periods recorded by the pacemaker simulator (jitter effects are reflected by noise on the
curve)
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pr EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC{Safe-Pump} .
pr DELAY-MSG .
...
eq msgs-init =
delay(set-mode(pump-module, bolus), t(9))
delay(set-mode(pump-module, bolus), t(11))
delay(set-mode(pump-module, bolus), t(12)) ... .
eq wrapper-init =
< pump-module : EPR-Wrapper{Safe-Pump} |
inside :
< pump-module : Pump-Module |
mode : base
> base,
val : base,
next-val : base,
disp : t(period),
stress-intervals : (nil).Stress-Relax-Log > .
... endtom)
This module shows the initialized wrapper object for the pump, with the initial state being the base rate
of infusion. Furthermore, there is also a set of delayed messages that will be sent to the pump. In the term
msgs-init, the model will send bolus requests at 9 time units, 11 time units, 12 time units, . . . after the
start of execution for the system. Again, creating a simulated patient model, we can verified the safety of
the instantiated pattern in Section 4.3.5. Instantiating the pump is similar to instantiating the pacemaker,
except that there are a few more types of output messages.
(mod CREATE-TICKER is
inc PARAM-PUMP .
inc TIME-CLIENT .
inc SEND-RECEIVE-CLIENT .
eq addr = "localhost" .
eq port = 4444 .
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eq def-te = 1 .
eq max-te = INF .
eq time-grain = 1000 . --- milliseconds
ops pump-client pump-client’ : -> Oid .
eq internal = wrapper-init msgs-init .
eq out-adapter(stop)
= createSendReceiveClient(pump-client, "localhost", 1234, "STP") .
eq out-adapter(base)
= createSendReceiveClient(pump-client, "localhost", 1234, "RAT1")
createSendReceiveClient(pump-client’, "localhost", 1234, "RUN") .
eq out-adapter(bolus)
= createSendReceiveClient(pump-client, "localhost", 1234, "RAT2")
createSendReceiveClient(pump-client’, "localhost", 1234, "RUN") .
var S : String .
eq in-adapter(msg-received(pump-client, S))
= none .
eq in-adapter(msg-received(pump-client’, S))
= none .
endm)
The model is communicating with localhost on port 4444. The time granularity is 1 second. The internal
configuration being executed is the wrapped pump as well as the set of messages that will deliver bolus
requests. The output requests are handled by a Java thread listening on port 1234 and forwarding the
request string to the actual Multi-Phaser NE-500 Syringe Pump (Figure 6.7). A few important requests to
the pump are: STP stop the pump, RAT <n> set infusion rate to n ml/hr, RUN start the infusion. Reflecting
down the CREATE-TICKER module and executing with erew will now control the physical pump motor!
As a validation for correct pump control, we used a Salter Brecknell 7010SB scale to weigh the amount
of liquid infused from the syringe pump over time (Figure 6.8). The data granularity is a bit rough, since
the scale can only measure within a precision of 0.1 oz. For this example, to clearly distinguish between
two pump states, we let the base rate of infusion be zero (horizontal parts of the graph) and the bolus rate
be the maximum infusion rate provided by the pump (positive sloped parts of the graph). Bolus requests
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Figure 6.7: Multi-Phaser NE-500 Syringe Pump
Figure 6.8: Infusion Volume over Time
are continuously sent to the pump. The safety properties require that bolus doses last no longer than 30
seconds, and there must be 10 seconds between bolus doses and at most 3 bolus doses for a window size of
3 minutes. The graph validates that these properties are indeed satisfied for this particular execution of the
pump.
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Chapter 7
Related Works
This dissertation describes specific examples of formal patterns for medical systems. It is thus natural to
discuss the related works in: (1) application of formal methods to medical systems and software, and (2)
formal specification and verification of software patterns.
7.1 Formal Methods and Medical Systems
Medical systems have always been quite simple when compared to other safety critical systems such as
avionics or nuclear power plants. However, the infamous set of accidents cause by overdosage in the radiation
therapy machine Therac-25 [31] immediately brought the issue of medical device safety to the attention of
the entire world. This later let to work in formal specifications of radiation therapy machines [25] creating
a domain specific language, and the synthesis of safety interlocks based on these specifications [24].
Controlling dosage has always been the a critical and prevalent aspect in most medical systems. The
formal specification and analysis of CARA (computer-aided resusitation algoritm) was done simultaneously
by different research groups at UPenn [7] and Stony Brook [45] using different specification techniques and
verification tools. This later led to the development of formal specification for infusion pumps in general
[10][27][53]. Further work has also been done at UPenn in building medical plug-and-play prototypes along
with modeling and verification [9][8].
Pacemaker safety has also been emphasized in the recent years. The Software Quality and Research
Laboratory (SQRL) at McMaster University issued the Pacemaker Formal Methods Challenge to formally
specify and verify an entire pacemaker [32]. Currently, no research group has completed a full specification
and verification of the pacemaker challenge, but researchers at UPenn have used it as a case study to explore
model-driven design [26]. Aside form safety concerns, recent works have also brought the issue of pacemaker
security into the spotlight [22]. Formal methods work has also been done in this area in terms of modeling
systems and attackers in the medical domain [11].
On the source code level, static verification techniques have also been proposed for medical software bugs
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in industrial scale software [28], and also put into practice at the FDA.
Our medical examples that we used to motivate our command-shaper pattern are heavily influenced by
the case studies and challenges found in the related works above. We improved our understanding of infusion
pump requirements through work on the GIP, and we improved our understanding of pacemaker systems
by the resources provided to us by SQRL. That being said, all these related works model and verify these
systems individually and separately. We go one step further and describe patterns of software design that
can be applied to multiple systems.
Our pattern on network safety is closely related to [30], which also describes a network pattern to
handle disconnects. However the protocol described in [30] does not lend itself to having any simple formal
specification, and we have chosen to present a much cleaner heartbeat pattern for specification and analysis.
7.2 Formal Methods and Software Patterns
The terminology of software patterns became widely adopted with the Gang of Four (GoF) book [21]. Of
course, this later spawned some famous follow up works [13, 48] that design entire systems only around the
concept of patterns. In these works, patterns have always been a tool for modularity and portablity of code.
Since patterns were so widely used and many times incorrectly, it was natural to have extensive works on
formalizing design patterns [4, 39, 47, 20, 51, 49, 18, 2]. These mostly focus on the original GoF patterns of
which many are just structural without any behavior. In this dissertation, we solely focus on patterns that
have behavior and ones that can satisfy predefined safety properties. This clearly restricts our patterns to
be much smaller than the GoF design patterns, but in turn, we can provide more safety guarantees.
The use of parameterized modules to define patterns is also related to the idea of assume-guarantee
aspects of patterns [38]. That is properties that we prove for a pattern, guarantees, will hold if the pattern is
instantiated with a proper input. Thus, our work is also related to the plethera works on assume/guarantee
reasoning [15, 1, 41, 52]. Of course, our work is not about this specific reasoning technique but about how
to apply this technique to create useful patterns in medical systems.
There have also been similar works describing other patterns in other domains such as virtual synchrony
in avionic systems [40, 35] and DoS protection for network security [14, 29, 6]. A general survey of various
patterns related to distributed systems can be found in [33].
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
We have demonstrated that formal patterns are not only possible to describe in the simple and executable
language of rewriting logic. We have also demonstarted that it is also very practical to use them for medical
device safety. In all of our patterns, the actual pattern module description did not exceed 20 rewrite rules.
Although our patterns are simple for a first attempt at tackling formal specification of patterns, they are
still quite useful and practical for many systems. The point of using patterns is modularity and reusability.
That is, patterns offer the hope of making larger, and more complex systems decomposable into simpler and
smaller systems by application of these formal patterns. Of course, one could ask the question of whether
it is necessary to describe such simple patterns like button debouncers in such rigorous detail. First, formal
patterns, even when not yet proven correct, force us to be precise in describing a system. Furthermore, even
simple patterns are worthwhile to specify in detail, especially if they occur often. As we have shown in the
example of the message repeater pattern, the first and most intuitive design can easily be incorrect or at
least can reveal the implicit assumptions that we have made with these systems. Of course, all specifications
are inevitably bound to a representation. Just as design patterns are bound to object-oriented systems,
our current design patterns are bound to actor models. The actor models provide a lot of flexiblity and
provide a very general model of concurrency. However, real systems may be much more deterministic that
actor models. For example, the button interface patterns are actually solved mostly at a level close to the
hardware, which does not actually require the full nondeterminism offered by the actor model. Just as
implementing and executing any algorithm requires choosing a particular programming language, specifying
a pattern requires choosing a particular modeling paradigm. While this is a current limitation, we imagine
that with more research in formal patterns, more general models of computation designed specifically with
pattern specification in mind will emerge and allow more general patterns to be specified.
Within the confined framework and scope in which we have formally specified our patterns, we have
successfully shown that many patterns can be formally specified using the established theories and frame-
works of parameterized modules. Furthermore, we have shown how the parameterized modules are detailed
enough to allow proof of generic safety properties or generic bisimulation results. Most of our patterns
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can be seen as simple wrappers around objects that try to preserve certain behaviors, and their proofs of
correctness are reasonably straightforward. However, it is worth remembering that the proofs apply in very
generic contexts, since they are completely parameterized and the properties hold in any bisimulation. This
means that repeated composition of many patterns that preserve assumptions and preconditions will allow
the development of a large system that satisfies all the proven properties. Not only does this provide a new
way of decomposing requirements of a system in a very effective manner, but it also provides the knowledge
of when a system can be reused confidently and safely.
This dissertation presents a small but important start for exploring how formal patterns can be applied
to the domain of medical systems. It is my hope that the many limitations of this work can be addressed
in the future. We make many ideal assumptions such as having perfect clock synchronization between
different medical devices. For future work, it would be important to explore the effects of clock skew during
synchronization and how this can affect the model and design of the patterns described. Also, since we
leverage our models on the power of the existing Maude rewriting logic framework, it was natural for us to
use object-oriented actor models to describe system behaviors. However, these abstractions may need to be
changed to model accurately the faults that occur in hardware designed systems that have less flexibility in
the behaviors and interfaces of components and more parallel and synchronized communication methods.
Furthermore, the case studies in this work are currently still limited, and we will of course need to apply our
patterns to more complex modelled systems, such as the Generic Infusion Pump model described in [10].
And naturally, applying patterns to larger systems would require composition of many smaller patterns.
While some patterns that provide full bisimulation results can be trivially composed, other patterns need
much more consideration in order to be composed correctly to preserve the required safety properties. This
highly nontrivial problem of pattern composition is one of the major challenges that must be addressed in
future work before formal patterns can be ubiquitously used in larger scale medical systems.
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Appendix A
Complete Maude Specifications of
Models Used
A.1 Basic Modeling
A.1.1 Time Advancement Semantics
The formal model of any timed system starts by defining the notion of time advancement. We use the
conventions used in the Real-Time Maude documentation[43] to ensure deterministic timed rewriting without
missing any critical timed events. The tick operation defines how to advance a system by certain time
durations, and the mte operation defines the maximum time elapse that can be used to ensure no critical
intermediate states are missed. These concepts are specified more precisely in the TICK-MTE-SEM module:
(tomod TICK-MTE-SEM is inc LTIME-INF .
op tick : Configuration Time -> Configuration .
op mte : Configuration -> TimeInf .
var C : Configuration .
var T T’ : TimeInf .
crl [advance] : {C} => {tick(C, T)} in time T if T le mte(C) [nonexec] .
var NC NC’ : NEConfiguration .
eq mte(none) = INF .
eq mte(NC NC’) = minimum(mte(NC), mte(NC’)) .
eq mte(NC) = zero [owise] .
eq tick(none, T) = none .
eq tick(NC NC’, T) = tick(NC, T) tick(NC’, T) .
op hasMsg? : Configuration -> Bool .
eq hasMsg?(none) = false .
eq hasMsg?(NC NC’) = hasMsg?(NC) or hasMsg?(NC’) .
eq hasMsg?(M:Msg) = true .
eq hasMsg?(O:Object) = false .
endtom)
The tick operator and mte (maximum time elapsible) are used to provide deterministic semantics or
the advance rule (tick rule). We also define hasMsg? to test when a configuration contains no messages.
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Notice at this point, we have not specified any particular model of time (natural number time, rational
number time, etc.), and we try to maintain the generality until specific models need to be defined. Notice
that the maximum time elapse (mte) of a configuration is the mte of the component with minimal mte in
the configuration. Any component with undefined mte will be assumed to have zero mte, and time will not
be able to advance in that case. This is useful, because for messages that must be delivered instantaneously,
time will not advance until the message disappears (is delivered) in the system. Also, tick rules work by
ticking each individual component of the configuration (without using any context information) if the mte
of the entire system is greater than zero.
A.1.2 Real-Time Components
After defining the semantics of time advancement, we define some typical building blocks for real-time
systems. These include clocks and timers. Clocks encapsulate time values that are monotonically non-
decreasing over time. Clocks can be either running or stopped. A running clock will advance its internal
time by the same amount as the time advanced, and a stopped clock will hold its internal time constant
over time. Timers encapsulate time values that are monotonically decreasing over time. A timer continues
to decrease the encapsulated time by a value equal to the time advancement, and system time is no longer
allowed to decrease when a timer’s encapsulated time value reaches zero. It is assumed that some significant
event happens at the time a timer reaches zero, and the event will instantaneously influence the state of the
system before any further time advances. The module RT-COMP defines these notions:
(fmod RT-COMP is inc LTIME-INF .
sorts RT-Comp Clock ClockAttr Timer .
subsorts Clock Timer < RT-Comp .
ops run stop : -> ClockAttr [ctor] .
op c : Time ClockAttr -> Clock [ctor] .
op t : Time -> Timer [ctor] .
op clock0 : -> Clock . --- started clock
op timer0 : -> Timer . --- expired timer
ops stop run : Clock -> Clock .
op stopped? : Clock -> Bool .
op value : Clock -> Time .
op no-timer : -> Timer .
var T T’ : Time .
var CA : ClockAttr .
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eq mte(no-timer) = INF .
eq tick(no-timer, T) = no-timer .
eq clock0 = c(zero, run) .
eq timer0 = t(zero) .
eq stop(c(T, CA)) = c(T, stop) .
eq run(c(T, CA)) = c(T, run) .
eq stopped?(c(T, stop)) = true .
eq stopped?(c(T, run)) = false .
eq value(c(T, CA)) = T .
op tick : RT-Comp Time -> RT-Comp .
op tick : Clock Time -> Clock .
op tick : Timer Time -> Timer .
eq tick(c(T, run), T’) = c(T plus T’, run) .
eq tick(c(T, stop), T’) = c(T, stop) .
eq tick(t(T), T’) = t(T monus T’) .
op mte : RT-Comp -> Time .
op mte : Clock -> Time .
op mte : Timer -> Time .
eq mte(c(T, CA)) = INF .
eq mte(t(T)) = T .
endfm)
A.1.3 Delayed Messages
It is useful to have a notion of delayed messages. Essentially messages wrapped inside an operator with a
timer, and the message is delivered (wrapper operator removed) once the timer expires. Not only does this
allow modeling communication delay, but this is also necessary as to set inital states of systems that receive
inputs over time. Aside from modeling messages with fixed delay, we also define the notion of a TimeSet
that can model nondeterministic message delay that can take any delay out of a set of times.
(tomod DELAY-MSG is
inc TICK-MTE-SEM .
pr RT-COMP .
sort DelayedMsg .
subsort DelayedMsg < Msg .
sort TimeSet .
subsort Time < TimeSet .
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op __ : TimeSet TimeSet -> TimeSet [assoc comm] .
op delay : Msg Timer -> DelayedMsg [ctor frozen] .
op delay : Msg TimeSet -> DelayedMsg [frozen] .
var M : Msg . var TM : Timer .
var T : Time .
ceq delay(M, TM) = M if TM == timer0 .
eq tick(delay(M, TM), T) = delay(M, tick(TM, T)) .
eq mte(delay(M, TM)) = mte(TM) .
var TS : TimeSet .
eq mte(delay(M, TS)) = zero .
rl delay(M, T TS) => delay(M, t(T)) .
rl delay(M, T) => delay(M, t(T)) .
endtom)
Delayed messages, are messages wrapped in a delay operator such that they are completely frozen until
the delay timer runs out. This is useful for modeling communication delays as well as just to test inputs
over time. Delayed messages can also take nondeterministic delays, where the messages may be delayed by
any time in a set of possible times.
A.1.4 Event Logs
Naturally, the notion of safety in real-time systems may also depend on the behavior of systems over time.
While we can use tools for timed temporal model checking, the counter examples found are quite convoluted
to parse and understand. Furthermore, our systems are much simpler and mostly deterministic given a set
of initial conditions (the only non-determinism comes from faults). Thus, it is easier for us to keep a log of
events over time, and evaluate the safety properties as a predicate on these logs. Essentially this keeps a
running history of the system in its current state, and this allows us to evaluate time related properties as
just a predicate defined on the current state. Usually history is recorded based on a set of discrete events
over time.
(fmod EVENT-LOG{E :: TRIV * (sort Elt to |EventType|)} is pr RT-COMP .
sorts NoEventType{E} EventType{E} Event{E} .
sorts !MtLog StoppedEventLog{E} EventLog{E} .
subsorts E$|EventType| NoEventType{E} < EventType{E} .
subsorts !MtLog < StoppedEventLog{E} < EventLog{E} < RT-Comp .
op !none : -> NoEventType{E} [ctor] .
op !e : E$|EventType| Clock -> Event{E} [ctor] .
op type : Event{E} -> E$|EventType| .
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op elapsed : Event{E} -> Time .
op stop : Event{E} -> Event{E} .
op stopped? : Event{E} -> Bool .
op tick : Event{E} Time -> Event{E} .
op mte : Event{E} -> Time .
var EV : Event{E} . var ET : E$|EventType| .
var C : Clock . var L L’ : EventLog{E} .
var SL : StoppedEventLog{E} .
var T T’ : Time .
eq type(!e(ET, C)) = ET .
eq elapsed(!e(ET, C)) = value(C) .
eq stop(!e(ET, C)) = !e(ET, stop(C)) .
eq stopped?(!e(ET, C)) = stopped?(C) .
eq tick(!e(ET, C), T) = !e(ET, tick(C, T)) .
eq mte(!e(ET, C)) = mte(C) .
op !nil : -> !MtLog [ctor] .
op __ : Event{E} StoppedEventLog{E} -> EventLog{E} [ctor] .
op stop : !MtLog -> !MtLog .
op stop : EventLog{E} -> StoppedEventLog{E} .
op append : !MtLog !MtLog -> !MtLog .
op append : EventLog{E} StoppedEventLog{E} -> EventLog{E} .
cmb EV SL : StoppedEventLog{E} if stopped?(EV) .
op log : !MtLog NoEventType{E} -> !MtLog .
op log : EventLog{E} EventType{E} -> EventLog{E} .
op tick : !MtLog Time -> !MtLog .
op tick : EventLog{E} Time -> EventLog{E} .
op mte : EventLog{E} -> Time .
eq stop(!nil) = !nil .
eq stop(EV L) = stop(EV) stop(L) .
eq append(!nil, L) = L .
eq append(EV L , L’) = EV append(L, L’) .
eq log(L, !none) = L .
eq log(L, ET) = !e(ET, clock0) stop(L) [owise] .
eq tick(!nil, T) = !nil .
--- only the latest event needs to be ticked
--- remaining event clocks are stopped
eq tick(EV L, T) = tick(EV, T) L .
eq mte(!nil) = INF .
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eq mte(EV L) = mte(EV) .
endfm)
A.2 Button Related Patterns
A.2.1 Button Press Model
The first step to modeling button related patterns is to understand how to model a button over time. A
button can be modeled as a set of press and release events over time. Notice the similarity between the
button press model and event log models. However, these are ultimately different in that the button press
model is not used for execution and will be processed as an input. So even though button models and event
logs are both timed list, they are used differently (e.g. button press model uses absolute time instead of
relative time), and we create a separate model.
(fmod PRESS-RELEASE is inc LTIME-INF .
inc CONVERSION .
sorts Press Release .
sort Event .
subsort Press Release < Event .
sort PressReleaseList .
sorts MtList PressLastList ReleaseLastList .
subsort MtList < PressLastList ReleaseLastList .
subsorts PressLastList < PressReleaseList .
subsorts ReleaseLastList < PressReleaseList .
sort Input .
subsort PressReleaseList < Input .
op press : Time -> Press .
op release : Time -> Release .
op nil : -> MtList .
op __ : PressLastList Release -> ReleaseLastList .
op __ : ReleaseLastList Press -> PressLastList .
var L : PressReleaseList .
var T : Time .
op t-last : PressReleaseList -> Time .
eq t-last(nil) = zero .
eq t-last(L press(T)) = T .
eq t-last(L release(T)) = T .
op valid? : PressReleaseList -> Bool .
eq valid?(nil) = true .
eq valid?(L press(T)) = valid?(L) and (t-last(L) lt T) .
eq valid?(L release(T)) = valid?(L) and (t-last(L) lt T) .
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var L’ : PressReleaseList .
var E : Event .
op _->_ : PressReleaseList PressReleaseList ~> PressReleaseList .
op _->_ : Event PressReleaseList ~> PressReleaseList .
eq L -> nil = L .
eq L -> (L’ E) = (L -> L’) E .
eq E -> L = (nil E) -> L .
op length : Input -> Nat .
eq length(nil) = 0 .
eq length(L E) = s length(L) .
endfm)
After defining button input as a list, we can also convert this list to a set of delayed messages for defining
the initial state of inputs in an actor model.
(tomod PRESS-RELEASE-MSGS is inc PRESS-RELEASE .
inc DELAY-MSG .
op to-msgs : PressReleaseList Oid -> Configuration .
msgs press release : Oid -> Msg .
var L : PressReleaseList .
var O : Oid .
var T : Time .
eq to-msgs(nil, O) = none .
eq to-msgs(L press(T), O) = to-msgs(L,O) delay(press(O), t(T)) .
eq to-msgs(L release(T), O) = to-msgs(L,O) delay(release(O), t(T)) .
endtom)
A.2.2 Button Fault Models
We can also use the model of button presses to define fault relations for the inputs.
(fmod BUTTON-FAULTS is pr PRESS-RELEASE .
vars T T’ : Time .
vars R R’ : Time .
vars I I’ I’’ : Input .
op sub-event : Press Input -> Bool .
op sub-event : Release Input -> Bool .
eq sub-event(press(T), nil) = false .
eq sub-event(press(T), I release(T’)) = sub-event(press(T),I) .
eq sub-event(press(T), I press(T’)) = (T == T’) or sub-event(press(T),I) .
eq sub-event(release(T), nil) = false .
eq sub-event(release(T), I press(T’)) = sub-event(release(T),I) .
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eq sub-event(release(T), I release(T’)) = (T == T’) or sub-event(release(T),I) .
op sub-input : Input Input -> Bool .
eq sub-input(nil, I’) = true .
eq sub-input(I press(T), I’) = sub-input(I,I’) and sub-event(press(T), I’) .
eq sub-input(I release(T), I’) = sub-input(I,I’) and sub-event(release(T), I’) .
op same-input : Input Input -> Bool .
eq same-input(I,I’) = sub-input(I,I’) and sub-input(I’,I) .
op bounce-duration : -> Time .
op space-duration : -> Time .
op bounce-fault : Input Input -> Bool .
eq bounce-fault(nil,nil) = true .
eq bounce-fault(I release(T),I’) = bounce-fault(I,I’) .
eq bounce-fault(I, I’ release(T)) = bounce-fault(I,I’) .
eq bounce-fault(I press(T), I’ press(T)) = bounce-fault(I,I’) .
ceq bounce-fault(I press(T), I’ press(T’)) = bounce-fault(I, I’ press(T’))
if T le (T’ plus bounce-duration) /\ T gt T’ .
eq bounce-fault(I,I’) = false [owise] .
op stuck-duration : -> Time .
op stuck-fault : Input Input -> Bool .
eq stuck-fault(nil,nil) = true .
eq stuck-fault(I release(T), I’) = same-input(I release(T), I’) .
eq stuck-fault(I press(T), I’ release(T’)) = stuck-fault(I press(T), I’) .
ceq stuck-fault(I, I’) = same-input(I,I’) or stuck-fault(I,I’’)
if I’’ release(T) press(T’) := I’ .
eq stuck-fault(I, I’) = false [owise] .
op phantom-thresh : -> Time .
op phantom-fault : Input Input -> Bool .
eq phantom-fault(nil, nil) = true .
eq phantom-fault(I press(T), I’ press(T)) = phantom-fault(I,I’) .
eq phantom-fault(I press(T) release(T’), I’ press(T) release(T’)) = phantom-fault(I,I’) .
ceq phantom-fault(I press(T) release(T’), I’ press(R) release(R’)) = phantom-fault(I,I’ press(R) release(R’))
if T gt R’ /\ T’ lt (T plus phantom-thresh) .
eq phantom-fault(I,I’) = false [owise] .
endfm)
A.2.3 Debouncer Pattern
This is the full specification of the Debouncer Pattern described in detail in Section 3.3.3.
(oth DEBOUNCED is
pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
class |Wrapped| .
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op |dest| : Msg -> Oid .
op |t-bounce| : -> Time .
op |t-space| : -> Time .
eq |t-bounce| lt |t-space| = true .
msg |press| : Oid -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
eq mte(|press|(O)) = zero .
--- assumes that all messages sent to external objects are of sort |OutMsg|
endoth)
(tomod DEBOUNCER{|O| :: DEBOUNCED} is
pr RT-COMP .
pr DELAY-MSG .
class !Debouncer{|O|} |
inside : NEConfiguration,
timer : Timer .
op init-timer : -> Timer .
eq init-timer = no-timer .
vars T : Time .
var O : Oid .
var TM : Timer .
vars C C’ : NEConfiguration .
op get-inside : Object ~> Configuration [frozen] .
eq get-inside(< O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C >)
= C .
op pi-inside : Configuration -> Configuration .
eq pi-inside(C C’) = pi-inside(C) pi-inside(C’) .
eq pi-inside(< O : !Debouncer{|O|} | >) = get-inside(< O : !Debouncer{|O|} | >) .
eq pi-inside(C) = C [owise] .
eq tick(
< O : !Debouncer{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >,
T)
=
< O : !Debouncer{|O|} |
inside : tick(C, T),
timer : tick(TM, T) > .
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eq mte(
< O : !Debouncer{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >)
=
minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
rl |press|(O) < O : !Debouncer{|O|} |
timer : no-timer,
inside : C >
=>
< O : !Debouncer{|O|} |
timer : t(|t-space|),
inside : |press|(O) C > .
crl |press|(O) < O : !Debouncer{|O|} |
timer : TM, inside : C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C >
if TM =/= timer0 /\ TM =/= no-timer .
crl < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : TM >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | timer : no-timer >
if TM == timer0 .
var IM OM : Msg .
crl IM < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : IM C >
if |dest|(IM) == O /\ IM =/= |press|(O) .
crl < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : OM C >
=> < O : !Debouncer{|O|} | inside : C > OM
if |dest|(OM) =/= O .
endtom)
A.2.4 Dephantomizer Pattern
This is the full specification of the Dephantomizer Pattern described in Section 3.4.1.
(oth PHANTOMABLE is
pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
class |Wrapped| .
op |dest| : Msg -> Oid .
op |t-phantom| : -> Time .
msg |press| : Oid -> Msg .
msg |release| : Oid -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
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eq mte(|press|(O)) = zero .
endoth)
(tomod DEPHANTOMIZER{|O| :: PHANTOMABLE} is
pr RT-COMP .
pr DELAY-MSG .
class !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : NEConfiguration,
timer : Timer .
op init-timer : -> Timer .
eq init-timer = no-timer .
vars T : Time .
var O : Oid .
var TM : Timer .
var C : Configuration .
eq tick(
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >,
T)
=
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : tick(C, T),
timer : tick(TM, T) > .
eq mte(
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >)
=
minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
rl [set-timer] : |press|(O) < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : no-timer >
=>
< O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : t(|t-phantom|)
> .
rl [non-phantom-release] : |release|(O) < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : no-timer, inside : C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
inside : |release|(O) C > .
crl [phantom-release] : |release|(O) < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} |
timer : TM >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | timer : no-timer >
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if TM =/= timer0 /\ TM =/= no-timer .
crl [reset-timer] : < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | timer : TM, inside : C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | timer : no-timer, inside : |press|(O) C >
if TM == timer0 .
var IM OM : Msg .
crl [forward-in] : IM < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : IM C >
if |dest|(IM) == O /\ IM =/= |press|(O) /\ IM =/= |release|(O) .
crl [forward-out] : < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : OM C >
=> < O : !PhantomIgnore{|O|} | inside : C > OM
if |dest|(OM) =/= O .
endtom)
A.2.5 Stuck Detection Pattern
This is the full specification of the stuck detection pattern described in Section 3.5.
(oth STUCKABLE is
pr TICK-MTE-SEM .
class |Wrapped| .
op |dest| : Msg -> Oid .
op |t-stuck| : -> Time .
msg |press| : Oid -> Msg .
msg |release| : Oid -> Msg .
var O : Oid .
eq mte(|press|(O)) = zero .
endoth)
(tomod STUCK-DETECT{|O| :: STUCKABLE} is
pr RT-COMP .
pr DELAY-MSG .
class !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : NEConfiguration,
timer : Timer,
stuck-err : Bool .
op init-timer : -> Timer .
eq init-timer = no-timer .
op init-stuck-err : -> Bool .
eq init-stuck-err = false .
vars T : Time .
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var O : Oid .
var TM : Timer .
var C : Configuration .
eq tick(
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >,
T)
=
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : tick(C, T),
timer : tick(TM, T) > .
eq mte(
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : C, timer : TM >)
=
minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
rl [set-timer] : |press|(O) < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
timer : no-timer,
inside : C >
=>
< O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
timer : t(|t-stuck|),
inside : |press|(O) C > .
rl [release-event] : |release|(O) < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : C >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} |
inside : |release|(O) C,
timer : no-timer,
stuck-err : false > .
crl [stuck-event] : < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | timer : TM >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | timer : no-timer, stuck-err : true >
if TM == timer0 .
var IM OM : Msg .
crl [forward-in] : IM < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : C >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : IM C >
if |dest|(IM) == O /\ IM =/= |press|(O) /\ IM =/= |release|(O) .
crl [forward-out] : < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : OM C >
=> < O : !StuckDetect{|O|} | inside : C > OM
if |dest|(OM) =/= O .
endtom)
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A.3 Command-Shaper Pattern
The input theory for the Command-Shaper Pattern, which describes the stress-relax safety requirements.
(fth SAFE-STATE is
inc TOTAL-ORDER * (
sort Elt to Val,
op _<=_ to _<=risk_
) .
pr STRESS-RELAX-LOG .
ops min-val max-val crit-val safe-val : -> Val .
eq min-val <=risk safe-val = true .
eq safe-val <=risk crit-val = true .
eq crit-val <=risk max-val = true .
op period : -> Time . --- period of wrapper dispatch
op delta : Val Val -> Val .
op tdelta-min : Val Val -> TimeInf .
var V V’ V’’ : Val .
eq [no-delta] : delta(V, V) = V .
ceq [delta-bound] :
((V <=risk V’’) and (V’’ <=risk V’)) or
((V’ <=risk V’’) and (V’’ <=risk V)) = true
if delta(V, V’) = V’’ .
ceq [delta-mono] : delta(V, V’) <=risk delta(V, V’’) = true if V’ <=risk V’’ .
--- ceq [delta-max] : delta(V,V’) = delta(V,V’’) if delta(V,V’) =/= V’ /\ V’ <=risk V’’ .
ceq [delta-max] : (delta(V,V’) == delta(V,V’’)) = true if delta(V,V’) =/= V’ /\ V’ <=risk V’’ .
eq [no-tdelta] : tdelta-min(V, V) = zero .
ceq [ind-tdelta] : tdelta-min(V, V’) = tdelta-min(delta(V,V’), V’) plus period
if V =/= V’ .
ceq [tdelta-mono] : tdelta-min(V’, V) le tdelta-min(V’’, V) = true
if V <=risk V’ /\ V’ <=risk V’’ .
op safe? : Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
op norm : Stress-Relax-Log -> Stress-Relax-Log .
var T T’ : Time .
var CA : ClockAttr .
var SRE : SREvent .
var L L’ : Stress-Relax-Log .
eq [initially-safe] : safe?(nil) = true .
--- instantaneous safety equivalent to safety with stopped time
eq [stopped-safe] : safe?(E(SRE, c(T, CA)) L) =
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safe?(E(SRE, c(T, stop)) L) .
--- safety implies safety of all sub-logs
eq [sub-safe] : safe?(E(SRE, c(T, CA)) L) implies safe?(L) = true .
--- decreasing stress durations preserves safety
ceq [stress-safe] : safe?(E(!stress, c(T’, CA)) L) implies safe?(E(!stress, c(T, CA)) L) = true
if T’ ge T .
--- safety is preserved while in a relaxed state
eq [relax-safe] : safe?(E(!relax, c(T, CA)) L) =
safe?(L) .
--- normalization preserves log structure
--- norm-tick-sort
cmb tick(norm(L), T) : Stress-Relax-Log
if tick(L, T) : Stress-Relax-Log .
--- norm-app-sort
cmb append(L’, stop(norm(L))) : Stress-Relax-Log
if append(L’, stop(L)) : Stress-Relax-Log .
--- normalization preserves safety
eq [norm-tick-safe] : safe?(tick(norm(L), T)) =
safe?(tick(L, T)) .
ceq [norm-log-safe] : safe?(append(L’, stop(norm(L)))) =
safe?(append(L’, stop(L)))
if append(L’, stop(L)) : Stress-Relax-Log .
--- normalization is idempotent
eq [norm-tick] : norm(tick(norm(L), T)) = norm(tick(L, T)) .
eq [norm-app] : norm(append(L’, stop(tick(norm(L), T))))
= norm(append(L’, stop(tick(L, T)))) .
endfth)
The internal wrapped object used by the Command-Shaper is defined as another input theory as follows:
The structural part of the Command-Shaper Pattern is defined as follows:
to enforce the safety defined in the input theory SAFE-STATE is as follows:
(oth WRAPPED-OBJECT is
inc SAFE-STATE .
inc TICK-MTE-SEM .
class Wrapped | set-val : Val .
sort InMsg .
sort OutMsg .
subsorts InMsg OutMsg < Msg .
msg set-val : Oid Val -> InMsg .
var O : Oid .
vars V V’ : Val .
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eq mte(set-val(O, V)) = zero .
rl [wrapped-recv] : set-val(O, V)
< O : Wrapped | set-val : V’ >
=> < O : Wrapped | set-val : V > .
--- assumes that all messages sent to external objects are of sort OutMsg
--- assumes that set-val is the only message of sort InMsg sent from external objects
endoth)
We now describe the behavioral part of the Command-Shaper Pattern to enforce safety constraints
described in SAFE-STATE on the wrapped object defined in WRAPPED-OBJECT:
(tomod EPR-WRAPPER{X :: WRAPPED-OBJECT} is
class EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : NEConfiguration,
next-val : X$Val, val : X$Val, disp : Timer,
stress-intervals : Stress-Relax-Log .
op _get-next-val : Object ~> X$Val [frozen] .
op _get-val : Object ~> X$Val [frozen] .
op _set-next-val_ : Object X$Val ~> Object [frozen] .
op _set-val_ : Object X$Val ~> Object [frozen] .
op _log-stress_ : Object EventType{SREvent} ~> Object [frozen] .
op _norm-stress : Object ~> Object [frozen] .
op _deliver : Object ~> Object [frozen] .
var O : Oid .
var V V’ : X$Val .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
var E : EventType{SREvent} .
var C : NEConfiguration .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : V > get-next-val = V .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V > get-val = V .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : V > set-next-val V’
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : V’ > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V > set-val V’
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | val : V’ > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : L > log-stress E
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : log(L, E) > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : L > norm-stress
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | stress-intervals : norm(L) > .
eq < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C, val : V > deliver
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : (set-val(O, V) C) > .
endtom)
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(fmod WRAPPER-AUX{X :: WRAPPED-OBJECT} is inc EPR-WRAPPER{X} .
op cap : X$Val -> X$Val .
op stress? : X$Val -> Bool .
ops toStress? toRelax? : X$Val X$Val -> Bool .
op inEnv? : X$Val Stress-Relax-Log -> Bool .
var V V’ : X$Val .
ceq cap(V) = min-val if V <=risk min-val .
ceq cap(V) = max-val if max-val <=risk V .
eq cap(V) = V [owise] .
eq stress?(V) = not (V <=risk crit-val) .
eq toStress?(V, V’) = not stress?(V) and stress?(V’) .
eq toRelax?(V, V’) = stress?(V) and not stress?(V’) .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
ceq [inenv-unreachable] : inEnv?(V, L) = false
if tdelta-min(V, crit-val) == INF /\ stress?(V) .
ceq [inenv-stress] : inEnv?(V, L) = safe?(L) and
safe?(log(tick(L, tdelta-min(V, crit-val) plus period), !relax))
if stress?(V) /\ tdelta-min(V, crit-val) :: Time .
ceq [inenv-relax] : inEnv?(V, L) = safe?(L) if not stress?(V) .
endfm)
(tomod EPR-WRAPPER-EXEC{X :: WRAPPED-OBJECT} is
inc WRAPPER-AUX{X} .
op log-entry : X$Val X$Val ~> EventType{SREvent} .
op next-val : Object ~> X$Val [frozen] .
var O : Oid .
var L : Stress-Relax-Log .
var V V’ V’’ : X$Val .
var T T’ : Time .
ceq log-entry(V, V’) = !stress if toStress?(V, V’) .
ceq log-entry(V, V’) = !relax if toRelax?(V, V’) .
eq log-entry(V, V’) = none [owise] .
ceq next-val(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} |
val : V, next-val : V’, stress-intervals : L >)
= delta(V, safe-val)
if not inEnv?(delta(V, V’),
log(L, log-entry(V, delta(V, V’)))) .
ceq next-val(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} |
val : V, next-val : V’, stress-intervals : L >)
= delta(V, V’)
164
if inEnv?(delta(V, V’),
log(L, log-entry(V, delta(V, V’)))) .
var C : NEConfiguration .
var M : X$OutMsg .
crl [dispatch] :
< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} |
disp : t(T), val : V, next-val : V’ >
=> (< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | disp : t(period),
next-val : V’’,
val : V’’
>
log-stress log-entry(V, V’’))
norm-stress deliver
if V’’ := next-val(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | >)
/\ T = zero .
rl [recv] : set-val(O, V) < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | >
=> < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | next-val : cap(V) > .
rl [forward] : < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C M >
=> < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C > M .
eq mte(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} | inside : C, disp : t(T) >)
= minimum(T, mte(C)) .
eq tick(< O : EPR-Wrapper{X} |
stress-intervals : L,
disp : t(T),
inside : C >, T’)
= < O : EPR-Wrapper{X} |
stress-intervals : tick(L, T’),
disp : tick(t(T), T’),
inside : tick(C, T’) > .
endtom)
A.4 Heartbeat Pattern
Here, we provide the full specification of the final correct heartbeat pattern described in Section 5.3.3.
(oth COMM-PAIR is
inc LTIME-INF .
class Sender .
class Receiver .
op dest : Msg -> Oid .
op sid : -> Oid .
op rid : -> Oid .
op repeat-msg? : Msg -> Bool .
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msg safe-msg : Oid -> Msg .
op repeat-time : -> Time .
op timeout : -> Time .
eq repeat-time lt timeout = true .
op init-sender : -> Configuration .
op init-receiver : -> Configuration .
endoth)
(tomod REPEATER{X :: COMM-PAIR} is
pr DELAY-MSG .
class SenderWrap | internal : Configuration, time : Timer,
repeat-msg : Configuration .
class ReceiverWrap | internal : Configuration, time : Timer,
repeat-msg : Configuration .
op repeated : Oid Msg -> Msg .
op repeated? : Msg -> Bool .
vars M M’ : Msg .
var C : Configuration .
var TM : Timer .
var T : Time .
var O : Oid .
eq dest(repeated(O,M)) = O .
eq repeat-msg?(repeated(O,M)) = false .
eq repeated?(repeated(O,M)) = true .
eq repeated?(M) = false [owise] .
eq mte(< sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM >)
= minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
eq mte(< rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >)
= minimum(mte(C), mte(TM)) .
eq tick(< sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM >, T)
= < sid : SenderWrap | internal : tick(C,T), time : tick(TM, T) > .
eq tick(< rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >, T)
= < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : tick(C, T), time : tick(TM, T) > .
op init-sender-wrap : -> Configuration .
eq init-sender-wrap =
< sid : SenderWrap | internal : init-sender, time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none > .
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op init-receiver-wrap : -> Configuration .
eq init-receiver-wrap =
< rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : init-receiver, time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none > .
--- send a nonrepeated message
crl [send-nonrepeat] : < sid : SenderWrap | internal : M C, time : TM >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none > M
if dest(M) =/= sid /\ repeat-msg?(M) == false .
--- send a repeated message
crl [send-repeat] : < sid : SenderWrap | internal : M C, time : TM >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M > M
if dest(M) =/= sid /\ repeat-msg?(M) == true .
--- need dest(M) == rid ???
--- repeat a message
crl [repeat] : < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C, time : TM, repeat-msg : M >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C , time : t(repeat-time),
repeat-msg : M > repeated(dest(M), M)
if TM == timer0 .
--- forward msg to sender
crl [fwd-to-sender] : M < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C >
=> < sid : SenderWrap | internal : C M >
if dest(M) == sid .
--- forward a message that will be repeated
crl [fwd-with-repeat] : M < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C, time : t(timeout),
repeat-msg : M >
if dest(M) == rid /\ repeat-msg?(M) == true .
--- forward a message that is not repeated
crl [fwd-no-repeat] : M < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C, time : no-timer >
if dest(M) == rid /\ repeat-msg?(M) == false /\ repeated?(M) == false .
--- receiving a message repeat that was seen
rl [repeated-seen] : repeated(rid,M) < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM,
repeat-msg : M >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | time : t(timeout) > .
--- receiving a message repeat that was not seen
crl [repeat-not-seen] : repeated(rid,M) < rid : ReceiverWrap | repeat-msg : M’ >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | >
167
if M =/= M’ .
--- repeat message timeout
crl [repeat-timeout] : < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C, time : TM >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : safe-msg(rid) C, time : no-timer,
repeat-msg : none >
if TM == timer0 .
--- forward out from receiver
crl [fwd-from-recv] : < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : M C >
=> < rid : ReceiverWrap | internal : C > M
if dest(M) =/= rid .
endtom)
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